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PREFACE

I present the following material less as discovered
Truth and Reality and more as a personal exploration of the
relationships within knowledge as I have come to construct
and experience them.

Thus, this document is more of an

invitation to the reader to explore the ways that I, at
times quite subjectively, have attempted to construct my
world.

In this regard,

I have always felt that at the heart

of the intellectual enterprise there is net to be found a
mature,

objective adult who carefully scrutinizes the facts

and checks each hypothesis with precison, but more likely a
child playing with building blocks making one structure, and
when that falls, spontaneously beginning the construction of
another without a second thought.

It is this spirit of

"serious play" that I have attempted to cultivate during the
construction of this document.
People are becoming increasingly aware of the degree to
which we all construct our worlds on the basis of our
personal experience.

In some small degree, this work

represents my own attempt to integrate my world, an attempt
to provide answers to questions which have long troubled me.
Only my readers can decide if my answers and the synthesis
they provide are useful for their purposes.

This work was constructed as a complete system, each
part or chapter builds upon the previous c h a p t e r ’s
conclusions.

To aid the reader in keeping some perspective

on this, a summary of the main points of the chapter are
presented on the following page of each chapter in a section
titled:

"OVEBVIEW."

These sections are not intended to

summarize the content of each chapter as much as they are a
distillation of the major points as they form a basis for
the operation of succeeding chapters.

Major conclusions are

presented, not the evidence upon which the conclusions are
based.

For the latter,

the reader is directed to the

content of the chapter pioper.
Chapters IV through VIII relate information about
China.

This inquiry has relied, in assembling this

material, upon secondary sources only.

Therefore, these

sections will include extensive quotations from known
scholars in the area of Chinese studies.

The use of long

quotations, I think, is justified by the fact that I am
limited to secondary sources and I would like to relate as
much of the context for the specific quotation as is
possible.

To establish my case, I feel it necessary to

examine in detail recurrent themes in Chinese knowledge.
Some readers may, at times, find these chapters a bit
ponderous.

Given these circumstances,

the reader may find

the overviews of these chapters helpful in providing
continuity to the work as a whole.

V

This work has taken shape over a number of years.
its structure has evolved and changed,
which this work will be presented.

As

so has the world to

One of these key changes

has been toward a neutrality toward sexual roles.

This

presents certain difficulties because this work was prepared
in a style which relied on the word "man" as its key
referent.
Recently the American Psychological Association

(1977)

has published guidelines for "de-sexing" their professional
publications.
to these

In the following work, I have tried to adhere

guidelines as completely as possible.

Since much

of this manuscript was prepared prior to such an
endorsement,

the reader is asked to tolerate awkward

phrasing at certain points,.
Another change that has occurred is the tendency to
accept as valid knowledge based on personal experience which
can be related in less formal terms.

Even in science,

it is

beginning to be recognized that there is a major personal
component in all that the scientist does.

Perhaps at the

expense of scholarly detachment and scientific objectivity,
the use of the first person will predominate throughout this
document.

This is done less fcr convenience than as a means

of relating a certain guality about the material itself.
In closing,

I would like to acknowledge the support

others have given me over the years,.

First and foremost, I

would like to thank Dr. Frederick b. Jervis whose
intellectual stimulation made the conceptual structure of

this inquiry possible.

I would also like to thank Dr. Peter

S. Fernaid under whose direction the present manuscript was
prepared.

It was cnly through Dr. Fernald's courage and

support that this manuscript can now be submitted as partial
fulfillment for this degree.
I would also like to offer my gratitude to the other
members of my doctoral com m i t t e e , Dr,. R. Valentine Dusek,
Dr. David E. Leary, Dr. Carleton P. Henge, and Dr.
R. Woodward,

who demonstrated sustained interest in this

project and offered constructive criticism.
Chiang,

William

Dr. Hung-Min

while not a member of the doctoral committee, was

gracious enough to give of his time to review a version of
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improvement,

particularly in the sections concerning China.

The technical assistance cf Frank 0. Smith in
proofreading this document and cf David LaBianca in
preparing the photographic materials is most appreciated.
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ABSTRACT
CHINESE AND WESTERN HAN:
A CHALLENGE TO THE ASSUMPTION OF AN INHERENT NATURE
TO HUHAN BEINGS

by
JOSEPH JOHN HIRAEITO
University cf New Hampshire,

1979

This inguiry attempts to challenge the assumption that
human beings have an inherent nature.

Such a program would

appear to be justified by the fact that the current
psychological framework cf human beings appears to have
inherent limitations in its capacity to encompass the human
potentials of people as knowers and as the known.
A theory of frameworks is suggested which views the
limitations or boundary conditions of a framework as the
product of the guestions that are asked and the assumed
context in which they are asked.

From this perspective,

an

analysis is made of the current limitations of the
traditional psychological framework.

It is suggested that

these limitations are the result of the guestions that the
psychologist asks which are, in turn, limited by the
assumption that human beings have an inherent nature.

xii

xiii

A survey is made of traditional methods in respect to
their appropriateness for challenging this assumption.
Finding these methods inappropriate, the Method of
Alternative Assumed Contexts for Questioning is constructed
which bases its operation on the generation of alternative
assumed contexts,
context,

the asking cf the same question in each

and examining the consequences in the alternative

frameworks.
Alternative assumed contexts are presented for
Traditional China and the west.

The assumption of unity is

suggested as underlying the Chinese framework,

while the

inverse assumption of divisibility is presented for the
West.

These alternative assumed contexts produce a

different process cf questioning in each framework.

These

alternative frameworks have consequences in the way human
beings experience and function.

The traditional Chinese

experienced and functioned within a context of unity, and
hence tended to unify what is in the West assumed to be
divided.

Specific examples are given in each of three

areas: experience and functioning toward Nature, toward
others and toward the self.

Finally, the areas themselves

are shown to be unified and to be the product of a process
of questioning based on unity.
The relation between the process of questioning and the
consequent experience and function of people is presented as
a challenge to the assumption cf an inherent nature to human
beings.

The results suggest that much of what we view as

"inherent” in human beings is a function of viewing them
from a singular process of questioning.

Skepticism is

expressed about the prospects cf constructing a complete
framework based on the assumption cf an inherent human
nature.
The results also generate an alternative assumed
context which views human nature as a product of the process
of questioning through which it is viewed.

This alternative

is used as a basis for dealing with the central problem of
encompassing human potentials.

Within the alternative

suggested, human beings, as the known, construct their own
potentials from their process cf questioning,

with these

potentials being limited only by the fact that they must
remain within some process of guesticning,.

Likewise, the

potentials of the human being as a knower are equally
contained within this very same process and have the same
limitations and potentials as the human being who is known.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Kuhn

(1962)

has suggested that the development of

scientific knowledge is a discontinuous, revolutionary
process,

which involves the challenging of traditional modes

of operation and the substitution of an entirely new
framework..

The revolution involves the transcendence of the

current paradigm,

which has served to guide intellectual

activity, in favor of a new paradigm which provides an
alternative orientation.
This notion of the revolution of a paradigm as the
central process of the development in scientific knowledge
challenges traditional biases toward viewing the development
of knowledge as a continuous process where knowledge is
expanded almost in an ate sic manner,

where false assertions

about the nature cf the world are continually and additively
replaced by true assertions.

Within this view, the paradigm

or field of discourse within which the assertions are made
is not challenged:
assertions,

only the content of the paradigm, the

are challenged.

Kuhn does make provision for non-paradigmatic change
within his model.

During non-revolutionary periods, there

is “normal science,"
solving."

where the major endeavor is "puzzle

Within this period, the paradigm is assumed and

l
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the tools of the paradigm are employed to solve the problem
presented.

These problems are regarded as capable of being

resolved given adeguate elaboration of the methodological
orientation of the paradigm and the innovative application
of these methods.

ALTERNATIVE DIRECTIONS FOE INQUIRY
The

Kuhnian model has direct implications for any

inguiry which has the purpose of changing knowledge.

While

change does occur within the non-revclutionary phase, the
most significant changes occur when the paradigm itself is
challenged and the process of revolution stimulated.

The

piecemeal changes which occur within normal science are
important to this process,

but not central.

At any one given time, the Kuhnian position reguires
that each investigator make an evaluation of where efforts
should be directed.

If it is the investigator*s evaluation

that the current paradigm is dominant and will be dominant
in the future, then efforts would be best directed toward
investigations which assume the paradigm as a given and
define problems as puz 2 les which maybe resolved given
diligent work.

Alternatively, the investigator may make the

evaluation that the current paradigm is about to be
challenged.

Efforts,

given this analysis,

would best be

directed toward investigations which have the purpose of
challenging the paradigm.

3

The responsibility of the investigator within the
Kuhnian model is considerably expanded.
merely taken as given.

Problems cannot be

Some evaluation must be made as to

the source of the problem:

as a puzzle within the paradigm

or as an indication of the limitations of the paradigm
itself.

In this manner, the investigator can be thought of

as constructing or defining the problem rather than
encountering a problem as.something external to one*s own
process of evaluation.

LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT HOMAN PARADIGM
This inquiry will be concerned with challenging a
central assumption of the current human paradigm which is
dominant in contemporary psychology.

Since I have assumed

this direction for inquiry, it is required that I present
some evidence which has led me to make the evaluation that
my efforts would be best directed toward an inquiry of this
nature.
At the core of my evaluation is the feeling that
psychology is rapidly approaching a revolutionary phase in
the knowledge of human beings and that the current paradigm
will be replaced with an alternative.

It follows that some

evidence may be presented from contemporary psychology which
would indicate that the paradigm is in jeopardy.

The

remainder of this chapter will review some of the evidence
that has suggested to me that my efforts would be best
directed toward an inguiry which challenges the current
paradigm.

4

Limitations in the Knowledge of Others
In our society,

one of the most cherished values we

hold about people is our belief that people have the
potential to act in a democratic fashion.

Because of the

complete acceptance of cur belief in this potential, it
becomes a convenient baffle tc demonstrate a problem.

For

as the framework cf the person, as currently employed by
psychology, is expanded, a limitation is revealed:

there is

no capacity for the p e r s o n ’s democratic potentials.

Our

democratic image of the person becomes systematically
excluded.
Allport

(1955) recognized the limitation and the

dilemma so produced for psychology when he pointed to the
inability of cur psychological framework of the person to
extend from the laboratory-clinic setting to the ballot box.
He writes that modern psychology is in a dilemma created by
the gulf that exists between the image of the person that
the current framework presents to us and our cherished
democratic image:
Up to now the ’behavioral sciences,' including
psychology, have net provided us with a picture of
man capable of creating or living in a
democracy . . . .
They have delivered into our
hands a psychology cf an ’empty organism', pushed
by drives and molded by environmental
circumstance.
Shat is small and partial, what is
external and mechanical, what is early, what is
peripheral and opportunistic have received the
chief attention of psychological system builders.
But the theory cf democracy requires also that man
possess a measure of rationality, a portion of
freedom, a generic conscience, propriate ideals,
and unigue value.
He cannot defend the ballet box
or liberal education, nor advocate free discussion
and democratic institutions, unless man has the
potential capacity to profit therefrom, (p. 100)

5

Here we meet the limitation of our framework of the
person directly#

and the problem is given a concrete form.

Nothing can make the problem more explicit than the
perplexing cleavage of thought that it forces upon us.
Allport writes of this cleavage: MNo paradox is more
striking then that of the scientist who as a citizen makes
one set of psychological assumptions# and in his laboratory
and writings makes opposite assumptions respecting the
nature of man."

(p. 33)

What makes this duality necessary

is the limitation imposed by a framework which cannot
entertain both images of the person within a unified field.
This f r a m e w o r k ’s inability to encompass p e o p l e ’s potentials
as democratic human beings reduces the very character of our
democratic image of them.
What makes the above example of limitation of our
framework of the person explict is that most of us endorse
this democratic image.

However# this example is a special

case of a more general limitation.

As has become

increasingly apparent to some sections of the psychological
community, the current framework# given its expansion#
reduces not only the democratic potentials of people but,
also, their human potentials.

I am, of course# referring to

the so called "third force" in psychology today# that loose
federation of existential and humanistic psychologists.
This segment has been particularly vocal in its opinion that
our current framework systematically reduces human
potentials.

Within this group also there is entertained the

6

belief that the person is always capable of transcending any
limitations imposed from without and can exert new
potentials beyond the limitations the psychologist assumes
they possess.
The

movement where the general case has, perhaps, been

most explicitly stated

is within humanistic psychology.

From this perspective,

Severin

(1965)

provides us with this

definition of the limitations:
Many psychologists who ask themselves ’what is
man?' are less than satisfied with the human image
their science has created.
It seems too
fragmentary, too rigid, too lacking in unity and
individuality to reflect adequately the autonomy,
spontaneity, and creativity of the real people
with whom they deal.
(p. v)
This protest is but one of many and could easily be
duplicated a hundredfold from the writings within
contemporary psychology.
At this point, the framework as the psychologist
employs it could be defended by the argument that
psychology, as a discipline, is still a young science, our
framework is in its infancy,

and as such must content itself

for the time being with what has been termed by Allport as
the "crude and simple" aspects cf human beings.
suggested that, with the course of time,

It would be

modifications can

be made in the framework to obviate the problem I have
presented.
Without becoming ensnared in historical issues, such an
argument does not adequately take into account the full
extent of the problem as it is embedded in the foundations
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of oar framework of human beings.

What is being contended

is that it is the framework itself that is the source of the
limitation and the producer of the problem, not its present
level of refinement.

Our current framework has limitations

inherent within itself tc deal with the person's potentials
regardless of the sophistication of our methodology or the
extent of our data collection with which the framework is
supported.

The problem cannot fce obviated by "discovering

some new facts" or by "changing an assumption here or
there." The problem as made manifest by this limitation is
more basic.
Writing from the perspective of existential psychology.
Hay (1960)

seems tc have become acutely aware of the

inherent limitations of our current framework to ever
understand a 'living' human being:
There seems tc be the following 'law' at work:
the more accurately and comprehensively we can
describe a given mechanism, the more we lose the
existing person.
Thg ffill ctbj=olutely and
S2§£il£llX XI fa£J5J)ll£l ihe fo^ c e s~<?y drives, fog
E2II XI III illisins
i b s t l S & i S S I agd ngt th§
lixiBI h gmap bejqg. For the living
person . . . always transcends the given
mechanism . . . .
(p. 18, His italics)
May seems to be ruling out, in prfofopjg. the possible
extension of our current framework to ever include a
person's full existence,

by suggesting a 'law* akin to

Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in quantum theory, a
principle that seems to place limitations not on what we
currently know, but on the very capacity of a framework to
know.
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Limitations in the Knowledge cf Ourselves
As we extend our framework inward,

we find the

framework limits our own potentials to function and
experience as knowers.

Technically, the problem is defined

in psychology by the problem cf reflexivity in theorizing.
On one pole, we consider ourselves to be psychologists and
knowers,

exercising a certain autonomy of action and

responding to reason.

On the ether pole, the object of our

theorizing, the person in our framework of knowledge, is
alternatively conceived as a creature of motivation,
responding deterministically tc stimuli.

As we turn the

latter image of the human being back upon the former image
in a reflexive manner,

the problem of the limitations of our

framework to encompass the potentials of the knower is
acutely defined.
He psychologists have been understandably reluctant to
deal with the basic problem of reflexivity in knowledge;
the fact that the human framework must not only deal with
others but alsc with ourselves as knowers seems to have
almost eluded our attention.

With the exception of the

personal construct theory proposed by Kelly

(1963),

psychological theorists have net dealt with or made special
provision for reflexivity within their theories.

While the

archives of psychology are full of theoretical formulations
of how other men behave,

there is little on how we

psychologists function as knowers.

While elaborate theories

have been constructed tc account for the behavior of other
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people#

there is little elaboration on a theory which could

account for the behavior of psychological theorists when
they generate these complex theories.

Psychologists have#

it seems# failed to recognize the simple and basic fact
that,

as Kelly

(1963)

states#

"if the theory is to account

for the way in which a man turns# it should also account for
the way its author turned when he wrote it."

(p. 39)

When we attempt to deal with reflexivity and extend our
current framework to the psychologist as a knower#

we are

again presented with a limitation and the experience of a
problem.

At the heart of this paradox is a framework which

reguires that the psychologist,
with a forked tongue."

metaphorically# must "speak

As Maslcw

(1966) has recognized:

It was as if psychologists then lived by two
mutually exclusive sets of rules or as if they
spoke two different languages for different
purposes.
If they were interested in working with
animals or with part-processes in human beings,
they could be ’experimental and scientific
psychologists.’ But if they were interested in
whole persons (we may add like themselves)# these
laws and methods were not of much help.
(p. 8)
Acutely aware of these limitations#

Bannister

has called psychology an "exercise in paradox."

(1970)

He writes:

But in our more solemn moments we seem to prefer
the paradoxical view that psychologists are
explainers# predictors and experimenters# whereas
the organism# God bless him, is a very different
kettle of fish.
(p. 5)
Bannister goes on to extend our framework of human beings to
its ultimate extreme and makes the paradoxical conseguences
explicit:
If we follow the logic of non-reflexive
psychological theories still further we arrive in
the middle of the Skinnerian fantasy world in
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which we can be convinced that once ill the data
is safely gathered in then we can control and
manipulate men in every detail.
We are now faced
with the paradox of puppets controlling puppets.
(p. 8)
The

problem of reflexivity and its perplexities

generally can be completely avoided by many psychologists
because they work within a miciotheory within the larger
framework.

They are net concerned

with the universal

implications of their assumptions and conclusions.

These

implications may be safely relegated to the distant future
or dismissed as superfluous flights of metaphysical
speculation.
present,

It is only in the world of fantasy, at

that the full implications of reflexivity on the

psychologist as knewer can be examined.
One such exercise in imagination of p s y c h o l o g y ’s future
is presented in detail by Skinner in his utopian novel,
Wajdefl II.

Walden II is the ultimate application of what

the psychologist has learned about people to the design of a
complete social organization.

This, then, represents the

articulation of psych o l o g y ’s framework,
Skinnerian, on the grand scale.

provided one is a

In Walden II, human

behavior is controlled and manipulated from infancy.

Here

we have the ultimate application of the framework of person
to humankind.

It is in this situation also that the problem

of the limitations of this framework and the resultant
problems of reflexivity again manifest themselves.

11

For even in this utopian setting#

Skinner finds it

necessary to defend a non-reflexivity position# for without
it the social framework of Walden II would dissolve into a
paradox.

To use Bannister's discription from above# this

would be a case of " puppets controlling puppets." Skinner's
•architect for his utopia, Frazer#

freely admits that he

could never have been a product of his own utopia.

Even in

this complete application of the framework# the constructor
of the framework must be separated from his creation# if the
system is to work.

Skinner# through Frazer#

acknowledges

the problem through a vocal denial of any reflexivity in his
knowledge:
Isn't it enough that I've made other men likable
and happy and productive?
Bust I posess the
virtues which I've proved to be best suited to a
well-ordered society?
Must I exhibit the
interests and skills and untrammeled spirit which
I've learned how to engender in others?
Must I
wear them all like a damned manikin?
After all#
emulation isn't the only principle of
education— all the saints to the contrary.
Must
the doctor share the health of his patient?
Must
the icthyologist swim like a fish?
Must the maker
of firecrackers pop?
(Skinner# 1965, pp. 249-50)
The limitation of the framework to encompass the knower
does not dissolve in the utopian setting but becomes more
acute.

In this condition#

people seem to adhere very

stubbornly to the paradoxical position that the person who
knows#

the person who reinforces#

must be separated from and

cannot be encompassed within the same framework as are
community of people that are designed and reinforced.

In

examining the utopian setting above# the point can be more
directly seen that the problem lies in the foundations of
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our framework cf the person, not in its present level of
articulation.

The limitations demonstrated are not a

product of our ignorance,

but rather are contained in the

manner in which we construct knowledge about ourselves.
What has been revealed is an inherent limitation in the
capacity of our framework of the person to encompass the
human being as a knower similar to the limitations of the
mathematical framework presented by G o d e l ’s proof which
seems to set limits on the ability of the framework to know.
As Bronowski

(1968) has recognized, there is an essential

difficulty in a human framework produced by the "self
reference" that underlies it everywhere.

Reflexivity and

its associated problems run like a deep fissure to the very
foundations of psych o l o g y ’s framework of the person.
Bronowski concludes that this difficulty cannot be simply
resolved by the occasional addition of a new axiom here or
there.
Psychology is not unigue in experiencing the
limitations of its framework of the person.

As psychology

is related to other social sciences and shares their more
general framework, it is possible to detect parallel
problems in other social sciences.

For example, the same

problem of reflexivity can be revealed in sociology.
As Gouldner

(1970)

like the psychologist,

has recognized,

the sociologist,

functions toward people with a

certain duality of purpose,

a duality that shares the common

mark of non-reflexive theorizing in psychology:

the tendency

13

for the sociologist to regard ether people as believing out
of need and the sociologist as a knower as believing because
of the dictates of logic and reason.

Gouldner suggests that

there must be developed a reflexive sociology which would
view the sociologist and the person being studied within a
methodological monism as people comprising not two distinct
breeds but one breed of man.

The work of Gouldner in

sociology runs parallel to the theoretical orientation of
Kelly noted above in psychology, in respect to the
reflexivity issue.
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OVERVIEW
The work c£ Kuhn was used to suggest an alternative
direction for inquiry.

It was suggested that each

investigator must make an evaluation of where efforts would
be best directed— toward working within the current paradigm
or framework or challenging that paradigm or framework.
Evidence was presented which has led this investigator
to conclude that efforts are best directed toward
challenging psychology's framework of the person.
Limitations of this framework of the person were reviewed as
they relate to knowledge of others and to psychologists as
knowers.

C H A P T E R II

A BASIS FOR FRAMEWORKS AND PSYCHOLOGY'S FRAMEWORK

It has become apparent to me that an orientation which
requires the challenging of psychology's framework of the
person,

also requires a larger framework within which to

accomplish this task.

The challenge to any framework

assumes at least seme knowledge or at least some speculation
about ho w frameworks are structured and function.

As a

consequence, I have found it necessary to develop some
opinions about the dynamics of frameworks.

A THEORY OF FRAMEWORKS
What initiated my investigations into frameworks was
the feeling that the current psychological framework of the
person was limited, not by current levels of knowledge,

but

by something more fundamental within the structure and
function

of frameworks.

This led me to examine the source

of the limitations of any framework or of frameworks in
general.

Questions as Double-edged Swords
Defining a framework is a difficult problem for it is
not a thing, but a fundamental relation in knowledge.

The

key element in defining a framework is the means by which
this relation becomes fixed.

'Framework' as the concept is

being used here is not a static entity which can be given
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definition by enumerating its attributes by a number of
declarative sentences.

The term framework refers to

something more elusive in quality, that is to the manner in
which people relate to their knowledge.
Framework has a "global" impact, relating to both
thinking

and doing:

what people think as well as how people

behave.

A framework is, then, a general interpretive medium

for both experience and function.

A framework would appear

to transcend the meaning of only an axiomatic system.
involves not only thought,

but also action.

It

This is what is

referred to when I use the term "functional" in describing a
framework.
The second term I use to describe a framework is
"relation."

A framework is not an entity, but a relation

between the framework and what is not of the framework.
framework, then,

A

cannot exist fully as an isolated entity.

For example, the Newtonian framework could not be fully
defined as a framework independent from something beyond the
framework.

However,

in contrast to the framework of

relativity,

given this relational condition, the Newtonian

framework could be defined for what it was.

This need for

alternatives in defining frameworks will be used to
advantage in the following chapters of this inquiry.
Since a framework is a relation, to define a framework
one must attempt to uncover the principle by which this
relation is fixed.

Boundary conditions, by fixing this

relation, define frameworks.

As an analogy for this
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FIGURE 1
TWINS-GOBLET GESTALT FIGURE
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mechanism, I can refer to a familiar phenomenon in the
psychology of perception, the Gestalt figure.

This is more

than a pure analogy for a framework is actually a Gestalt
phenomenon in itself.
gestalt

In Figure 1, we find a familiar

figure in which the perception can be that of a

goblet or the faces of twins.

The important point in this

example is that the boundary conditions— what we assume to
be the boundary between the black and white surfaces— serve
to fix the relation between figure and ground defining the
framework of what we see.

If we consider the black surface

to be the ground, the goblet appears.
white surface to be the ground,

If we consider the

the twins appear.

Essential

to our perception, then, is the relation between figure and
ground as revealed by what we assume to be a boundary.
In similar manner,

the boundary conditions define a

framework by fixing the relation between the framework and
what is not the framework*

These boundary conditions are a

function of our knowlecus.

For example, it,has been

demonstrated experimentally that variables presented before
the presentation of the stimulus in Figure 1, psychological
sets, can affect the final product of the perception.
similar fashion,

In a

the dynamics of o n e ’s knowledge affect the

boundary conditions for o n e ’s framework.

It is to an

analysis of these dynamics that I now turn.
A point of departure in the search for the boundary
conditions for frameworks of knowledge is an observation
made by the historian and philosopher of science Stephen
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Toulmin

(1961), who noted:

The intellectual frame of a m a n ’s thought displays
itself less in the detailed results he enunciates
than in the questions he asks and the assumptions
which underlie his theorizing,
(pp. 94-95)
This comment is very significant in providing a direction
and point of focus.

It has been a traditional bias to

regard the framework of a person’s thought as the product of
encounters between the pe r s o n ’s knowledge and an external,
static limit imposed by the world.

According to this view,

the limits of a framework of thought, i.e., its boundary
conditions,

are the result of a process of exhaustion where

the knower is the inert recipient of the discovery of these
limits.
The importance of Toulmin*s comment is that it serves
to redirect attention to the boundary conditions as they are
set by a dynamic process of interaction which has as its
dual point of focus the guesticns asked and the assumptions
entertained.

It is frcm this base that the boundary

conditions are set.

There is a confrontation between a long

standing tradition in Western knowledge which treats
knowledge as a response by a static observer to the
"questions posed by nature," rather than as a dynamic
process by which the knower constructs knowledge through
questioning.

It is only within the present century,

with

the development of relativity and quantum theory that this
dynamic process cf construction has been demonstrated,

for

in both cases the knowledge of the observer has been shown
to have a pronounced effect on the ultimate framework that
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comes to be known.

To guote the quantum physicist,

Werner

Heisenberg:
Natural science does not simply describe and
explain nature;
it is a part of the interplay
between nature and ourselves;
it describes nature
exposed tc our method of questioning. (Heisenberg,
1958, p. 81)
It is suggested that the source of the boundary
conditions of o n e ’s framework of knowledge arise from this
dynamic process of questioning.

Previously,

it has been our

bias to regard the limits of a framework of knowledge as
being the result of 1;hat which js known.

The impact of this

process of questioning in producing the result has been
largely obscured.

However, the full impact of the process

can be best demonstrated by examining a case where a
framework of knowledge is delimited solely by this process,
in short,

where there is nothing to be known.

Spectorsky (1955)

provides us with the opportunity for

such a demonstration in his book, Thg Exurbanites, a
sociological study of life in the suburbs of New York City.
He describes a "game” current among members of the community
he studied which demonstrates my point,

sometimes quite

embarrassingly.
The format of the "game" runs somewhat like this: One
person of the group is chosen to be "It" and is told that
the other members of the group will, in his absence, invent
a story, and that his task,

upon returning,

is to guess this

story ny asking the grcup guestions which can be answered by
yes or no.

In the "It's" absence, the group is told that no
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story will be invented and that the group is to give yes or
no answers only on the basis of the last letter of the last
word of the guestion, contingent only on its being a vowel
or consonant.

Here we have a case where the "It" must

construct a system of knowledge where nothing is to be
known.

Amazingly, the

"It," under most circumstances,

constructs a coherent tale from the virtually random
feedback.

The questions that he asks tend to converge to

produce a guite compelling and convincing story;

so

convincing that, Spectorsky reports, it is sometimes very
difficult to convince the "It" that there was not a story
and that he has constructed it!
In this "game," the almost compulsive, seductive hold
of a process of questioning is revealed for what it is,
since there is nothing to be known to begin

with and the

knowledge comes solely from the process itself.

What is

demonstrated is an effect similar to the principle of
closure in Gestalt psychology,

the tendency for us to

provide closure for a framework of knowledge even when this
closure

is based on nothing but the continuous feedback to

our questioning.

There is a tendency for a process of

questioning to converge and to limit the field from which we
choose questions,
answered.

based on the guestions we have previously

It is through this latter process that the

boundary conditions for a framework cf knowledge are
established.
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There is a quality, then, in a process of questioning,
in the relation of asking questions, obtaining answers,

and

asking new questions based on those previously answered,
which tends to fix a framework and its boundary conditions.
The implications of this relation takes us far beyond the
limits of this work.

In the future, this factor should be

taken into account in evaluating the closure of any system
of knowledge for this closure may be a premature one, an
artifact of one's process of questioning itself.
Questions are truly double-edged swords.

They are not

only responsible for providing closure to knowledge, but
also for opening new vistas for knowledge provided one asks
the right questions.

In the above, I have concentrated on

the role of questions in setting the limits or boundary
conditions of knowledge.
investigation:

The inverse relation also requires

asking a different question is instrumental

in setting new boundary conditions.

It seems simplistic and

trite to summarize the above argument by saying that "one
only gets answers to the questions one asks," but this is
largely the case.

To ask different questions is to get

different answers, answers which may have the roots of a new
framework of knowledge,

if you will, new "discoveries"

contained within them.
The process of questioning, then,

plays an important

and quite unheralded dual role in knowledge— that of
expanding and limiting the boundaries of that knowledge.
Here, again,

we run counter to a very forceful bias in
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Western knowledge which attributes revolutions in knowledge
to the discovery of new information.

There is, however,

some evidence that asking different guestions has played an
important role in revolutions in knowledge,

for it is

through such a redirection in knowledge that we become
attuned to the need for constructing new information.

The

central role of our process of questioning in science has '
been largely obscured by our biases;

however,

this dyn.amic

process is the very mainspring of our scientific knowledge
as Bronowski

(1973)

reminds us:

"The essence of science:

ask an impertinent guestion, and you are on the way to the
pertinent answer.” (p.

153)

£ hallmark in this matter is a perceptive comment made
by Whitehead

(Price,

1954)

that "the

'silly question' is the

first intimation cf some totally novel development.”
(p. 174)

In short, some "silly guestions," but not all

silly guestions, are "silly" because they lie beyond our
current understanding and belong,

as it were,

to an as yet

undeveloped framework of knowledge which these guestions are
about to open before us.

There is a further goad presented

by the "silly" guestion for the production of an alternative
framework based on this "silly guestion" for as Churchman
(1968)

has observed:

"once you've asked a stupid guestion,

then you have to defend your right to ask it."
(pp. viii-ix)

This defense generally includes the

formulation of a framework where the guestion is no longer
silly or stupid, but is the most significant guestion.
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As a case in point,

an examination will be made of the

role of " silly questions" in perhaps the most profound
revolution in knowledge of the universe in this century,

the

change from the Newtonian universe to the relativistic
universe of Einstein-

There is evidence that Einstein’s

giant leap into a new framework for physical knowledge was
as much a product of asking "silly guestions" as a product
of the discovery of new information.

Indeed, much of the

information that Einstein used in constructing his theory
had been publicly available for decades.
roots of

I will examine the

relativity as they are grounded in the character of

the questions Einstein asked.
Wertheimer

(1959),

who had the opportunity to

extensively interview Einstein about the cognitive basis of
his development of relativity,

has pointed to Einstein's

tendency from an early age to ask "silly guestions,"
questions which were in his later years to lead him to
alternative framework of physical thought.
(1959)

Wertheimer

writes:

The problem started when Einstein was sixteen
years old, a pupil in the Gymnasium . . . .
It was
then that the great problem really started to
trouble him.
He was intensely concerned with it
for seven years;
from the moment, however, that
he came to guestion the customary concept of time,
it took him only five weeks to write his paper on
relativity . . . .
The process started in a way
that was not clear, and is therefore difficult to
describe— in a certain state of being puzzled.
First came such questions as: what if one were to
run after a ray of light?
What if one were riding
on the beam?
If one were to run after a ray of
light as it travels, would its velocity thereby be
decreased?
If one were to run fast enough would
it no longer move at all?
. . . to young Einstein
this seemed strange, (p. 214)
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These questions that young Einstein asked were, indeed,
"silly questions" given the Newtonian framework of his day;
yet, it was these very guestions that guided him to a new
framework.

It is easy to see that the guestions Einstein

was asking, while "silly questions" in the classical
framework,

were the most significant questions in his new

relativistic framework.
Einstein, then,

was a man who from his early youth had

the capacity to use this process of questioning and the
questions he asked to great advantage.

Einstein, instead of

using the process of questioning to generate new information
within the classical framework,

manipulated the process

itself to open new realms of knowledge in an alternative
framework.

This was Einstein's gift, as Bronowski

(1973)

eloquently describes it: "Einstein was a man who could ask
immensely simple questions.

And what his life showed, and

his work, is that when the answers are simple too,
hear God thinking."

then you

(p. 256)

If we turn for a moment to the ether great revolution
in modern physics, quantum theory,

we can find evidence of

other thinkers who recognized the all-powerful effects of
one's process of questioning.

Chief among the authors of

this revolution was the physicist Niels Bohr, a man who was
quite aware of the need to be extremely careful with one's
questions.

Bronowski

(1973)

relates that "He used to begin

his lecture courses by saying to his students,

'Every

sentence that I utter should be regarded by you not as an

FIGURE 2
THE EFFECT OF CONTEXT ON PROGRAMMING PERCEPTION
(AFTER ORNSTEIN, 1972)
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assertion but as a question.*"
openness to questions*

(p. 334)

It was this

of which this is but an example*

which served Bohr admirably in founding a new framework for
physics.

Questions are Asked in an.Assumed Context
This work is committed to a context theory of meaning:
that the meaning of a part does not reside in that part
alone*

but the relation cf the part to the whole.

view is not alien to psychology;

Such a

this view has been

supported by the Gestalt psychologists who have recognized
the effect of the whole on our perception of the part.

This

conception has been particularly useful in visual
perception.

Likewise*

a large body of experimental evidence

has been amassed which demonstrates the role of set as a
context on perceived meaning.
For example, Ornstein

(1972)

has pointed to context

effects as a model for the selection process in perception.
Ornstein presents the structure in Figure 2 to illustrate
the point.

The meaning of the central symbol is dependent

on the context in which it is assumed to be placed.

If the

context is numeric* the symbol is perceived as a number.
the context is alphabetic*
letter.

If

the symbol is perceived as a

Such context or set effects have been the object of

experimentation for some time within psychology.
Such relations and principles*

however*

are not limited

to the psychology cf set or the psychology of perception.
Hanson

(1969)* for example* extends these principles into

FIGURE 3
THE DUCK-RABBIT FIGURE
(AFTER HANSON, 1969)

FIGURE 4
THE DUCK-RABBIT FIGURE IN THE CONTEXT OF DUCKS
ASSUMES THE MEANING OF A DUCK
(AFTER HANSON, 1969)

3o

v.

FIGURE 5
THE DUCK-RABBIT FIGURE IN THE CONTEXT OF RABBITS
ASSUMES THE MEANING OF A RABBIT
(AFTER HANSON, 1969)
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the philosophy of science arguing that "facts" are dependent
upon a theoretical context for their meaning and cannot
stand alone.

"Facts," he argues, are theory laden and

cannot be treated in isolation.

He gives the example that

even the "fact" of the sun's rising can be given alternative
meanings dependent cn the context of knowledge.

The

thirteenth century thinker would see the "fact" in the
context of the astronomical knowledge of the time as a
"sunrise," while the twentieth century astronomer views the
same "fact" as a "horizon turn."
Hanson provides us with the following concrete example
of the effect of context on meaning.

The drawing in Figure

3 when placed in the context shewn in Figure 4 is seen as a
rabbit and when placed in the context of Figure 5, it
appears as a duck.
simplistic,

While this example admittedly is

it demonstrates a very important,

and sometimes

unnoticed, effect of context on organization of our
perceived meaning.
Likewise,

within mathematics, Frege

(1959)

has

recognized the principle of context as being of great value
in his investigations into the concept cf number.

He

observes that it is only in the context of a proposition
that symbols have any meaning.
states,

This principle, Frege

is the key to understanding some rather puzzling

problems in mathematics generated by taking terms out of
context as identities.

Frege sees this principle as having

application beyond the domain of mathematics proper.
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The degree to which human beings are "context"
processors is generally not recognized until an attempt is
made to duplicate human processes through the use of a
machine.

Dreyfus

(1972)

points to the failure of the

glowing predictions of just a decade ago that computers
could produce readable translations to come to fruition.
The failure is largely dependent on the fact that a word is
not just a configuration of sounds and letters, but acquires
meaning according to its context in the sentence.

It has

become increasingly apparent tc those working in the field
that there is great difficulty in programming a computer to
produce such expected meanings from the context in which the
word is contained.
Raphael

(1976)

provides an amusing example of the

failure of the computer tc appreciate meaning in context.
The biblical quotation, "*The spirit is willing but the
flesh is weak.*" was translated by computer from English to
Russian and back again.

The result was:

agreeable, but the meat has spoiled."

"The vine is

(p. 180)

Anyone to

whom I have ever related this story has had no problem in
seeing that the computer was responding to the literal
meaning of the words and not the contextual meaning.
Focusing the context principle of meaning on guestions,
it follows that the guestions

we ask do not stand in

isolation nor do they possess self-sufficent meaning.
Questions are not in themselves meaningful or "silly" for
that matter; the context makes them so.

It is in relation
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to this context that the meaning emerges.
noted above,

For example,

we

in the case of Einstein and his questioning

which led to relativity, that within the context of
classical Newtonian theory, the guestions the young Einstein
asked were,

indeed, "silly" questions.

of relativity,
questions..

Yet, in the context

these 3 3 j0£ questions were the most meaningful

The context of physical theory, then, played a

crucial role in defining the meaning of questions about the
nature of light and observer*s place in the universe.
Central to a further analysis of the context of
questioning is the role of assumptions.

‘Assumption,* as

the term is normally used in thought, refers only to an
axiom or proposition upon which knowledge is based..

The

term as it is employed here refers tc something more basic
and global.

Assumptions are not just axioms as in geometry,

but are also premises in the "geometry for living."
Assumptions refer, as do frameworks of which they are
elements, to both what we think and what we do.

This term

is used to refer to the manifold which contains both our
thought aqd action.

My meaning is perhaps most closely

approximated by Polanyi

(1958) in his definition of

presuppositions:
When we accept a certain set cf pre-suppositions
and use them as our interpretative framework, we
may be said to dwell in them as we do in our own
body.
Their uncritical acceptance for the time
being consists in a process of assimilation by
which we identify curselves with them.
They are
not asserted and cannot be asserted, for assertion
can be made only wj.tftitfl a framework with which we
have identified ourselves for the time being;
as
they are themselves our ultimate framework, they
are essentially inarticulable.
(p. 60)

34

It is this "in-dwelling" quality of assumptions which gives
us an assumed context for our knowledge.

Just as people

dwell within their bodies and use them, quite unconsciously,
as a basis for their behavior,

one uses assumptions and the

framework that arises from them as an assumed context for
functioning.
The assumed context can be spoken of as an
"interpretative framework." One should recognize, however,
that the framework a person functions within as an
individual is not unique in all aspects to themselves, but
that the framework is itself contained within the framework
of institutions, these in turn contained in the framework of
nations,

and, finally,

they are all contained in an

essential degree by the cosmic assumed context provided by a
culture.

Assumptions and the process by which they function

are transpersonal in their origins,
context,
well.

providing the assumed

not only for the individual but for a culture as

This dimension is one of degree cnly, for one can

identify the same process all along the dimension from the
individual to the culture.

Just as the individuals within a

culture have assumptions which form the interpretative
framework for function,

so does an entire culture or epoch

have certain assumptions which lead to an interpretative
framework.
Lovejoy

(1957)

has recognized the operation of a common

assumed context from the level of the individual to the
level of the culture.

He writes:

"There are, first.
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implicit or incompletely explicit a§S3ia£ii2B5* or more or
less gnconscious m^n^al &§]&££# operating in the thought of
an individual or a generation.11 (p. 7) Lovejoy goes on to
give the example of the pervasiveness of the assumed context
of "simplicity" in the age of Enlightment of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries which made them ages of qsplits

§i2LEli§i§s.
In a similar manner,

Whitehead

(1925)

finds that

assumptions provide the framework for philosophy and for
individual philosophers within an epoch:
When you are criticising the philosophy of an
epoch, do not chiefly direct your attention to
those intellectual positions which its exponents
feel it necessary explicitly to defend.
There
will be some fundamental assumptions which
adherents of all the variant systems within the
epoch unconsciously presuppose.
Such assumptions
appear so obvious that people dc not know what
they are assuming because no other way of putting
things has ever occurred to them.
With these
assumptions a certain limited number of types of
philosophic systems are possible, and this group
of systems constitutes the philosophy of the
epoch.
(p. 69)
This pervasive quality of assumptions and the assumed
context that arises from them,

dispersing as it does in the

hierarchy of levels from the cultural to the individual and
back again,
inquiry.

has great importance for the approach in this

It means at any given level,

the real basis for

the assumed context can best be defined at the most
subsuming condition:

the cultural level.

It is important,

then, in defining the global character of assumptions to
understand the full dimensionality of this concept.
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Assumptions— as they have been defined as an assumed
context for knowledge, an interpretative framework— so color
the world that it is difficult, if net impossible, for one
to recognize the assumptions that one holds.

There is great

difficulty in making an assumed context explicit when that
assumed context lies at the basis cf o n e ’s functioning.
Assumptions and the assumed context to which they give rise
must remain in the twilight of awareness, remaining "tacit"
to use P o l a n y i ’s term.
Lovejoy

(1957)

We should note above that both

and Whitehead

(1925)

use the term

"unconscious" to describe the effect of assumptions on their
holders.

This is the root cf P o l a n y i ’s pessimistic

assessment made above that assumptions cannot be defined
because they are the basis by which assertions are made to
begin with.
I am reminded of the philosopher’s argument that if one
could only perceive shades of red, one.could not recognize
red as a color.

It is only when one sees the full spectrum

of colors that one is freed from this red-shaded world.
Likewise,

assumptions so color the world that it is

difficult to recognize them within the world they have,
themselves, created,

until this world is transcended.

Assumptions cannot be defined directly.
must be approached obliquely.

Rather, the problem

Whitehead's advice given

above not to "chiefly direct your attention to those
intellectual positions which its exponents feel it necessary
explicitly to defend,"

is certainly appropriate here.
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attention should be directed,

alternatively, to what

positions are not defended— that is, to places where the
framework itself falls short.
It follows, then, that assumptions and an assumed
context can be made most explicit when transcended.

When

the assumption or assumed context fails, and its influence
wanes,

the assumption cr assumed context can be made most

vulnerable to detection.

A gliSSlElS fif -};rai)scefldenc$ can

thus be asserted for making assumptions explicit.
follows,

It

also, that when the assumed context is transcended,

and shown to produce a paradox, that assumed context is made
most explicit.

Prior tc this condition of transcendence,

one is simply using the framework based on this assumption
as a tool and does not experience its reality.

In applying

this principle for making assumptions explicit,

one should

seek the point where the assumed context generates a
paradox.
To provide this principle with substance, an example
can be given from psychoanalysis.

Freud developed an

elaborate theory of human beings;

however, he did not and

could not make explicit the assumed context upon which it
was constructed.

A significant part of this assumed context

was made explicit when Malinowski

(1927) attempted to apply

Freudian psychoanalytic theory, in the field, to natives of
the Trobriand Islands of the Pacific.

It was through

M ali n o w s k i 1s experiences with the paradoxes that were
generated, that he recognized that Freudian psychoanalytic
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theory had assumed the European nuclear family, for the
Trobriand Islanders had a different nuclear family structure
from the traditional European family.
This difference of assumed context for psychic dynamics
produced major differences in the results of the theory— in
particular, the form and direction of the Oedipus Complex,
of which

was directed toward the uncle instead of the father

due to differences in the family structure.

The important

point in this example is that nc amount of work within
classical psychoanlysis could have made this assumed context
explicit;

it was. only when the context was transcended,

when Malinowski attempted to apply the assumed context to
the family structure of the Trobriands and met with paradox,
that the assumed context of the European family structure
became available.
The principle of transcendence can be used to engineer
the detection cf assumptions and assumed contexts.

It is in

this respect an indispensable tcol which this investigator
shall make use of in the following pages.

£11 that remains

to bring this section into closure is to demonstrate that
the assumed context, as I have defined it, gives meaning and
significance to the guestions we ask.

The relation has been

recognized in some guarters of the philosophy of science.
Kuhn

(1962),

for example, recognized that the vast

majority of time in science is spent in what he calls
"normal science,"

where the major activity is "puzzle

solving." The paradigm provides these puzzles and defines

39

for the scientist which guestions are meaningful and demand
further investigation,

and which do not.

Clearly, then,

during this period, the paradigm in K u h n ’s terminology, or
assumed context in my own terminology,
guestions the scientist asks.

gives meaning to the

It is only during the short

and chaotic periods of revolution, during which a different
framework is born, that this encapsulating hold of the
paradigm on guestioning is broken and different guestions
are entertained.

This condition has already been discussed

above in terms of the guestions that Einstein asked which
produced the revolution of relativity.
A sophisticated and concrete
relation even more defined can be
mathematics.

example to make this
taken from the history of

Mathematicians since the time of the Greeks

have asked the guestion "What is mathematical truth?" The
traditional source of the assumed context in which this
guestion has been asked derives from the geometry of the
Greeks.

Within this geometry, it

was assumed that

mathematics was a representation of the physical world.
guestion

The

was given the meaning that that which is

mathematically true corresponds to the way the world is.
This assumed context endured for centuries and with it an
unchanged meaning for the guestion.

In a revolution in

mathematics in the 19th century, E u c l i d ’s parallel postulate
was replaced giving rise to a number of non-Euclidean
geometries which were as consistent as the Euclidean, given
their assumptions.
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The whole assumed context for mathematics was changed
by changing this postulate;

fcr could not other

mathematical systems be developed which did not correspond
directly with the world as it was apprehended?
(1959)

indicates,

As Kline

after 1830 mathematicians were given a new

freedom to "devote themselves tc any ideas which attracted
them, however wild and unrelated to the physical world they
might appear tc be on first sight."

(p. 461)

This new

assumed context produced an alternative meaning for the
question.

No longer could a proposition be evaluated for

its truth solely on its correspondence with the physical
world.

Whereas in the cld context,

the guestion was given

the meaning that there must be a correspondence between the
mathematical proposition and the physical world;
new context,

within the

the guestion acquired the meaning that we

should look within the propositions themselves as the source
of truth.

This context initiated the search for truth

through consistency,

the ability to derive true propositions

from a set of axioms.

It is important to note that the

question did net change, but that its meaning did change
within a different assumed context.

An Example of the Total Process
To this point in the discussion, the structural aspect
of the theory of frameworks has been presented.

While some

effort has been directed toward identifying the
relationships between the parts, the interaction of
questions, assumptions,

and boundary conditions, the
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discussion should not be left at this point.

These parts,

in actual fact, comprise an integrated whole which may be
termed a process of questioning.

To a large extent each

person is immersed in some process of questioning,

making it

difficult to transcend the limits of the framework produced
by this process.
complete

The present discussion would not be

without an effort to present

example is provided by Debono

the total process.

(1970),

An

who presents in abook

on creativity the following problem:
A man worked in a tall office building.
Each
morning he got in the lift on the ground floor*
pressed the lift button to the tenth floor, got
out of the lift and walked up tc the fifteenth
floor.
At night he would get into the lift on the
fifteenth floor and get out again on the ground
floor.
What was the man up to?
(p. 95)
Now, assuming that we have someone before us who can
answer our guestions

about the problem,

get at the source of

this strange behavior by asking

guestions.
ask:

we would proceed to

Debono suggests seme of the guestions we might

"Was the man an exercise nut?";

to someone on the tenth floor?";
back on the elevator

"Did he want to talk

"But why didn't he get

at the tenth floor to go to the

fifteenth?" Many such guestions and lines of guestioning
suggest themselves.

Before going on to the next paragraph

where the "solution" is given,

it might be appropriate to

stop for a moment and reflect on seme of the possible
guestions that might be asked.
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How, what we have revealed before us is a concrete
example of the dynamic process cf guestioning.

He have been

generating a framework of knowledge through our process of
guestioning

(i-e., the guestions we have been asking) for

the purpose of solving the problem.

It follows that all the

guestions we have asked, the guestions we consider
significant to ask, are conditioned by an assumed context.
These guestions are, in a real sense, convergent guestions
in respect to a particular assumption.

It is through the

dynamic interrelation of these elements that a process of
guestioning has emerged placing boundary conditions on our
knowledge.

What, then, is this assumption?

Debono provides

us with the assumption and "solution:"
In fact the man acted in this peculiar way because
he had no choice.
He was a dwarf and could not
reach higher than the tenth floor button.
The
natural assumption is that the man is perfectly
normal and it is his behaviour that is abnormal.
(Debono, 1970, p. 96)
It was this assumption— that the man was normal and the
behavior abnormal— that limited the guestions we asked and
resulted in a framework which had boundary conditions which
precluded a solution.

We can see in this example the impact

of one's process of guestioning on knowledge.

Likewise,

there is revealed the process of guestioning as a dynamic
process of interaction and connection, that actually does
affect the guestions that are asked and what people actually
do to solve problems.
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APPLICATION TO PSYCHOIOGY'S FBAMEWOBK
OF THE PERSON
The theory made explicit above would suggest that the
source of the limitations of psychology's framework of the
person would be found in the guestions psychologists ask, as
these guestions fix the boundary conditions of the
framework.

It would be further suggested that a central

assumption lies at the core of this guestioning and that
this assumption is the central delimiting factor.

The Character of Questioning in Psychology
What guestions do psychologists ask about people?
Psychology is a very diverse discipline and the guestions
that are asked are, correspondingly,

guite diverse:

experimentalists ask guestions about human learning and
perception, clinicians ask guestions about their clients*
personalities, and philosophical psychologists ask guestions
bout a person's ultimate nature.
on.

Murray

(1938)

The list could go on and

provides us with the flavor and diversity

of the psychologist's guestioning:
Man is today's great problem.
What can we know
about him and how can it be said in words that
have clear meaning?
What propels him?
With what
environmental objects and institutions does he
interact and how?
What occurrences in his body
are not influentially involved?
What mutally
dependent processes participate in his
differentiation and development?
What courses of
events determine his pleasures and displeasures?
and, finally, by what means can he be
intentionally transformed?
(pp. 47-48)
In this guotation,

Murray summarizes the full spectrum of

the psychologist's guestioning about people.

If we look
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closely,

we can find a few central guestions which underlie

such diverse areas of psychology as physiological psychology
and personality theory.
From these fundamental guestions,
great difficulty,

without

proceed to see that any one researcher in

psychology within a specific area,
paradigm

we could,

for example a specific

in classical conditioning, is pffrlly asking only a

masked version of one of these fundamental guestions, a
guestion which it is believed, if answered,

will ultimately

lead to the solution cf one of the more fundamental
guestions.
The theory of frameworks would suggest that at the
center of this diversity of guestioning there is a pivotal
question which gives a fixed structure to the entire process
of questioning.
focus,

In short, there is a convergent point of

a central guestion, for the process of questioning in

psychology.

An insight into what this question may be is

provided by Boyce

(1961):

Nhat is man?
And how can we come to know it?
These two guestions are vital not only to any
complete philosophy, but also to some of the most
basic problems that the human mind confronts.
What is the true reason for our existence?
Where
did we come from?
Nhy are we here?
and Where are
we going?
Is there a discoverable nature of man
as a person with rights and dignity, which can
serve as a foundation for our cherished democratic
concepts?
What
is the basis for law? of human
responsibility? Of human rights? Is
the notion
of freedom compatible with the laws of nature?
Does man have a
nature which includes the
spiritual, and how can this be known? In what
does man*s ultimate happiness consist?
Questions
of what man s hogld do can be based only on what
man is.
(P* 3)
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In the above* Boyce is suggesting to us that all the
questions the psychologist asks and, ultimately,

the

knowledge that is constructed about people is based on what
a human being is-

It seems, within this framework, that the

key question that one asks is "What is a human being?'* If
psychologists are in the laboratory or the clinic,

they are

basically asking this question and their efforts are
directed toward providing an answer.

It is also clear for

the purposes of this inquiry that this question is given
such paramount importance, not because of something
intrinsic to the question itself,

but as a function of the

assumed context in which it is asked.
the theory cf frameworks,

Given the logic of

there must be at the center of

this assumed ccntext an assumption which provides
significance to this question.

A Perspective on Questioning in Western Knowledge
The search for the assumption at the core of
questioning in psychology,

in my opinion, must take the

discussion beyond the confines cf psychology proper and even
beyond the social sciences.

These disciplines, being a

product of the last century, have inherited a process of
questioning that has been elaborated for centuries.

It was

these centuries which saw the elaboration of the
philosophical and scientific manifold in which psychology
and the other social sciences now function.

It would seem

to follow that to seek something as basic as the assumed
context for questioning within psychology,

one is required

46

to transcend tfce U n i t s

cf psychology and the social

sciences, and seek the roots of this context in the larger,
prior context of Western knowledge.
While I have indicated above that the guestion "What is
the human being?"

is central tc questioning in psychology,

what is the key guestion for the philosopher or physicist?
Perhaps,

by examining these guestions,

we can more closely

approach the assumption which underlies Western knowledge.
In respect to physics, Capek

(1961)

writes of the basic

"identity of one problem" within physics, a problem
generated and centered around the following mode of
guestioning:
What is the nature of physical reality and to what
extent can it be understood?
All specific
problems of physics are merely concrete and
partial aspects of the same basic guestion;
in
truth, if we disregard its naive phrasing, the
guestion which the pre-Socratics tried to answer:
* What is the world made of?* was not essentially
different.
(p. xvi)
As Capek points out,

the source of these guestions cannot be

found in physics alone, as it cculd not be found in
psychology alone,

but the sou 'ce is more deeply embedded in

the Western framework of knowledge

which both have

inherited, a framework which has not lost its essential form
since the time of the Greeks.

To reveal its source, we must

now turn to the parent discipline of both physics and
psychology, that is to philosophy.
What, then, is the key guestion for the philosopher?
For our answer to this,

we must follow Capek*s observation

above and retreat to the dawn cf Western thought in
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pre-Socratic philosophy.

Wild6 and Kimmel

(1962)

characterize the questioning of the Greek philosophers in
this fashion:
When the first Greek thinkers experienced with awe
and wonder the presence of Being in the cosmos and
asked the guestions: What constitutes the Being of
the things that are? • In what and from what do
they have their being?
What does it mean, to be?
By their very asking of the questions they
revealed a forward step achieved in the
consciousness of western man . . . .
By their
questioning and their attempts to answer the
questions these early Greeks set in motion the
quest which, according to Husserl, has determined
the destiny and character cf Western culture.
(p. 10)
Thus,

we see that the process of questioning we find in

physics and psychology is itself cast in a form produced by
the early Greek philosophers.
central question:

When the physicist asks his

"What is the nature of physical reality?"

or the psychologist asks his central question: "What is the
nature of human beings?", they are both only echoing a
tradition of questioning begun at the very beginnings of
Western thought when the pre-Socratic philosophers asked the
paramount question:

"what is the Being of things?"

Western tradition of knowledge,

The

within this perspective,

reveals itself as a unified process of questioning.
The guestion still remains, however, as to the
assumption that underlies this similarity in questioning.
If the analysis of both processes of questioning and the
theory of frameworks is appropriate, one should be able to
uncover an assumption which underlies this process of
questioning providing significance to these questions.
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Guthrie

(1950)

gives us an insight into vhat this assumed

context

was for the pre-Socratics when he writes of them:

They looked for something permanent, persisting
through the chaos cf apparent change;
and, they
thought that they could find it by asking the
question:
’What is the world made of?* The world
as our senses perceive it seems restless and
unstable . . . .
Philosophy started in the faith
that beneath this apparent chaos there exists a
hidden permanence and unity, discernible, if not
by sense, then by mind.
(p. 23)
It seems then the centrality of the question:

"What is

the world made of?" derives from the prior assumption that
there is §n jnh^r^qt na£u£e £o ££§ univer s e , beyond the
world of chaotic change,

which can be known.

It is this

assumption that provides the assumed context for Western
thought;

all further work was to be only an elaboration of

this basic assumed context.

This assumed context so

permeates Western thought that it is difficult tc conceive
of an alterntive.

As with any assumption, it was only with

the partial transcendence of this context,

with the

development of organic, process knowledge in the West that
the full impact of this assumption on knowledge begins to be
recognized.
It is apparent,

for example, within the process

formulations of Whitehead

(1925):

One such ^ s u m p t i o n underlies the whole philosophy
of nature during the modern period.
It is
embodied in the concept which is supposed to
express the most concrete aspect of nature.
The
Ionian philosophers asked. What is nature made of?
The answer is couched in terms of stuff or matter.,
or material . . . .
(p. 69)
We can see within W h itehead’s astute comment the full
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interrelation which I am seeking to illustrate: the
assumption of an inherent nature to the universe, leading to
a process of guestioning to discover this nature, and
finally resulting, as a conseguence, in a system of
knowledge that focuses on fired entities or material stuff.
This process of guestioning,

established as it was in the

infancy of Western knowledge,

has a pronounced effect on the

derived knowledge in physics and psychology.
This assumed context provided by the pre-Socratic
philosophers has undergone a significant revision in modern
times.

With the rise of science, recognizing the inhibitory

effects of searching for the inherent nature of things in
terms of essences in an Aristotelean sense, the modern
investigator has transformed the assumed context.

One no

longer searches for essences in things for "the nature of
things,

in themselves," but is content tc work with

appearances,
phenomena.

with discovering functional relationships among
Still, however,

the spirit of the assumed

context maintains itself through this transformation.

The

Western investigator still serves the assumption of an
inherent nature of things,

but this search becomes

redirected toward discovering something fixed in the
appearance of the universe without the unnecessary
metaphysics involved with a search for essence.
This transformation of the assumed context in modern
times ha s produced certain manifest changes in the process
of guestioning itself.

However, these changes are only
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manifest,

for at root the guestioning is in unity with that

of the pre-Socratics.

Harcuse

(1964) has recognized this

redirection in theoretical emphasis and its corresponding
redirection of the process of guestioning from the
"metaphysical
'

H

o

v

'What is.........?'

.

(

p

.

151)

. . .

to the functional

Thus, the scientist who would

scoff at searching for the essences of things still does
equal service the assumption cf an inherent nature by
searching for something functionally fixed in the phenomena
studied, considered in an empirical, operational sense.
Both the search for essences carried out before the
modern era and the search for fixed relations carried out in
modern science are motivated by the imagination of the
pre-Socratics, with their assumption that there is something
to be known that is permanent beyond the chaos of the
universe as immediately experienced.

Thus, this modern

transformation is not a major alteration in the most basic
sense,

but serves only to increase the acceptability of the

original assumed context in an era where metaphysics is not
greatly valued.

The Assumption of an Inherent Nature to Human Beings
In dealing with the general case of Nestern knowledge,
I have already considered psychology as a special case.
However,

within this special case, we can see the assumption

that human beings have an inherent nature to be known is at
the root of the central meaning and significance given to
the question "What is a human being?"

One interpretation
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would be that:

th§ sssissi

sjjssiiasisa iiial siisis is

psychology is th a t hjjm§s £j§ia.S§
inhgssQt

Minze

a s s u med £ 2 h§vg an

££ar £he jsyghslsaisj; gan gomg £o kngw.

Given the perspective generated above, this conclusion is
hardly an unexpected one.
The profound influence of this assumed context has been
recognized for some time by existential psychologists;
(1960)

Hay

takes a parallel course in criticizing the character

of contemporary psychology:
In endeavoring to separate reality into its
discrete parts and to formulate abstract laws for
these parts. Western science has by and large been
e^en-friflj-j-st in character;
mathematics is the
ultimate, pure form of this essentialist approach.
In psychology, the endeavor is to see human beings
in terms of forces, conditioned reflexes, and so
on, illustrate the approach via essences.
(p. 16)
Psychology’s fixation on one dimension of guestioning
centering around "What is the human being?" is only
symptomatic of a more basic commitment to the assumption
that the human being has an inherent nature to be known.
While few psychologists today would consider themselves
essentialist in the classical meaning of the term, the
search for functional,

empirical relationships is egually in

the service of the assumption of an inherent nature.
Western knowledge in general,

As in

there has been a manifest

transformation of the process of guestioning.

The

contemporary psychologist nc longer looks for the essence of
the human being in the Aristotelian sense.
in the case of the physicist,

Nonetheless, as

the psychologist still seeks

fixed empirical relationships within human nature.

Again,
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it would be suggested that for these empirical relationships
to be coherent over time and space there must be an
underlying structure or inherent nature.

Thus, the

contemporary psychologist is as committed to the assumption
of an inherent nature as is the modern physicist to an
inherent nature to the physical universe.
It was through physics that psychology originally
obtained its assumed context for knowledge.
one of the founders of American psychology,
(1952),

Thus, we find
William James

readily quoting the physicist Helmholtz to the

effect that " «the ultimate goal of theoretical physics is to
find the last unchanging causes of the processes in
N a t u r e . " 1 (p. 883) It is not difficult to infer that James
is likewise supporting a position that the ultimate goal of
theoretical psychology is to find the last unchanging causes
of the processes of human beings.
This relationship between physics and psychology is no
less true today.

Where the physicists have reduced their

goals from discovering the underlying structure of matter to
discovering functional relationships within a matrix of
empirical data, psychologists have followed the same course
and no longer search directly for the substance of human
beings,

but only for functional relationships within

empirical data.

In a practical sense, in each area, the

effect of the assumption of an inherent nature to the object
of study and the guestions that arise from this assumed
context are still most influential.
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While the contemporary psychologist may cringe from
asking the traditional,

metaphysical guestion "What is a

human being?" the psychologist, given his logico-empirical
Zeitgeist, still asks the functional guestion "How does a
human being do this?" Both questions are equally indicative
of a process of questioning influenced by the assumption of
an inherent nature to the person.

The latter is just a more

conservative version of the former.
The remainder cf this inquiry will be directed toward
expanding the boundary conditions of psychology*s framework
of the person by changing the above process of questioning.
To accomplish this, the assumption that human beings have an
inherent nature which is at the core of this process of
questioning will be challenged.
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CVEBVIEW
A theory of frameworks was suggested which viewed the
boundary conditions of frameworks as a function of the
questions asked.

The guestions that are asked, were, in

turn, related to the assumptions or assumed context of the
questioner.
This theory was applied to psychology’s framework of
the person.

The central question the psychologist asks is

"What is the human being?" This central guestion for
psychology was given perspective by examining this as a
special case of the general tendency to ask "What is the
world made of?"

The latter guestion was given paramount

importance because it was assumed that the world had an
inherent nature that could be known.
This insight was applied tc psychology where the
assumption of an inherent nature to human beings was
identified as central to p s ychology’s process of
questioning.

It was concluded that this inquiry should be

directed toward challenging this assumption.

C H A P T E R III

METHOD

In the present context, the sole criterion for method
is its ability to challenge the assumption of an inherent
nature to human beings.

This criterion should be kept

clearly in mind during the following discussion.

SURVEY OP TRADITIONAL HETHODS
There are any number of "methods" that people
use: intuition,

religion, tradition.

The current survey

will be concerned exclusively with two large categories of
formal methods, experimental and analytic.

These two

classes of methods may be most clearly distinguished on the
basis of the activities cf these who employ them.

In short,

when one uses one method as opposed to another, one
functions in a different manner.
By experimental methods,

I refer to methods where the

user concentrates on the analysis of data and observation
from which the data is derived, with the criterion of
validity ascribed to the correspondence between one*s
propositions and the data.
methods

By analytic methods,

I refer to

which center around activities such as logical or

semantic analysis with the criterion of validity being
linked to the internal consistency of propositions..

This

classification is to be taken only as one of convenience and
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not as suggesting a complete epistemology,.

Experimental Hethcds
He begin with experimental methods because they are so
central

to psychology.

The purpose for which experimental

methods are used in psychology is to discover the inherent
nature of the human being, net to guestion if this nature
exists.

They do not evaluate if the human being has an

inherent nature,

only if the answer given by the

psychologist is valid cr not.

This commitment to the

assumption of an inherent nature makes experimental methods
inappropriate for challenging p sychology’s framework of the
person.
This can be guite simply illustrated by challenging any
experimentalist to construct an experiment or an entire
program of research which would produce evidence that the
human being does net have an inherent nature.

Such a

request would undercut the basis of experimentation within
psychology.

Such a request would negate the very purpose

for doing an experiment to begin with: io d iscover tfr^
inherent 3 §£J3£§ si h u aag frejpg.

Contrary to being a

suitable method for challenging psychology’s framework,
experimental methods are the mechanism through which the
framework is maintained and refined.
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Analytic Hethods
He now turn to the seemingly mere promising area of
analytic methods.

I have considered analytic methods after

experimental methods for a purpose.
establish above,

As I have attempted to

experimental methods are inappropriate for

the purpose of this inquiry.

The total effect of analytic

methods within p s y c h o l o g y ’s framework of the person has been
to focus knowledge toward experimental methods.

Thus,

analytic methods, in this ancillary capacity, are themselves
inappropriately contingent on the inappropriateness of
experimental methods.

Tc understand the ancillary function

of analytic methods, it would be best to investigate the
historical setting of their introduction within psychology.
Stevens

(1939)

wrote what has come to be a classic

article on the application cf analytic methods to the
problems of psychology.

In this article, he wrote cf a

common spirit which has developed in which the conception of
science was that cf fitting a formal system of symbols to
empirical observations.

He described the confluence of

operationism, logical positivism,

and logical empiricism

within psychclcgy toward this ccmmcn goal.

The purpose of

this was a division of labor by which analytic methods as
used by the philosopher could be brought into the service of
experimental methods by making the latter more efficient:
The philosopher complements the scientist by
probing the nature and the rules of this symbolic
language.
Statements about the empirical domain
are called object-sentences;
statements about
language-forms are syntactical sentences.
In any
special science, such as psychology, both types of
sentences frequently occur, because the
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psychologist must tell us not only about his
facts, but also how he intends to use his words
and symbols . . . .
The philosopher, on the other
hand, can point out the logical implication of the
p s y c h o l o g i s t s language and help him guard against
the vicious combination of these two types of
sentences which lead to pseudo-propositions.
(p. 237)
From this quotation, one begins to appreciate the
perceived utility of analytic methods within psychology.
This particular paper,

coming as it did early in the

introduction of philosophical sophistication into psychology
and the social sciences, reflects the context in which the
social scientist approached analytic methods.

The climate

was one in which analytic methods were to aid the more
efficient functioning of experimental methods, a role
Marcuse

(1964) describes as therapeutic.

Such movements

within psychology such as operationism and logical
positivism were to have the function of doing therapy on the
psychologist’s knowledge, such that the psychologist could
function as a "better"

experimentalist and clearly relate

experimental results tc others.

In this manner, analytic

methods became infused with the assumptions and purpose for
inquiry of experimental methods.
The mechanism by which analytic methods serve
experimental methods deserves closer scrutiny, for it is a
case study in the truncation of a process of questioning.
Analytic methods, as used traditionally within psychology,
tend to legislate what questions can be meaningfully asked,
having the effect of focusing the process of guestioning
toward experimentation and the discovery of an inherent
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nature,

not toward challenging this assumption..

The nature

of this therapeutic function is that it attempts to "cure
from illusion, deception, obscurities,

unsolvable riddles,

unanswe yfrbjg guestjcq^. from ghosts and spectres," to quote
Marcuse

(1964, p. 183, My italics).

I take particular note that analytic methods attempt to
remove from attention "unanswerable guestions."

Chapter II

has demonstrated the danger of artifically eliminating
certain guestions from the realm of legitimate guestions.
It was noted above, in respect to questions and boundary
conditions of knowledge, that it is just these seemingly
"unanswerable guestions" or "silly guestions" as I have
called them, that are often the key to challenging
assumptions and expanding the boundary conditions for
knowledge.

The Attempted Flight Beyond Method
Some psychologists have recognized the limitations of
the current psychological framework and have also recognized
the emptiness of the formal methods outlined above.

Their

reaction has been to deny advocacy of any method or position
about the inherent nature of human beings in the hope that
such an uncommitted position will free them from service to
the assumption of an inherent nature.

The result is often

quite the opposite.
One of the major problems in advocating a position of
non-commitment is that it is purely

The only

method that remains from this point of .view is a negative
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one: a rejection of an inherent nature to human beings or,
more accurately, a rejection of the possibility of knowing
this inherent nature.

This negativism is at best

••halfhearted" for it attempts tc make a positive assertion
about human beings within a negative context.
A paradox arises frcm the fact that even in complete
negation,
asserted.
(1968)

something positive about human beings is being
For example, we can take the statement of Jourard

as representive of this situation.

He writes:

After having tried cut psychoanalytic, trait
theory, self-theory, and other kinds of
theoretical models of man, I have opted for a
model that is no model, or is a meta-model.
It is
one implicit in the philosophical tradition of
existential phenomenology (Luijpen).
According to
this perspective, man is the being such that in
his being, his being is in question,.
(p. 114)
In J o u r a r d ’s statement, we find an example of the negative
reaction which current psychological framework fosters among
some.

Jourard*s answer, like that of many other

psychologists, is to reject the framework.

But does the

traditional framework allow such luxuries?

Is Jourard

really rejecting all models?

Is this in fact a complete

negation of the assumption of an inherent nature to human
beings?

Does anyone have the option of "opting for no

model?" To answer these questions and uncover the fallacy of
such negative approaches, I will recall the discussion in
Chapter II concerning the nature of knowledge, specifically
the discussion of the role of assumptions in knowledge.
Within this perspective,

I defined assumptions as a

container for knowledge,

concluding that
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"assumptions cannot be avoided in constructing knowledge."
This principle is egually applicable to the knowledge
of human beings.

We do not have the option of having no

assumed context for knowledge,.

While on the surface it may

seem plausible tc subscribe to a position of non-commitment,
some assumed context is indispensable for the knowledge of
the human being.

As Van Kaam

(1965)

has recognized:

There is no escape from assumptions in psychology.
The psychologist of every school always makes
ultimate and absolute judgements about what is
called the nature of man and about the way in
which man can be understood.
(p. 177)
Even

a position of open-ended empiricism is not tenable,

for,

as Van Kaam points cut, even this level of

research

requires some ultimate assumptions about human nature.
Thus, the psychologist cannot adhere to a complete
negativistic position in respect to human nature.

Any

framework abhors a vaccuum guickly converting the negative
position to a positive assertion about people.
Paradoxically, even the most vehement rejection of an
inherent nature to people converts to an affirmation of an
inherent nature.

Paul Tillich

(1961), for example, has

recognized that any existentialist position ultimately rests
upon an essentialist position.

He argues that even Sartre's

radical departure from essentialism with his famous
statement that a person's essence is his existence, in final
analysis rests upon an essentialist position.

It becomes an

affirmation of a human being's §SS§alial freedom to
transform himself.

Even in such an extreme position one
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cannot escape reinforcing the assumption of an inherent
nature.

For even Sartre, in his extreme existentialism and

rejection of the traditional framework of the person is
affirming a process which is assumed to be inherent in human
beings!

THE HETHOD OF ALTERNATIVE ASSUHEE CONTEXTS
In the search for method, as I examined the
inappropriateness of current formal methods, it appeared
that the key to developing an appropriate methodology rested
with an application of the theory of frameworks made
explicit in the previous chapter.
Hy evaluation was that traditional methods are
inappropriate because,

tsed for the purpose that I would

like, the methods are required to work against the dynamics
of the process of questioning.

These methods have been

constructed to expand a framework based on an assumption
that human beings have an inherent nature,

It is extremely

difficult to see how these methods may be used to challenge
this very same assumption and framework.

It was with this

thought in mind that I began to consider the construction of
a method that used to advantage the structure cf frameworks
and the closure imposed by a process of questioning.

Alternative Frameworks and the Criticism of Knowledge
It is not difficult to establish the importance of
alternative systems in the criticism of an assumed context.
In the viewing of an alternative system, the seemingly
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unrelenting and monopolistic held of a framework of
knowledge can be brcken.

alternative systems provide a

point of reference from which the system can be criticized.
Just as it is difficult to make assumptions explicit from
within a framework, it is egually difficult to criticize a
framework from within the framework.
the latter,
Pirsig

In attempting to do

we are involved in what has been called by

(1974)

a "platform problem." Since we use a framework

as the "platform" for action including the action of
criticism, one cannot use this same "platform" for the
purpose of critically examining the platform.

This is the

great advantage of the alternative system as a solution to
the problem;

given an alternative, one has two or more

"platforms" upon which to stand.

From this vantage point,

one is free to pull at the flocr boards of either platform.
As an example of the profitable use of alternative
systems,
Heyerdahl

I can point to the work of the anthropolcpist
(1950).

In his bock Kon-T^ki* he explains that

the Pacific area had been divided into two specializations:
Polynesian and American anthropology.
however,

He recognized,

that the problems of the Pacific could not be

solved from within one of these areas independently.

The

entire Pacific area had to be considered in its unity, for
it is only through viewing the alternative areas together
that the full relations can be exposed within the entire
area.

He writes that tc pursue the elaboration of one

anthropological area exclusively would be "like doing a
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puzzle and only using the pieces of one color."

(p. 32)

Here he is pointing to the obvious point of leverage
that alternative systems provide; for in viewing the
alternatives, questions are generated not only about the
systems themselves, but also about the relations between the
alternatives.

The total effect of viewing alternatives is

to expand the power exerted over knowledge,

a power that can

never be equalled by refining cr focusing of a singular
system.

In H e y e r d a h l ’s case, it is highly unlikely that an

anthropologist working within the specialization of either
Polynesian or American data could have developed the
hypothesis that people sailed across the Pacific from one
cultural area to another; but,

given H y e r d a h l ’s subsuming

vantage point of the alternatives viewed together such an
idea is mere likely to be generated.
Within more systematic realms, this principle of the
need for alternative systems for evaluation may be
illustrated in both analytic atd experimental areas.

Within

the former, G o d e l ’s work as described by Nagel and Newman
(1958)

has provided a proof that seems to indicate that,

within axiomatic systems at least as complicated as
elementary arithmetic,

the consistency of the system cannot

be established from within the system itself.

To establish

consistency, it is necessarj to appeal to rules beyond the
system, to a larger system.

G c d e l ’s proof seems to

demonstrate that we cannot have a consistent system and a
complete system at the same time.

To demonstrate the
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consistency of such an axiomatic system, one must appeal to
transformation rules which lie beycnd the system.
I can find a parallel development in experimental
methods.

It is possible to discern an evolution in physical

thinking from the view that experimental methods simply test
the theory against the facts to the view that we are always
testing our knowledge

within competing,

alternative systems.

Duhem*s argument against the refutability of an isolated
hypothesis is certainly an important step in this evolution
(Duhem,

1954), as is P o p p e r ’s recognition that we must

decide between at least two systems in evaluating our
knowledge

(Popper,

1965).

The full fruition of this development occurs in
Feyer abend’s thesis that a plurality of theories is
necessary for the complete evaluation of any empirical
system

(Feyerabend,

1963).

It is net sufficient, he argues,

merely to compare cne theory with the

’facts,* but

factuality can be asserted only when the theory has been
confronted with alternatives,

(p. 7)

Feyerabend gives the

scientist responsibility not only to produce information
within a theory, but actively tc seek alternatives as part
of his research program, because it is only within such a
confrontation that the factuality of o n e ’s information can
be established.

It is clear,

then, that the use of

alternative systems for the criticism of knowledge is not an
alien process,
information,

but central to the development of

central to the claims of objectivity in
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science.

The Method Described
In the design of a method, two factors should be
integrated in my opinion.

The method should use to

advantage the process cf convergence that is typical of
questioning within any framework.

Also, the method should

use to advantage the powerful leverage provided by viewing
alternative systems or frameworks.

These were the criteria

which guided me in the construction of a method.

The method

that was the result of this process I have called "The
Method of Alternative Assumed Contexts for Questioning." In
the remainder of this document this method will be referred
to by the acronym AACQ.
The logic of the method is quite simple:

to avoid the

closure imposed by a singular process of questioning, two or
more alternative processes of questioning are constructed.
In the juxtaposition of one framework of questioning to an
alternative,

a significant leverage is generated.

Likewise,

the closure of each process of questioning augments this
relief by helping to define clearly the ether framework{s).
The execution of the method may be segmented into three
discrete steps:
1-

Ilabsiiiion of &ltejn§tiv§ fl^ g med CQfltgx-fcs
An alternative assumed context for questioning is

produced by making explicit the assumptions underlying the
context under consideration and the derived principles which
develop from these assumptions.

In making assumptions
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explicit, I use to advantage the principle of transcendence
described above.
2.

The EX£2S13I§ &£

hltSiSSii-SS

Sicqqsseq £f fljissiisaifia

In this step, the alternative processes of questioning
are exposed as a dynamic process.

In each alternative

assumed context, the § a m ^ question is asked and a different
meaning generated in each context.

This same question,

given alternative meanings, becomes the focus for a process
of questioning in each framework.

In this way, the process

of questioning is brought under some control and carefully
evaluated in each framework.
3.

Consequences for FufiSiiSliia

£2£S£i§£££

The purpose of this step is to complete the alternative
systems by demonstrating that the alternative processes of
questioning generate alternative consequences.

In short,

the processes of questioning have certain implications for
function and experience:

"they make a difference."

By

defining the relation between the process of questioning and
the effects of this process on what is experienced and how
one functions, the full impact of the process can be
evaluated.

This step is accomplished by placing examples of

experience and function within the alternative assumed
contexts.
Following these three steps, the method has been
executed and alternative systems of knowledge are displayed,
each in relief of the other.

An evaluation of each assumed

context can be undertaken using the results of the method as
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a basis.

Linking The Method to Traditional Knowledge
While this may be the first formal statement of the
method of AACQ, aspects of the method are net completely
alien to traditional modes of thought.

For example, many

different cultures as well as cur own have recognized that
asking the same question in different contexts produces
different information,

and that such an awareness of how

questioning functions can be the source of enlightenment.
Here is an example taken from fables of Sufism, a
system of Moslem mysticism of the Near East:
A Sufi master was visited by a perplexed
Seeker-after-Truth, who said to him:
'I have crly one question to ask.
Why is
it that, wherever I go, I always seem to
get different pieces of advice from Sufis?'
The master answered:
'Come with me for a walk through this
town, and we shall see what we can discover
about this mystery. '
They went into the market-place.
Sufi asked a greengrocer:
'Tell me, what time cf prayer is it?
The Greengrocer said:
'The time for the morning p r a y e r . '
They continued their walk.
After some
time the Sufi asked a tailor:
'What prayer time is it?'
The tailor answered:
'It is the time of the midday prayer.'
After spending more time in conversation
and companionship with the Seeker, the Sufi
approached another man, this time a bookbinder.
'What time of prayer is it?'
The man replied:
♦It is now the time of the afternoon prayer.*
'Do you want to continue the experiment,
or are you now satisfied that virtually the same
question can elicit almost totally different
answers, all of them corresponding to the
current truth?' (Shah, 1971, pp. 6-7)
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Along more formal methodological lines, a close
parallel to the method is the "thought experiment"
physics.

used in

The "thought experiment," as used by

physicists— primarily Einstein and Bohr— presents a
contrived situation which brings together essential features
of physical thought to reveal conflicts and internal
contradictions leading to a fuller understanding of the
framework.

Unlike an ordinary experiment,

the situations in

a thought experiment are often impossible or extremely
unlikely;

for example,

in the case of Einstein’s masterful

use of the thought experiment to demonstrate aspects of
relativity theory, one is asked to envision elevators
falling through space or trains traveling at the speed of
light.
The important point is not the material possiblity of
the situations,

but rather their heuristic value, the

insights they provide.
experiments,

Within Einstein's thought

for example, it is not at guestion if a train

can be made to travel at the speed of light,

but rather what

the implications of this situation are for physical theory.
It will be recalled from the discussion in Chapter II
concerning Einstein's construction of relativity that he
used such thought experiments and the guestions they
generated to direct his theorizing.

Within the thought

experiment, then, the content is only of value in terms of
the more general process of criticizing knowledge, of
demonstrating contradictions in the framework of thought and
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of entertaining new frameworks.
Even the positivistic philosopher of science# Ernst
Hach#

a few years before Einstein's use of the thought

experiment in physics#

recognized the important role of

thought experiments in knowledge.

Writing in 1897# he

traced the development of the thought experiment from the
time of Aristotle.

He found a direct continuity with the

principles of physical experimentation:
It can be seen that the basic method of the thought
experiment is just like that of a physical experiment#
namely# the method of variation.
By varying the
circumstances (continously# if possible) the range of
validity of an idea (expectation) related to these
circumstances is increased.
Through modification and
specialization of the circumstances the idea is
modified and specialized . . . .
(Mach, 1973# p. 453)
In the method of AACQ, the model of the thought
experiment is appropriate.

For as with the thought

experiment# one systematically uses the method of variation
to place the same guestion in alternative contexts and find
the range of validity of the meaning so generated.

At this

point at least# the method proposed here and the method of
the thought experiment are guite similar..

APPLICATION OF THE METHCD TO THE PROBLEH
The method of AACQ requires for its operation an
alternative to Western knowledge.

Finding such an

alternative is an increasingly difficult task within Western
knowledge;

with its superiority in the ability to

manipulate the physical world#

Western knowledge has tended

to overwhelm most alternative cultural systems, reducing
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them to

merely sources cf anthropological data.

addition,

In

the alternative selected should be a viable

alternative to Western civilization.

One should find within

the alternative a majority cf criteria one would associate
with the term "civilization." It was with these requirements
that I began a search for an alternative,.

Traditional China as an Alternative
In my search for an alternative, I was directed toward
finding a pocket of humanity that was isolated from the
mainstream of Western thought, to the extent that an
alternative framework cf thought could develop and serve as
the nucleus for an alternative "civilization." As a final
test, I would expect that normal Western categories of
thought would fail when confronted by this alternative.
With these intentions firmly in mind, I surveyed world
history and came upon traditional China as most closely
meeting the above criteria.
As Latourette

(1964)

has observed, Chinese civilization

has been isolated from the rest of humankind more completely
and remotely than any other civilization,.

This isolation

can be largely attributed to geographical factors.
Latourette writes:
oceans,

deserts,

"Cut off from the rest of mankind by

and mountains, although receiving varied

contributions from abroad, they (the Chinese] created a
distinct civilization."

(p. ix)
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The effects of this isolation

and the alternative

character of Chinese knowledge can be discerned at a very
early level of development.

For example, while the

neolithic culture of China was quite similar even in detail
with the neolithic culture in the rest of the world, the
elegant civilization of China which flowered from this base
was quite unlike any other civilization that developed from
this common base in the rest of the world
Creel

(1929)

(Luard,

1965).

As

has speculated:

If one wishes to make an extreme statement, he
might even contend that ancient India, the
Mesopotamian world, the Mediterranean world, and
Europe shared one system cf human thought, while
Ancient China presents us with another . . . many
ideas which have been.thought ♦universal' and been
referred to the 'psychological unity of mankind'
must abdicate this position when the Chinese
touchstone is applied.
(pp. 2-3)
My intention is to take full advantage of this fractionation
of the "psychological unity of mankind" when exposed to the
counterexample of the "Chinese touchstone" in a systematic
fashion.
However, two problems arise in the use of traditional
Chinese civilization as an alternative to the West:
defining what is meant by "traditional Chinese
civilization," and the contamination and subsequent
alteration of this civilization through interaction with the
West.
In respect to defining "traditional Chinese
civilization,"

this concept, like "Western civilization,"

covers a wide diversity cf different elements within its
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boundaries.

Yet within this diversity,

over the centuries,

there has been a common stream of thought, an identity of
purpose, that identifies Western civilization as a unified
concept.

In Chapter II, I suggested what one dimension of

this identity is, to some degree, by presenting a common
process of questioning from the time of the pre-Socratic
Greeks to contemporary physics and psychology.

Likewise, I

would suggest that a similar identity can be found in the
knowledge of traditional China as a common stream running
through Chinese thought.
Fried (1973)

has enumerated some of the difficulties

implicit in defining traditional China.

He argues that such

a concept is too simplistic and must rest upon huge
generalizations,

while overlooking such major variables as

time, location and social class.

He points to the

difficulties in choosing a particular system of knowledge,
such as Confucianism,

or a particular period of time as a

model for traditional China.

Fried*s arguments and

reservations are valid given the purposes of traditional
scholarship in this area.

Such over-generalized concepts

seem to inhibit traditional scholarship where the purpose is
to make more and more clear distinctions,.
Within this perspective,
concept is too simplistic.

"traditional China" as a

Yet, it is essential that this

inquiry and method not share the limitations of traditional
inquiries;

furthermore, I shall argue below that the

purposes of this inguiry are not the same as those of the
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Chinese scholar-

In using the concept of traditional China

within the context of the method, I am only stating that an
alternative framework of human beings can be constructed
from the information that traditional China offers;
other assertions are being made-

no

I am definitely not

asserting that "traditional China" as I am representing it
existed as an entity,

nor am I stating this concept as a

model for all of Chinese thought.

Hy wish is that the

reader will bear in

mind that the method has the much more

modest and severely

delimited purpose of challenging the

assumption of an inherent nature to human beings.

This

purpose places a certain distance between this approach and
that of traditional Chinese scholarship.
The second problem is, perhaps,

more threatening for it

would compromise the very alternative character cf
traditional Chinese

knowledge in respect to the West,.

begin with, I will make every

To

effort to limit my

consideration of traditional China to China prior to 1500,
the time when the impact of Western civilization began to
alter China in a pronounced manner-

I am not suggesting

that there was no interaction prior to this date, even as
early as prehistoric times-

However, I am suggesting that

such interactions with the West never produced a major
impact on Chinese thought.
Until the sixteenth century,

what contacts there were

never altered the basic fabric of Chinese civiliation.
Needham

(1954)

ccmes to basicly the same conclusion:
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• ,. . there was mere intercourse and reaction
between the Chinese and their Western and southern
neighbours than has often been supposed, but
nevertheless . . . the essential style of Chinese
thought and culture patterns maintained a
remarkable and perennial autonomy.
This is the
real meaning of the •isolation1 of China;
contacts there were, but never abundant enough to
affect the characteristic style of the
civilization . . ..-(p. 157)
As a validation of the alternative character, one would
expect that Western categories cf thought would have
difficulty dealing with "things Chinese."

The East, in

particular China, has always enjoyed a certain mystical
quality

for Western eyes,

adjective ’inscrutable*
regard.

summarized most acutely by the

which has often been applied in this

This tends to underline the fact that Western

categories of thought do not easily encompass Chinese
categories,

and guite to the ccntrarj,

opposition to them.
noted

(Moore,

usually stand in

As one scholar in the area has aptly

1976), undoubtedly from much personal

experience and frustration in applying Western categories to
China;

"a lesson long since learned by China specialists is

that, in their application to things Chinese,
concepts often strain,
cultural burdens."

crack,

Western

and break under a host of

(p. 234)

This is not to say that attempts have not been made to
subsume Chinese thought within Western categories for these
attempts have and are being made.
very character, tend,

Such attempts,

in their

through unnecessary complexities,

to

demonstrate the very opposite of what they are attempting to
accomplish;

the alternative character of Chinese categories
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becomes underscored,

one can,

demonstrate a Taoistlc logic,

for example,

attempt to

but the result is something

less than satisfactory— so unsatisfactory that one observer
(Hu, 1971), has labeled such attempts as a fallacy, similar
to ordering a hamburger in a Chinese restaurant.

It can be

done, but the result is cot too appealing.
Viewing Chinese thought as a component of western
thought or, perhaps, a primitive precursor to Western
categories,

fails to appreciate the degree to which Chinese

thought is a complete and viable alternative to the West.
As such, it is most difficult, in fact seemingly impossible,
to assume the western framework without destroying the
essential characteristics of the Chinese framework which one
is examining.

Along this line, Wright

(1967)

argues:

To attempt to fit Chinese thought into Western
philosophic categories tends to do violence both
to the nature and to the hierarchy cf problems
with which Chinese thinkers have been concerned.
For example, epistemoiogy is a major focus of
interest for Western philosophers;
it is
subordinate or irrelevant for most Chinese
thinkers.
(pp. l-”^)
We could, for example,

deal with the thought of Confucius

within the category of the "epistemoiogy of Confucian
thought"

but this tends to violate the purposes contained

within this thought to begin with by replacing them with
Western

priorities.

Such attempts to violate the

alternative character of Chinese thought tend to reveal the
purposes and character cf Western knowledge more than they
shed light on Chinese thought.
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The alternative character cf traditional China has also
been demonstrated by the failure of Western expectations to
hold themselves against the Chinese example.
instance,

Fairbank

(1957)

As an

gives the case of the failure of

some Western assumptions about the social order to encompass
Chinese

society, by pointing to the example of Hax Weber's

investigation of bureaucracy.

Weber was able to encompass

Western social systems within a unitary concept of
bureaucratic order based on law, but when he was confronted
with Chinese social order,

according to Fairbank,

Weber

"naturally had to begin with the absence in China of any
•systematic,
law.'*'

(p. 4)

substantive, and thorough rationalization of
Weber was reguired to construct an alternative

category of bureaucratic order, demonstrating the unique,
alternative character of traditional Chinese social order.

The Spirit of this Inquiry into China
The method of AACQ places certain limitations on the
purposes this inquiry may pursue,

purposes for which inquiry

is not generally undertaken in Chinese scholarship.
Consequently, it is necessary to make explicit the different
approach to China that will be required in the following
chapters.

I do not see this methodology as being in

conflict with traditional scholarship.

Each has its own

purposes and may serve tc coaplement the other.

Indeed, the

material that will be presented in the following chapters is
the fruit of traditional scholars of China.

However, my

major concern is net with evaluating this material in
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detail,

but in attempting to construct new relationships

within the material itself through the operation of the
method of AACQ.
From the beginning cf this inguiry in Chapter I, I
defined this approach as challenging frameworks,
incrementally to them.

not adding

Con s e g u e n t l y , this approach demands

a high degree of generalization which is the intention and
spirit of the present inguiry.

It is only through the

principle of generalization that frameworks can be operated
upon.

Likewise, the method that has been constructed in

this chapter was designed with this latter purpose in mind
and has a high degree of tolerance to generalization.

The

method of AACQ demands a certain license for generalization,
a generalization that will lead to the confrontation of the
alternatives, the mainspring of the operation of the method.
This purpose clearly differentiates the method from that of
traditional scholarship which has as its purpose the
elaboration of a singular assumed context where
specialization and an eye to detail become paramount.
Specialization has certain inherent limitations in
dealing with Eastern and Western knowledge.

Northrop

(1946)

recognized this limitation in his classic investigation. The
Si

where he made a point of

distinguishing his own approach to the East from that of the
specialist.

In the introductory pages of this volume,

Northrop argues that traditional scholarship has certain
inherent limitations,

because of its specialization, in
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defining

problems which transcend local areas of concern and

affect the total framewoik.
Some problems can be defined only within the total
gestalt of the field.

According to Northrop,

traditional

scholarship, based as it is on meticulous specialization,
cannot define certain problems which lie in the relationship
between the local parts subjected to specialized study.
Making his purpose the identification of the underlying
basis of conflict in the world, Northrop feels that a new
type of scholarship is reguired, a scholarship that is based
on the general, with the courage to "venture into local
domains without all the detailed information of the experts
in these domains."

(p,

10)

It is only with this license that the whole can be
visualized and its problems defined.

As Northrop

recognized, this new form of scholarship does not have to be
antithetical and in conflict with traditional scholarship.
It is, rather, a complement of the latter.

For as the

latter provides specific focus, the former provides a much
needed wide-angle view.

The method used here reguires that

one work within the paradigm of the new scholarship.
Northrop suggests,

As

it is only within the interrelations

between specialized knowledge that the

problem addressed

here can be defined and it is cnly by venturing through
these diverse areas that the problem can be operated upon.
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Another way cf locking at the spirit of this inquiry is
to see the parallels between the present approach to
traditional approaches in physics and the social sciences.
The closest parallel to the method of AACQ within
traditional scholarship is the thought experiment.
Specifically# then# the application of the method to the
problem of challenging the assumption of an inherent nature
to human beings can be conceived of as a "thought
experiment" in human nature.

I am proposing the use. of the

"method of variation" by examining conceptions of human
behavior in the West and in traditional China to discover
the "range of validity" of the idea cf an inherent nature to
human beings.
Following E i n s t e i n ’s use cf the thought experiment in
physics, my intention in this inguiry is to expose certain
contradictions in our framework of human beings.

I will

construct the material conditions for this thought
experiment.

However,

experiment in physics#

as in the case of the thought
it is not the context of these

material conditions that is of utmost importance nor the
exhaustiveness of the scholarly detail;

it is rather# the

ability to unearth contradictions in the framework.
the content#

Again,

the material presented about traditional China#

is subservient to the process in which I am engaged,
unearthing basic relations and contraditions in the
framework of human beings.

Just as a train or elevator was

used by Einstein as the material setting to investigate the
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implications of physical theory* traditional China can serve
as the material setting for the investigation of the
implications of thoughts held about what is inherent in
human beings.
Still another way of looking at the following
discussion of traditional China is to regard the latter
concept as an "ideal type" in the sense in which it was used
by flax Weber.

The concept of ideal type frees the

investigator from having to deal with concepts which are
only representations of empirical instances and allows the
investigator "to illuminate what is peculiar to a given
cultural phenomenon."

(Idwards, 1967, p. 283)

Thus, within this conceptualization, traditional China
as a concept would not be reguired to represent all the
phenomena of Chinese civilization at any one given point in
time.

Yet, during all periods,

presents,

with the phenomena that each

one can still construct an ideal type which can

never be given a complete instance, but yet is still
representive of the global cultural phenomena of China.
This ideal type is still useful in ordering relationships,
even though there is no case where all cf the phenomena at
any one time could be said to coexist as one whole.
Such an argument from ideal types has been of use in
the physical and social sciences.

The physicist speaks of

the idea of the "perfect vacuum." Sociologists speak of
"pure rational bureaucracy" as do economists of the
"perfectly competitive market."

(Papineau,

1976, p. 137)
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In each case, the ideal type helps tc integrate and organize
existing ideas and to serve as a model for constructing new
relationships in future studies.
Finally, the way I look at my approach involves the
distinction between knowledge for and knowledge ab<?u;t.

The

traditional scholar's approach to China has the purpose of
constructing knowledge about China as an end in itself.

The

method of AACQ is constructing knowledge of China for a
certain purpose beyond the knowledge itself.

In particular,

the construction will have the purpose of generating
information to challenge the assumption defined by the
problem.

This distinction is helpful to me in keeping a

focus on the ultimate aim of the inquiry and to some degree
preventing me from becoming lost in the detail.
I can think cf no better way to close this chapter than
by quoting the propitious words of Chancellar in the
introductory pages of his translation of Wei-Ping's book on
Chinese acupuncture.

He says cf Chinese thought that it is

•'the result of an indigenous cultural and philosophical
idiom,

self-developed and isolated from the rest of the

world by high mountains and deep oceans.
thought unto itself.

Here is a world of

Tc penetrate this world, tolerance and

intellectual humility are needed."

(Wei-Ping,

1962, p. 5)
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OVERVIEW
The two classes o£ formal methods,
analytic methods,

experimental and

were evaluated as to their appropriateness

for the task of challenging the assumption of an inherent
nature to human beings.

Both methods were found to be

inappropriate for this purpose.
The method of AACQ was constructed which attempts to
use to advantage the structure cf processes of questioning
in providing closure for frameworks and the point of
leverage provided by alternative frameworks.

The basis of

the method is to ask the same guestion in alternative
assumed contexts and relating this to the consequences in
each framework.
In applying the method to the problem, traditional
China was suggested as an alternative to the West.

The

geographical and intellectual isolation of China from the
West was a key factor in producing this condition.

The

method requires a different approach to the knowledge of
traditional China from the approach of traditional
scholarship in this area.

CHA P T E R IV

ALTERNATIVE ASSUMED CONTEXTS FOR QUESTIONING
IN CHINA AND THE WEST

In order to make the method functional, I began to
examine traditional Chinese knowledge and western knowledge
with an eye to containing them within the economy of
parallel and alternative assumed contexts.

The key element

I was seeking was a single assumption central to the
structure of Western knowledge and a complementary
assumption central to the structure of knowledge in
traditional China.

ASSUMED CONTEXT FOR KNCWIEDGE IN THE WEST
The method I employed in attempting to search for the
assumed context for Western knowledge was to examine the key
traditions of the West.

In this context, perhaps structural

similarities could be found frcm which an approach could be
made to the assumed context itself.

The Assumption of Divisibility in Western Knowledge
The characteristic feature of consciousness in the
Western thinker is revealed most directly by the guestions
with which Western tradition was begun at the time of the
pre-Socratic philosophers.

Wilde and Kimmel

(1962) have

characterized this questioning in this manner:
By their very asking of the questions (questions
relating to Being) they revealed a forward step
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achieved in the consciousness of Western man— his
emergence from the naive immediacy of beings in
the midst of Being.
(p. 10)
The consciousness cf Western thinkers commenced, then,
to achieve maturity when they began to s^p^rate themselves
as knowing and guestioning beings from the Being of the
universe that was to be known.

This direction is suggested

by the dominant guesticns they asked, questions of the
order:

"What is the world made of?"

In the background of

this scenario in the birth cf Western knowledge is the
assumption of divisibility, a separation between the knower
and known.

This assumption was elevated to a point of

necessity for the functioning of Western knowledge.
In the following centuries,
increasingly central importance,

the assumption was given
with the final result that

all of Western knowledge was to hinge on this assumption.
With Parmenides and his Eleatic school of philosophy, the
assumption of divisibility became formalized and triumphant
over other systems not endorsing divisibility, such as the
philosophy of change advocated by Heraclitus.

By the fifth

century B.C., the assumption of divisibility became firmly
embedded in Western knowledge.

In Chapter IX, I will

examine this crucial period in greater detail.
From this source in early Greek times, the influence of
the assumption has penetrated all of Western knowledge.

All

of our current divisions have their source in the assumption
of divisibility.

Capra

(1975)

writes of this development:

The split cf this unity began with the Eleatic
school, which assumed a Divine Principle standing
above all gods and men.
This principle was first
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identified with the unity of the universe, but was
later seen as an intelligent and personal God who
stands above the world and directs it.
Thus began
a trend of thought which led, ultimately, to the
separation of spirit and matter and to a dualism
which became characteristic of Western philosophy.
(p. 20)
I can see in this trend a common process: the original
division gave rise to fcrther divisions and these to further
still,

until the totality of Western knowledge became

saturated with division.
At the beginnings cf the modern era,

we find the

philosopher Descartes formalizing divisibility for the
modern thinker.

Indeed, much cf the importance of his work

lies in the fact that he addressed himself to the major
problems of division.

I find, upon examination of his

works, a general endorsement of divisibility,
the division between mind and matter.

specifically

The elegance of his

philosophy lies in his ability to maintain these divisions
and yet unify them.
From the time of Descartes to the present, there is not
much to be said in respect to divisibility.

The synthesis

provided by Descartes is still very much with us, especially
in the social sciences.

Divisibility has permeated our

cultural tradition in the West, to the degree that we are
hardly aware cf it as a necessary,

functional basis for

activity.
To illustrate this, I can point to the privileged
status of divisibility within the major traditions of the
West: religion and science.

Defined on the most general
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level, these traditions have served as the container for
Western thought over the centuries.

As religion lost its

influence at the end of the middle ages, science guickly
rose to

fill the vacuum at the dawn of the modern era.

While many experience these traditions as separate and
different, on one level they both are equally committed to
the assumption of divisibility and hold the assumption
central to their operation.
Within Western religion,

the primal assumption of

divisibility reveals itself in the division between God and
man.

This division is the basis for most Western religions.

Even the scholarship of a man like Buber can only unify man
with God within an "I-Thcu" relation which maintains an
essential divisibility.
A major activity within most religions is prayer.
Again, the assumption of division is necessary for its
operation.

To pray, one must assume a division between God

and the human world;

to do otherwise is to destroy i^s

meaning.

(1965)

As Phillips

remarks, "a conviction that one

is talking to oneself is the death cf prayer."

(p. 41) This

recalls the story of the man who, when asked for a
justification for believing that he was God,

related that

one day he was praying and found that he was talking to
himself!

Clearly, such unifications of the central division

of religion reduces this institution to the absurd.
division

The

between Gcd and humankind must be assumed for

religion to function.
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A parallel development can be made explicit in the
other major tradition of the West:

science.

Science rests

firmly on the division between knower and known, observer
and observed.

Again, the central operation— the experiment

rests upon this division.

If this division is unified as it

is to some extent in modern guantum physics, the experiment
becomes problematical.

The very purpose of the experiment

is to make an independent observation of phenomena.

If

these phenomena are not independent of the observer, the
entire meaning of the experiment is called into guestion.
In this condition,

science relinguishes seme of its

validity.

Making the Assumption of Divisibility Explicit
The assumption of divisibility is so rooted in the
beginnings of knowledge in the West that it is difficult to
perceive the assumption as an assumption at all.

Bather,

the tendency is to regard the assumption as indispensible to
all knowledge.

So for us to challenge this assumption or

for us to hold it as only an arbitrary proposition is, in
one stroke, to challenge the very foundations of knowledge.
The encapsulating effect of the assumption then is more far
reaching than any ether assumption that the Western thinker
holds.
For most of us, divisibility is hardly an assumption at
all, but a discovery of "truth and reality."

Pirsig

(1974)

speaks of this sacredness of divisibility and the resistance
to regarding it as only an assumption:
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What is essential to understand at this point [the
time of early Greek philosophy] is that until now
there was no such thing as mind and matter#
subject and object# form and substance.
Those
divisions are just dialectical inventions that
came later.
The modern mind sometimes tends to
balk at the thought of these dichotomies being
inventions and says# 'Well# the divisions were
t h eye for the Greeks to discover,' and you have to
say# 'where were they?
Point to them!
and the
modern mind gets a little confused and wonders
what this is all about anyway# and still believes
the divisions were there.
(p. 367)
Questioning the assumption of divisibility on its own
ground# then# is almost an impossible task.

As was noted in

Chapter II# the task of making an assumption explicit within
the framework cf which tie assumption is a part is very
difficult.

With the assumption of divisibility in the West,

this situation is further compounded# for the assumption has
permeated the entire framework cf knowledge from its
infancy.
Chapter II was dedicated tc the evaluation of the
function of assumptions within frameworks.

In this context#

I noted the powerful "encapsulating" hold assumptions have
on one's knowledge.

It is this latter characteristic that

has prompted seme to argue that assumptions cannot be made
explicit and must forever remain "tacit."

However# it is my

conviction that assumptions can be made explicit and I
proceeded to delimit a principle by which this goal could be
accomplished.

The. " principle cf transcendence"

was

introduced whereby an assumption can be made explicit within
a framework when the assumption is transcended.
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Here my purpose is to apply this principle tc making
the assumption of divisibility explicit in Western
knowledge,

and, in the next section, to making explict an

alternative assumption in the knowledge of traditional
China.

In applying this principle, I shall assert that

divisibility is a necessary condition for the smooth
functioning of Western knowledge, and that when the
assumption is threatened,

Western knowledge generates a

paradox.
There is a tendency to dismiss some of the paradoxes
that I am about to present as trivial or nonsensical.
However,

it must be recalled the significant advantage that

paradoxes provide in the understanding of knowledge.
Paradoxes,

because they are paradoxical to us, have a

special status, for they have the valuable position of
sitting on the fence at the boundaries of one's knowledge.
Paradoxes cannot then be dismissed lightly,
they come to us in humble dress.

simply because

Kasner and Newman

(1956)

'

warn:
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the
logical paradoxes are not idle or foolish
tricks . . ... The paradoxes are like the fables
of La Fontaine which were dressed up to look like
innocent stories about a fox and grapes, pebbles
and frogs.
For just as all ethical and moral
concepts were skillfully woven into their fabric,
so all of logic and mathematics, of philosophy and
speculative thought, is interwoven with the fate
of these little jokes.
(p. 1952)
The paradoxes that are presented to us reveal something most
basic about knowledge,

and it is hoped that in this manner

they will demonstrate the way in which knowledge is based on
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the assumption of divisibility..

For as I will demonstrate,

when this assumption of divisibility is violated within
Western knowledge, a paradox arises.
Our first demonstration is from the field of logic.
Both very simple and very ancient,

the example dates from

the time of the early Greeks in the Uth century B.C., when
it was recognized that the simple statement of three words,
"I am lying," produces a profound and penetrating paradox.
If we accept the statement as true, then the statement
refutes itself.

If we accept the statement as false, the

statement also refutes itself.
In this example,

I feel there is a model for all of the

examples that are to follow.

The basic condition that

produces the paradox is the unification cf a divisibility;
in this case, the divisibility between the speaker and that
which is spoken of is collapsed.
knowledge to function further.

The result is a failure of
This particular example has

demonstrated its cogency through its longevity, first
fascinating the Greeks,

then the Schclastic philosophers,

only to be revived again by logicians and mathematicians in
the last century.

This cne example,

then, gives rise to an

entire family cf paradoxes which have developed guite
independently in widely different

areas of Western

knowledge.
For example,
language.

a similar case obtains in the area of

Language clearly depends for its force upon a

divisibility for it is a "system which can talk about
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something outside of itself." Its purpose is to operate
within this

divisibility, to describe the world.

division is

essential to the operation cflanguage for when

this division is challenged paradox results.
(1967)

This

Kilmister

provides a simple example:

***************************************************
*

*

*

The sentence in a box on this page is false.

*

*
*
***************************************************

This example places us in an analogous bind to that in the
case of the "liar" above.

There is an identity between the

language and that which is being described resulting in a
paradox.
The general semanticist Korzybski

(1958)

that "a word is net the object it represents."

reminds us
(p. 58) and

cannot be lest we be propelled into a world of paradoxical
self-reflection.
"territory"

Our language must be only a "map" of the

as general semanticists would put it.

This

division must be maintained as the basis of our linguistic
convention lest a paradox of infinite regression develop in
which the map must "include,
the map;

the map of the map;

endlessly * . .."

in a reduced scale, the map of
and so on,

(p. 58) The assumption of divisibility,

then, must be maintained for Hestern languages to function
adequately.
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If we turn tc the next bulwark of Western knowledge,
logic, I find a parallel dependence of logic on the
assumption of divisibility.

Its history is replete with

contradictions which arise from the unification of that
which has been assumed tc be divided.

Huch of the effort of

logicians, particularly in scholastic times,

was directed

toward systematically removing these contradictions from the
basis of logic.

The effort was directed toward the

discovery of a principle by which such paradoxes could be
avoided and the formulation of the fallacy of reason
contained within them.
Perhaps the most famous of these logical paradoxes is
that of a certain barber in a village described by Kasner
and Newman

(1956):

The village barber shaves everyone in the village
who does not shave himself.
(But this principle
soon involves him in a dialectical plight . . ..)
Shall he shave himself?
If he does, then he is
shaving someone who shaves himself and breaks his
own rule.
If he does not, besides remaining
unshaven, he also breaks his rule by failing to
shave a person in the village who does not shave
himself.
(p. 1950)
One can see in the last example the paradigm of other
examples treated above— the unification of a division.

In

this case the barber is unified with his own principle;
with other men the principle can be logically applied
without contradiction.

Such logical contradictions were

known to exist at the basis of logic since antiquity.
Scholastic philosophers attempted to formulate principles by
which such contradictions could be resolved.
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After this tine,

however, interest in such

contradictions diminished until the middle of.the nineteenth
century,

when analogous contradictions began to emerge at

the very basis of mathematics.

The mathematician Cantor,

the founder of modern set theory,

generated analogous

paradoxes concerning infinite classes.

Since set theory is

used as a basis for many processes central to mathematics,
these paradoxes— or antimonies,

as they became known

technically— could not be passed over lightly as an
interesting oddity in the otherwise consistent pattern of
knowledge.
Conseguently, in response to this difficulty, and
others in which mathematics found itself at the turn of the
century,

Whitehead and Bussell

monumental work,

P iia s iE i§

on a firm logical basis.

(1957)

attempted, in their

.f l i l £ h e m ajiga,

to place mathematics

Correspondingly, they found it

necessary to deal directly with the confluence of logical
and mathematical paradoxes and tc provide a principle
whereby they could be systematically removed from
mathematical logic.

It was in this context that they

presented several antimonies of which the following is a
principle example:
Let w be the class cf all those classes which are
not members of themselves.
Then, whatever class x
may be, *x is a w* is equivalent to *x is not an
x . * Hence, giving to x the value w, *w is a w* is
equivalent to *w is not a jg. ' (Whitehead and
Bussell, 1957, p. 60)
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It is with such paradoxes that the ordinary rules of
logical inference seem to fail.

Whitehead and Bussell

suggested the "theory cf logical types and degrees" whereby
these contradictions can be systematically removed from the
basis of mathematical lcgic.

The basis of this theory was

that propositions could be d i vided by type and degree.
These antimonies could then be attributed to irregular use
of different types of propositions within a single argument.
The major thrust of this theory was to insure a divisibility
which had been viclated in producing such
self-contradictions.
Whitehead and Bussell attributed the origin of these
antimonies to "a vicious circle fallacy."

"The vicious

circles in question arise from supposing that a collection
of objects contains members which can only be defined by
means of the collection as a whole."

(p. 37)

What in effect

Whitehead and Bussell were suggesting, in my terminology,
was that a certain divisibility must be maintained at the
basis of mathematical logic tc avoid contradiction, and they
suggested their theory cf types as a means of legislating
such a division of propositions.
In any respect, these paradoxes should be viewed as
something more than pure speculation or games, for as
Chihara

(1977)

notes, it was through a consideration of

these paradoxes that a fruitful exploration of the
foundations of mathematics was pursued in the first half of
this century.

He writes, "It is hard to imagine what form
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logic and set theory would have today had the paradoxes not
been discovered and taJssu SSSlSJlSlJ-11 (P- 3 6 9 * His italics)
In the 1930*s, the mathematician Godel dealt a telling
blow to any attempt to place mathematics on a
non-contradictory basis.

I have presented aspects of his

famous proof above in defense of the assertion that
alternative systems are needed for the full evaluation of a
system of knowledge.

However, this proof also demonstrates

that at the basis of any logical system as complex as
elementary arithmetic a necessary contradiction arises.

Any

one mathematical system cannot demonstrate its own
consistency;
propositions.

there will always remain certain undecided
We have in this a classic example of the

bracketing of a division where the system attempts to
demonstrate something about itself.
attempt

The result of the

to turn the system back upon itself is

self-contradiction.

In short, Gcdel*s proof, in its

broadest implications, established that:
It is not possible to demonstrate the
non-contradictoriness of a rational system by
using only the means offered by the system itself.
(Carruccic, 1964, p. 361)
Godel recognized in presenting his argument the
similarity between his proof and the paradoxes I have
already considered above,
"liar."

particularly the paradox of the

In terms of my purposes, it appears that a certain

divisibility between the system and itself must be
maintained to insure the full function of axiomatic systems.
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In the above discussion of the assumption of
divisibility I have focused on the areas of logic and
language#

areas in which there is an attempt to use precise

definition.

I concluded that at the basis of the validity

of both there is the assumption of divisibility.

However#

the assumption is a more general precondition for the
Western tradition of knowing.

Parallel demonstrations can

be found in the major traditions of Western knowledge.
For example,
cyberneticist,

from the area of religion# the

Wiener

(1964)

provides us with a

demonstration of the need for a basic assumed divisibility
at the center of religion which demands that God be divided
from the universe he created.

He recounts an age-old

question that has troubled many who believe and assert the
omnipotence of God:
Can God make a stone so heavy that he cannot lift
it?
If He cannot# there is a limit to His power,
or at least their appears to be;
and if He can#
this seems to constitute a limitation to His
powers too.
(p. 6)
This example and the double-bind it produces in our thought
can be clearly seen to fit within the paradigm noted above
in the case of the liar.

In this case# the unification of a

basic division in religion between God and the universe
results in a paradox.
In the other major tradition of Western knowledge,
science#

I can illustrate a similar dependence on the

assumption of divisibility,

is was noted above# the

tradition of science is committed to a basic division
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between observer and observed.
its classical manner#
but maintained.

For science to function in

this division must not only be assumed

This need can be demonstrated by examining

the paradoxes generated in scientific thought when this
division was challenged in the micrccosmic world of quantum
physics.
It was in the 1920's that the classical division
between the observer and observed was bracketed by
experimental results, results that seemed to demonstrate
that the observer could not be totally isolated from the
thing being observed.

This unification of the classical

division produced such paradoxes in thought as Heisenberg's
uncertainty principle whereby two variables could not be
known simultaneously— for example# both the position and
velocity of an electron.
theory#

Again# in the example of quantum

we find the same paradigmatic development#

the

unification of a division resulting in a paradox.
In the above discussion# I have endeavored to make
explicit the assumption of divisibility in many different
areas of Western knowledge.

I have attempted to demonstrate

in each case that as this assumption is challenged# the
system fails to function and results in paradox.

Without

the assumption of division# the powerful and central
bulwarks of Western thought are reduced to
self-contradiction.

On this basis, I conclude that the

assumption of divisibility is a general requirement for the
function of Western knowledge.
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Bridgman

(1959)

has recognized the interconnection of

the examples I have presented and the general character of
Western knowledge’s need to assume a division between
systems.
The essence of the situation presented by G o d e l ’s
theorem seems to be that we are here concerned
with a system dealing with itself— mathematics
attempting to prove something about mathematics,.
Similar situations present themselves frequently
in logic, as when we have the class of all
classes, including itself, or contemplate the
barber ordered to shave all those who do not shave
themselves, including himself, or the map that
must contain a map cf the map. In all these
situations we have systems dealing with
themselves, and in all these cases we have paradox
or, at best, infinite regression, and therefore
difficulty.
It is tempting to generalize G o d e l ’s
theorem to read that whenever we have a system
dealing with itself, we may expect to encounter
maladjustments and infelcities, if not downright
paradox.
(p. 7)
In this statement, Bridgman draws all of the examples
presented together to reveal the general case of the
generation of a paradox within Western knowledge:

when

previously divided systems are united into one system
paradox results.
Nowhere is this principle given more substance than in
the case of the theoretical problems surrounding General
Systems Theory.

The problems arise because the purpose of

this theory is to generate the most general system and in
the process all of the normal divisions between systems are
eliminated.

As would be expected, this structural condition

produces paradoxes surrounding how systems will be
integrated and differentiated.

Sadovsky

(1974)

has made

explicit no less than six paradoxes that these issues
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generate for systems theory.

ASSUMED CONTEXT EOS KNOWLEDGE
IN TBADITICNAI CHINA
A fruitful way to deal with the assumed context of
traditional China is simply to treat it as the inverse of
the Western assumed context.

Where the assumed context of

the West is dominated by the assumption of division,

using

this logic one would expect the Chinese framework to be
permeated by unity.

This is the hypothesis that largely

directed my efforts in this area.
One could speculate about the possible source of this
inverse relation.

I could speculate that in some manner

unity is "logically" prior to divisibility.

While Western

thought moved from unity to increasing divisibility, in
traditional China we dc not find divisibility at the core of
the consciousness of the Chinese thinker.
suggested that "a man
his race cr country,

’Westernizes*

Guenon

himself,

(1972)

has

whatever may be

to that extent he ceases to be an

Oriental spiritually and intellectually."

(p. 16)

From this perspective, the unity implicit in the
knowledge of China is net an sxcepticnal case to be
accounted for, but it is that Western thinkers have
progressively divided themselves from this primal unity.
According

to

Guenon,

this is ere of the great values of

oriental civilization for the Westerner, for the former is
the only major cultural system that has retained what the
Westerner has leng since abandoned.
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In contrast tc the development of knowledge in the
West, the Chinese retained and elaborated knowledge based on
an assumption of unity.

The knowledge that developed has an

"organic" quality, a term often used by scholars in this
area, viewing China as they do from the grounds cf Western
divisibility.

This is really the closest approximation the

Western terminology permits given its inherent assumption of
divisibility.
On another level, the assumption of unity, viewed
through Western eyes,

appears to reveal an emphasis away

from abstraction and toward immediate experience.
Western categories of thought seem to fail.

Again,

For example,

the contrast reveals itself most clearly in Northrop«s
distinction between "theoretic" and "aesthetic" components
(Northrop, 19h6).

Using this classification,

Northrop

argues that the West is characterized by the theoretic
component where Western thinkers attempt to abstract
themselves from that which is being known.

In firm

contrast, the knowledge of the East tends toward the
aesthetic ccmpcnent based on an essential intimacy between
the knower and that which is known.
In short,

the major thesis being presented is that

while the Western thinker found it necessary to articulate
knowledge on essentially two planes— characterized by a
large number of dualisms such as mind-body,
objective,

subjective-

and so forth— the Chinese, from the earliest

time, built their knowledge monistically, based on an
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essential unity.

Like tie divisibility of the West# this

unity revealed itself very early in the development of the
system of knowledge.
Wilhelm

(1960)

gives an excellent example of this

divergence in knowledge in his examination of the I p lying.
the Book of changes, an ancient Chinese text concerning
order and change in the universe.
this early stage of development

He notes that even at

(500 B.C.), there was a

clear distinction between the concepts of change in China as
compared to Greek thought of the same period.
dimension is one cf divisibility and unity.

Again, the
Change and the

laws of change were conceived by the Greeks to be separate,
such that the laws of change were abstracted from the actual
movement of things in the universe.
course,

Such an abstraction, of

bases its authority on the assumption of

divisibility prevalent in the Greek philosophy of the time.
While for the Chinese,

given their assumption of unity,

these two elements were viewed within the same unity.
Wilhelm notes:
But to the Chinese, as we shall see, the two
principles, mcvement and the unchanging law
governing it, are one;
they knew neither kernel
nor husk . . . heart and mind function together
undivided.
(p. 13)
As Wilhelm suggests, this one division,
divisions made by Western thinkers,
Chinese.

As Pirsig

like most

is not valid for the

(1974) has recognized, the basic

divisions were the result of the dialectical process of the
Greeks,

resulting,

in turn, in an entire series of
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dichotomies within Western knowledge.

Such a dialectical

process did not occur among the Chinese of this period and,
consequently,

their knowing process retained and perpetuated

an essential unity.

The assumption of Unity in Chinese Knowledge
The

problem in defining the assumption of unity within

the traditions of China is that we must approach this
alternative framework from the Western framework which has
the contradictory assumption of divisibility embedded in it.
Most directly,

the Western framework produces in us certain

expectations that must be produced for definition,

while the

Chinese framework tends to function along quite different
lines.

For example,

within the Western framework,

the more

central a concept is, the more important it is to the
framework, the more analytically it becomes defined.

Thus,

the layman's definition cf energy is less precise and
explicit than that of the physicist, who discriminates among
different types of energy.

This flow of knowledge derives

from the assumption of divisibility.
this assumption,

Within the domain of

the definition of a concept is related to

its clear discrimination from other concepts.
In Chinese thought, the customary criteria used in the
West for the definition cf concepts do not apply.

Indeed,

the reverse relation seems to exist, as a concept becomes
more central within the Chinese framework,
less definable and more obscure.

it becomes both

This flow of knowledge is

a product of the underlying assumption of unity, which
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continues to submerge the concept within the ever greater
unity of which it is a part.

Consequently,

the present

discussion with the purpose of defining unity within the
major traditions of China must, of necessity,

fall short of

Western expectations for definition.
The nearest that the Chinese approximate labeling the
fundamental unity of their framework is in the concept of
the Tao which is one of the most ancient, profound, obscure
and central concepts within Chinese knowledge.

To even

attempt to define it by Western standards of definition is
like attempting to hit the moon with an arrow;

one is told

by the sages of the East that one is destined to fail.
The concept of the Tao antedates both of the major
traditions of China, Confucianism and Taoism,
cjassj.cqs. according to Needham

with the locus

(1956), to be found in the

ancient classic, the I C h^ng. where it is recorded:
Ying and One Yang;
Consequently,
Taoism,

that is the Tao!

"'One

(p. 274).

both Confucius and Lao Tse, the founder of

inherited a framework based on the unity of the Tao.

The fullest definition

(if one can call it this) of the

relation between the Tao and the assumption of unity appears
in the great, but obscure classic of Taoism, the T^p Te
Ching. generally translated as the "The Way and its Power."
The work, however,
more explicit,
volume,

far from making the nature of the Tao

tends to further obscure it.

This little

of but a few characters, has undergone tens, if not

hundreds,

of translations due tc its basic obscurity.

We
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read in the beginning cf the vclume that the "True Tao"
cannot be spoken of:
The tao (way) that can be told of is not the
eternal T 3 0 :
The name that can be named is net the eternal
name.
(Chan# 1963# p. 139)
Here# we are confronted directly with the problem alluded to
at the beginning of this section:

to name this unity or Tao

is not to define it, by its very definition.
The point of this discussion is that the Tfao cannot be
approached by the traditional Western process of knowing;
to attempt to do so is to miss the mark completely.
response of the Master Nan Ch'uan to the guestion,

The
"What is

the Tao?" is here more than appropriate:
•The Tao#* said the master# ’belongs neither to
knowing ncr tc net knowing.
Knowing is false
understanding;
net knowing is blind ignorance..
If you really understand the Tac beyond doubt#
it's like the empty sky.
Why drag in right and
wrong?' (Watts, 1975, p. 38)
It is here more correct to identify the problem not so much
with the T 3 0 as with the Western process of knowing which is
antithetical tc the very character of that which we are
seeking to know.
at this pcint, almost in frustration,

one could ask:

"What can be said of tie unity cf the lao?" If I must "shoot
an arrow at the moon,"

I can provide an approximation by

saying that the T§o represents to the Chinese the way of the
universe, the unity of the universe.

The universe,

for the

traditional Chinese, was a unified whole functioning in
harmony like a giant organism, each part having its 3& 0 ,
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harmonizing completely into the 3 aS °f the entire universe.
This is such a difficult concept to relate because
order and change in the universe,
principles,

to Western eyes,

divided frcm the wcrld.

For the Chinese,

everything was unified into the whole of the Tao,.
(1956)

stand as

Needham

writes:

The key word in Chinese thought is order and above
all pa-t;-frern (and, if I may whisper it for the
f irst” time, Org^nj.sm). The symbolic correlations
or correspondences all formed part of one colossal
pattern.
Things behaved in particular ways not
necessarily because of prior actions or impulsions
of other things, but because their position in the
ever-moving cyclical universe was such that they
were endowed with intrinsic natures which made
that behaviour inevitable for them.
If they did
not behave in those particular ways they would
lose their relational positions in the whole
(which made them what they were), and turn into
something ether than themselves.
(p. 281)
The representation for this pattern or order was the T§o.
Both Confucianism and Taoism share this tradition of
the unity of the T a o . with a different emphasis.

The

Confucians had as their primary concern the pattern and
order of society and were, consequently, interested in the
"Tao of Man."

Alternatively, the Tacists were concerned

with order and pattern in Nature and consequently concerned
themselves with the "2§o of Nature."

Even as these two

traditions conflicted on many issues, they still shared the
communality of the unity of the £ao.
In the Taoist classic, the T§o

we find the

following passage in which Lao Tse relates the
unity of the universe:
There was something undifferentiated and yet
complete,.

to the
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Which existed before heaven and earth.
Soundless and formless, it depends on nothing
and does not change.
It operates everywhere and is free from danger.
It may be considered the mother of the universe.
I do not know its name;
I call it Tao.
(Chan, 1963, p. 152)
Again from the same classic.

Lac Tse relates how the

universe arises fom the unity of the T a o :
Tao produced the Cne.
The One produced the two.
The two produced the three.
And the three produced the ten thousand things.
The ten thousand things carry the yin and em
brace the yang and through the blending of
the material force <ch*i) they achieve harmony.
(Chan, 1963, p. 160)
Two elements must be stressed from this passage.

First,

that for the Chinese and the Tacists in particular, there is
always a unity below the diversity of things.

Secondly,

this progression that Lao Tse relates must not be read from
the Western assumption of divisibility,.

The differentiation

referred to here was not simply division as it occurred in
the West,

but rather a very special form of differentiation,

if this word is appropriate at all,

which maintained the

essential unity of the system.*

♦Scholars in both China and the West have traditionally
distinguished between T a c-Chia cr Estoteric Taoism and
Tao-Chj.as or Popular Tacist Religion.
The former is the
Taoism of the great mystics celebrated in the y^o 3s C h i n g .
while the latter is the corrupt version of the common
peasant which is given to superstition and necromancy.
This
inquiry will freely draw from both traditions as the
situation warrants.
It is my feeling that there is an
underlying communality which could be called Philosophical
Taoism which is at the center of both traditions and has
provided a particular orientation to Chinese culture.
I
would agree with the assessment of Smith (1958) that:
"Esoteric Taoism has vanished;
Popular Taoism is corrupt;
but Philosophical Taoism continues to shape Chinese
character in the direction of serenity and grace." (p. 181)
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In C o n f u c i a n i s m ,
u n i t y of the T a o .

we find

the s am e d e d i c a t i o n

In one of the m o s t p r o f o u n d p o i n t s

c l as si c of C o n f u c i a n i s m ,

The A n a l e c t s , C o n f u c i u s

abou t his d o c t r i n e s b y a d is c ip le .
ac co rd i ng
said,

Confucius

to the t r a n s l a t i o n b y L e g g e

'Shan, m y d o c t r i n e

un it y. '"

(p. 169)

in the

is asked

replies,

(1970) , "The M aster

is that of an a l l - p e r v a d i n g

For C o n f u c iu s ,

this u n i ty m u s t b e g in w it h

the i nd i vi du a l h u m a n b ei ng w h e r e h e a r t and m i n d
this m a n n e r ,

to the

o ne c an c o n d u c t on e' s

life

are one.

In

in a c c o r d a n c e w i th

the T ao of Man.
As I h a v e s u g g e st e d above,
divisibility

in the W e s t a f f e c t s

w i t h i n the W e s t e r n
I found W e s t e r n

framework.

t h i nk e rs

a s su me d d i v i s i b i l i t y
experiment

the a s s u m p t i o n of

w o u ld a n t i c i p a t e

In b ot h r e l i g i o n and

a t te m p t i n g

(namely,

in s c i e n c e ) .

the f u n c t i o n of p e o p l e

to f u n c t i o n w i t h i n

p ra y e r

S i m i l a rl y,

that p e o p l e w ou l d

in t r a d i t i o n a l China,

Taois m,

p e o p l e are a t te m p t i n g

u ni ty by a cting
t h e m s e lv e s
purpose

to p r o m o t e

I

a t t e m p t to f u n ct i on

the d i s c u s s i o n s

I can in this c o n t e x t s ay that

this

in r e l i g i o n and

w i t h i n the c o n t e x t of u n i t y w i t h i n their m a j o r
Without preempting

science,

trad it io ns .

that are to follow,

in bo th C o n f u c i a n i s m and
to w or k w i t h i n

the a s su med

the u n i t y of the T ao and a dj us t

to the n a t u r a l c o n t o u r s of

its nature.

for k n o w l e d g e w i t h i n the d o m a i n of u n i ty

in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the T a o .

T hi s

The
is to act

is e s s e n t i a l l y wh y

C o n f u c i u s p l a c e s such g r e a t e m p h a s i s o n the c o r r e c t b e h a vi o r
in the s m a l l e s t m a t t er s .

L i ke wi se ,

in T ao is m,

contrasting
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sharply with Western people's concern with experimenting and
controlling Nature, people attempt to unify themselves with
the Tao of Nature.
Examples of unification with the T 3 0 abound in Taoist
literature,

perhaps the mcst famous is the story of the

butcher of King Hui of Liang related by Needham

(1956):

Ting, the butcher of King Hui, was cutting up a
bullock.
Every blow of his hand, every heave of
his shoulder, every thread of his foot, every
thrust of his knee, every sound of the rending
flesh, and every note of the movement of the
chopper, were in perfect harmony— rhythmical like
the Mulbe r r y Grove dance, harmonious like the
chords of the C h^qq Shgu music.
'Admirable,' said
the prince.
'Yours is skill indeed!' 'Sir,' said
the cook, laying down his chopper, 'What your
servant loves is the T a o , which is higher than
mere skill.
When I first began to cut up oxen, I
saw before me the entire carcasses.
After three
years' practice, I saw no more whole animals.
Now
I work with my mind and not my eyes, my spirit
having no need of control of the senses.
Following the natural structure, my chopper slips
through the deep crevices, slides through the
great cavities, taking advantage of what is
already there.
My art avoids the tendinous
ligatures, and much more so the great bones.
A
good cook changes his chopper once a year, because
he cuts.
An ordinary cook needs a new chopper
once a month because he hacks.
But I have had
this chopper for nineteen years, and although I
have cut up many thousands of bullocks, its edge
is as if fresh from the wetstone.
(pp. 45-6)
Commenting on this passage, Needham remarks that the nature
of the T$o reveals itself as something not vague and obscure
to the Chinese, but as being the "naturalness, the very
structure, of particular and individual types of things."
(P-

45)
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Making the Assumption cf Unity Explicit
To find the assumption cf unity in the major traditions
of China is net tc make this assumption explicit in a
technical sense.

Again, the principle of transcendence

suggested itself to me for this task.

The thought that

first occurred to me was to attempt to make the assumption
explicit by employing the same stratagem as was done for the
Western

framework:

division.

engineering the unification of a

The expected failure of this stratagem would have

the benefit of reaffirming that traditional China is in fact
an alternative framework to the West.
In the assumption cf divisibility in the assumed
context of the West, it was pointed out that the unification
of a division resulted in a failure cf Western knowledge to
function.

It is logical that in an assumed context

dominated by unity, such a condition of unification of a
division should net prove a weakness but rather a strength
for the system.

It would be expected that such a condition

would not inhibit the functioning of the assumption of
unity,

but actually would reinforce this assumption.

To illustrate this point, I turn to the writings of
Chang-Tze, who is surpassed only by the founder of Taoism,
Lao Tze, in his knowledge of the Tao and its unity.

In his

writings, Chang-Tze provides the following example of the
unification of divisions as reinforcing the unity of the
Tao:
If you hide away a boat in the ravine of a hill,
and hide away the hill in a lake, you will say
that (the boat) is secure;
but at midnight there
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shall come a strong man and carry it off on his
back, while ycu in the dark knew nothing about it.
You may hide away anything, whether small or
great, in the most suitable place, and yet it
shall disappear from it.
Eut if you could hide
the world in the world, so that there was nowhere
to which it could be removed, this would be the
great reality of the ever-during Thing (the T ao).
(Legge, 1927, pp.. 242-43)
In the last sentence,

I find the classic example of the

unification of a divisicn, as Chang-Tze asks us to "hide the
world in the world."

Unlike Western knowledge where .this

condition produces a negation of the system,

given the

Chinese framework, there is an affirmation of the system.
To operate upon the assumption cf unity in the
framework of traditional China, a different stratagem would
be best employed.

We cannot simply unify what is divided

resulting in paradox and perplexity as has been done with
Western knowledge.

Given the assumption cf unity,

such

unifications do not present a problem, and, consequently,
cannot be used to advantage.

For example, consider the oft

quoted story of the man who confused the distinction between
waking and dreaming:
Formerly, I, Kwang Kau, dreamt that I was a
butterfly, a butterfly flying about, feeling that
it was enjoying itself.
I did net know that it
was Kau.
Suddenly, I awoke, and was myself again,
the veritable Kau.
I did not know whether it had
formerly been Kau dreaming that he was a
butterfly, or it was now a butterfly dreaming that
it was Kau.
(Legge, 1927, p. 197)
This story appears in the writing of the Taoist, Chang
Tze in a section of his writings titled the "The Adjustment
of Controversies"

which has as its purpose to demonstrate

that the unity of the 2 §o underlies all conflicting
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divisions.

Thus, in this context of unity, Kwang Kau's

confusion of the division between dreaming and waking
presents no major perplexities cr paradoxes.
Compare this to the fate cf the same unification in the
Western

framework.

The confusion of waking and dreaming

presents a central philosophical problem.

This issue is

best revealed in the philosophy of Descartes where the
confusion of dreaming and waking is one of Descrates* key
doubts and its resolution becomes central to his
epistemology.

He finds it necesssary to make as clear as

possible a distinction between the two states, while our
Chinese

philosopher merely entertains the possibilities of

relation between the two.
This example is representive of the differences in the
two frameworks.

A different approach must be taken from

that taken with the assumption of divisibility.

To advance

beyond this point, I shall employ the same general process,
the principle cf transcendence, to the problem of making the
assumption of unity explicit.

Since a framework based on

the assumption of unity presents to us a continous whole, I
could not find a clear point of leverage from within the
framework.

In this case, an effective principle of

criticism suggests that I should seek an alternative system
with which to confront the unified system of the Chinese,
the manner of an external probe.

In this manner, the

dominant unity of the framework can be transcended.

in
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As noted above, China has retained a privileged
position insulated from the impact of alien influence.

It

is this very isolaticn that has given China its alternative
framework.

Traditionally,

the Chinese have been dominant in

their cultural area and regarded themselves as the “center
of the world."

Their characteristic reaction to foreign

contacts has been to submerge these foreign elements, in a
non-violent manner., within the Chinese whole.

In this way,

innumerable barbarous hordes of Central Asia became
"sinicized"

and assimilated.

When the

power of the alien

was beyond the capacity cf this assimilation process, the
characteristic response,

even to the present time

(e.g.,

the

behavior of Haoist China in the 20th century), was to
withdraw into isolation.
There is cne major exception to this general course of
events in the history of China providing an interesting
point of leverage.
(circa,

65 A.D.),

appear in China.

At the beginning of the Christian era
a foreign element. Buddhism,

began to

Unlike the prior ccurse of events, the

Chinese addressed themselves directly to this foreign
doctrine and attempted tc deal with the problems generated
by its introduction within their assumed context.

In

Buddhism, we have a condition cf transcendence where the
overpowering unity of the Chinese was breached.
It will be recalled frcm the discussion above that the
Chinese scholar Creel

(1929)

was guoted as saying that if we

viewed the world in the most comprehensive terms, one could
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divide it into two alternatives with India, the Middle East,
and Europe on one extreme,
on the other.

and China and her cultural area

On this basis, India and her knowledge system

could be conceived as being Western.

An indication of this

can be taken from historical linguistics where it has been
recognized that there is a direct linkage between the
language of Ancient India,

Sanskrit, and the roots in

European languages.
Consequently, the linguist groups them together under
the label, Indo-European languages.

In China, we find a

radically different language structure which has little or
no relation to Indo-European languages.

If there is such a

gap between India and China on something as basic as
language structure, we would expect that this gap would be
reflected in many different areas.

Hright

(1959)

describes

the differences:
No languages are mere different than these of
C hina and India.
Chinese is uninflected,
logographic, and (in its written form) largely
monosyllabic;
Indian languages are highly
inflected, alphabetic, polysyllabic.
Chinese has
no systematized grammar;
Indian languages,
particularly Sanskrit, have a formal and highly
elaborated grammatical system.
(p. 33)
Naturally, of course,

these differences tend to permeate

through the entire system.

Wright goes on:

When we turn to literary modes, we find that the
Chinese preference is for terseness, for metaphors
from familiar nature, for the concrete image,
whereas, Indian literature tends to be discursive,
hyperbolic in its metaphors, and full of
abstractions.
(p.
33)
Here, in this comparison of languages and the immediate
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ramifications in literary style, we can appreciate the fact
that we are confronted with two basically different systems.
When we turn specifically to Buddhism,

we find that as

a system it emerged from the Indian cultural matrix being
very much committed to this assumed context.
point is that Buddhism,
knowledge,

The important

arising as it does from Indian

is essentially a part of the Western framework

and, consequently, has inherited the assumption of
divisibility which permeates the Western framework.

Before

proceeding further, I shall attempt to illustrate the
essential association cf Buddhism with the Western framework
of divisibility.
Daye

(1975)

points out that the Buddhists were very

careful in their definition of concepts such as "emptiness"
to insure that reflexsive problems would not arise.

In the

case of emptiness, a strict divisibility was maintained
which viewed "emptiness" only as a construct in language,
not as an ontological entity.

In this way, the turning of

emptiness back upon itself, and consequently,

the problems

and confusion inherent in this unification of a division,
could be avoided.
In Buddhism, the principle that a unification of
something normally divided leads to a paradox seems to be
very much operative.

Daye writes that in Buddhist thought,

there is a "persistent confusion surrounding the
propositions that there is perception but no perceiver,
thought but no independent ontological thinker."

(p.

99)
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As I have noted and suggested above these confusions vhich
Western thinkers and the Buddhists share arise from the
common assumption within the Western framework of a
separation between the knower and kncwn.

It would seem that

Buddhist knowledge shares the same limitations in respect to
division as does Western knowledge.
In the following discussion, I will assume that with
Buddhist knowledge we have an alternative to the Chinese
assumption of unity.

Tc make use of this transcending

condition, I will examine in detail the problem that the
Chinese experienced in attempting to understand Buddhist
knowledge.

If the analysis is correct, the Chinese thinker

should experience problems with the divisibilities imposed
by the Buddhists.

In short, the problems and paradoxes will

be due to the fact that the Buddhists were assuming certain
divisions which the Chinese traditionally had unified.*
At the time of the Buddhist introduction, human beings
in traditional China existed in a fundamental unity on a
number of levels.

On the level cf knowledge, the thinker

was unified with knowledge and the world, resulting in a
concrete and pragmatic form of knowledge.

Within the social

level, human beings were unified with other human beings in

♦To display the full impact of this discussion, it will be
necessary to anticipate the discussion that will be
undertaken in the next chapters.
However, at this point, in
order to present the contrast, it will be reguired to make
some rather bread generalizations about the unity of human
beings in traditional China without spending the time to
support each assertion.
The reader must keep in mind that
these assertions will be documented at length in the
following pages.
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the whole of the family and always functioned and
interpreted their world from the context of family
relationships.

The family, for the Confucian, revolved

around the central axis of the father-scn relation and
placed great importance on virtue in the relation of filial
piety.

It was through this relation of continued obedience

of the son to the father that the whole of the family was
perpetuated through time.
On the level cf the individual,
unity.
whole

we find a similar

Human beings were considered to be a harmonious
>f mind and body.

In general, the image that this

brief and sketchy portrayal of human beings in traditional
China is intended to convey is a human being unified with
the "here and now," as immediately reacting to the world in
concrete terms and functioning in a pragmatic manner.
This central assumption of unity really becomes
explicit when we examine the problems generated by the
introduction of Buddhist divisibilities.
think,

It is difficult, I

to appreciate the impact of this confrontation on the

Chinese.

From their perspective, the confrontation was

traumatic, generating numerous "absurdities."

Chen

(1973)

attempts to relate something of this:
The Chinese were also told that the phenomenal
world is illusory, like a mirage or shadow, that
life is suffering and transitory, that sensual
pleasures are undesirable and therefore ought to
be suppressed or eradicated, that the ideal
pattern of life was withdrawal frcm society and
family to life of celibacy and mendicancy.
The
Chinese also learned that because of rebirth,
their ancestors could very well be reborn as
animals and hence it wculd be wise to follow a
vegetarian diet.
(p. 3)

118

It can be seen frcm Chen's brief statement that one could
not imagine a system of thought that vas more antithetical
to the Chinese system.
At the root cf all cf these perplexities was the simple
fact that Buddhist notions of Beality were based on the
assumption of divisibility and the Chinese on unity:
Nirvana, the sole Buddhist Beality, lay outside
the Chinese order of reality altogether.
The
empirical world and its inner principle, which the
Chinese assumed to be all of Beality, was,
according to Indian Buddhism, sheer illusion.
(Nather, 1955, p. 26)
To open this point cf entry further, the major problem
for the Chinese was the proclivity cf the Buddhists for a
high level of abstraction in knowledge.

As I noted, the

Chinese were unified with the world and their knowledge was
immediate, concrete and pragmatic.

The Chinese revealed

their wholeness in reacting to this abstraction: they
attempted to reduce the abstractions of the Buddhists to
visual diagrams and, thus,

attempted to make these esoteric

doctrines immediately available

(Nakamura,

1964).

However,

such attempts were of little effect for there was a basic
difference in assumptions and language structures.
The Buddhists were being guite Western

with their

divisibilities and were seeking a "reality" beyond the world
as it is immediately experienced.

This doctrine comes into

direct confrontation with the Chinese assumption of unity
which required the world be experienced immediately as a
whole.

Needham

(1956)

writes cf this conflict:

Another doctrine introduced by Euddhism which was
basically antagonistic tc the indigenous
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philosophies was that of the illusory nature of
the visible world (J&ya), and its corresponding
theoretical form cf subjective idealism.
(p. 410)
Such differences resulted in different purposes for
knowledge.
Buddhism was not interested in co-ordinating and
interpreting experience, or finding reality in the
fullest and most harmonious statement of the facts
of experience, but in seeking some kind of
•reality* behind the phenomenal world, and then
brushing the latter away as a useless curtain.
(Needham, 1956, p. 417)
Dumoulin

(1963)

notes, along these

was a basic difference

same lines, that there

in values. The Chinese

wished to

live in harmony and unity with Nature and other human
beings,

while the Indian Buddhists were committed to fleeing

the world in an
If we turn

act of division.
to the social level, wefind analogous

problems centered around division and unity between human
beings.

The Buddhists regarded human beings as individuals,

who were seeking their own salvation in the manner of the
Buddha himself.

Consequently, the religion advocated the

monastic life independent of the everyday,

profane world.

Given the Chinese experience of the unity of people, the
conflict

in social values was readily joined.

As Chen

(1973)

records, the Chinese attacked the

Buddhists for being ,,u n f i l i a l ,, and destroying the unity of
the family and society in favor of individual gratification
of monastiic celebacy.

Again, we find the same paradigmatic

problem, the Buddhists were making a division of human
beings from the rest of humankind,

while the Chinese held a
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unity of all humankind as represented by the whole of the
family.
On the level of the individual,
same type of problem.

we find,

again, the

The Chinese had not shown any

inclination to divide human beings into mind and body or to
divide and analyze the personality of human beings.
Chinese,

the human being was a unified whole

The Buddhists,

For the

(Wright, 1959).

on the ether hand, had an elaborate system of

psychological analysis.

Again, a confrontation was at hand:

the Buddhists suggested a suppression of the passions in
which the mind controlled the body.

Consequently,

the

Buddhists advocated rules and methods for expunging of these
passions.

Chen

(1964)

records one such case in particular.

The Buddhists suggested that in order to extirpate lust, one
was to go to the cemetery and meditate on a corpse in
various states of decay.

The Chinese were deeply offended

by such rules for the passions and viewed them as an affront
to the natural and spontaneous movement of the T§o.
By way of summary, all of these issues speak with one
voice in suggesting the strength of the assumption of unity
in the Chinese framework and the threat with which the
introduction of Buddhism was perceived:
Though particular criticisms arcse over many
separate issues, the underlying complaint was
invariably the same: the adherence of Buddhist
monks and nuns to an cther-wordly ideal, which
caused them to repudiate the actual world with its
obligations and tc practice principles contrary to
nature, was a dangerous threat not only to society
and the state, but to the harmcny of the universe
as well.
(flather, 1955, p. 26)
The luxury of dividing oneself from the rest of society and
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from the world, that the Buddhists merely assumed, could not
be so assumed in the Chinese framework based on the
assumption of unity.

ALTERNATIVE PROCESSES OF QUESTIONING
It is hoped that the above discussion of alternative
assumed contexts is not just an academic exercise.
beyond this,

To go

the method requires that the alternative

assumed contexts be related to the questions that are asked.
In short, the respective assumptions of unity and
divisibility should be shewn to affect the nature of
questioning in each framework.

As a contingent further

step, to use this material within the method, these
alternative processes cf questioning must be focused upon
the problem and shown tc make a difference in terms of the
consequences in each system.

Alternative Assumptions and Alternative Questioning
Given alternative assumed contexts, it would be
expected that different questions would be thought to be
"significant” questions in China and the West.

In short,

the questions that Western thinkers ask are not the same
questions that thinkers in traditional China asked.
These different piocesses of questioning derive from
the alternative assumptions.

The Western thinker works with

divisions, the major division being the separation between
the knower and the known.

Consequently,

significant

questions are questions which lead tc the construction of
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information about the known.

The purpose for knowledge is

to understand.
In traditional China,

the assumption of unity requires

a different purpose and structure for constructing
information.

Since the thinker is unified into one system

with everything,

within the T a g , significant questions are

questions which provide information about relationships
within this whole.

The purpose for knowledge becomes to

act, to produce these relationships to the harmony of
humankind in Confucianism and the harmony of Nature in
Taoism.

The result of these different purposes and

assumptions is a radically different process of questioning
in each framework:
A comparison of the discussions of knowing in
pre-twentieth-century Western and in Chinese
philosophy reveals that the topics cf most concern
to the Westerners are rarely significant in the
Chinese discussions.
For example, the question of
certainty and doubt is important to Westerners:
Are there truths that cannot be doubted?
What are
the grounds for the knowledge we supposedly have
when we grasp such truths?
What is the relation
between knowing something and the reasons we can
give to claim knowledge?
What is the relation
between knowledge and belief?
Hew do we weight
the competing arguments in favor of intuition,
sense experience, and awareness of the laws of
logic in answering these questions?
Another set
of questions important to Western philosophy
concerns the relation between our sense
experiences and objects supposedly external to our
minds: Do objects themselves resemble our
perceptions of them?
Do objects exist outside of
and independently cf our minds and experience?
Certainly, the Chinese philosophers were not
unaware of seme of these guestions, but they were
primarily concerned with two quite different
questions.
First, what can we learn through
studying things that will tell us both how things
are naturally structured to act and how they
should act?
That is what we can learn about moral
rules and also about objects— acorns, streams.
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planets, cr people— that will help us evaluate
whether or not they are acting properly.
The
other question is what happens to a knower as a
result of his efforts to know, that enables him to
behave properly when alcne or toward other people
and things?
Does he learn things about himself in
the process cf trying to know the natures of other
things;
and does that knowledge help him to
behave more consistently with Ccnfucian norms?
Does he acquire feelings toward objects he knows
that he should seek to duplicate in his
noncognitive dealings with them in the future?
In
short, these who are interested in knowing are
interested in making the right evaluations and in
guides tc action.
(flunro, 1977, pp. 27-28)
This lengthy quotation seems justified by the fact that
Nunro is one of the few scholars in this area to make
explicit the relation between purposes,

questions,

and the

resultant differences between Chinese and Western knowledge.
These alternative processes of questioning diverge from
different central ox core guestions.

As was noted in an

earlier discussion of the dynamics of questioning,

guestions

asked in any framework are really rephrasings and specific
elaborations of a key question which is considered the most
significant question.

The same relation pertains here.

The

Western thinker asks questions about substance and the
Chinese thinker about relation and action.
this questioning are two key guestions.

At the basis of

Needham

(1956)

writes;
At any rate, Chinese thought, always concerned
with relation, preferred tc avoid the problems and
pseudo-problems of substance, and thus
persistently eluded all metaphysics.
Where
Western minds asked 'wjjaj; essentially is it ?*
Chinese minds asked 1 ho w is it related in its
beginnings, functions, and endings with everything
else, and how ought we to react to it ? 1 (p. 2 0 0 )
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Focusing the Alternative Processes on Human Beings
To use these alternative processes in the following
chapters, the process should be focused upon human beings
and the guesticns that are asked about human beings.

I can

build upon the earlier discussion cf the process of
questioning in psychology as that process converged to the
key question: "What is a human being?"

If all of the effort

so far directed is of any use it should be possible to give
this key guestion an alternative meaning in opposition to
the singular meaning of the Western framework,.
Within the assumed context of divisibility prevalent in
the West, the question acquires an all toe familar
meaning:

a human being is an isolated entity existing within

a divided world.

As the questioning progresses from this

central meaning, questions centering around human beings as
separate entities beccme of paramount importance until we
come to the extreme levels of derivation such as "What
traits are in this person*s personality?" We can easily find
in this interdependence of guesticns the entire framework of
human beings in the West.
Everywhere I look within the West,
of the Western meaning cf the guesticn.

I find the results
As I found

divisions at the center cf the major traditions of the West,
I must also find that human beings who function within these
traditions are a product of this same division.

The

conception of the human being that arises is that of a
person divided: the personality is composed of traits, the
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person is divided into mind and body,

people are experienced

as separate from ether people, and humankind is divided from
Nature.
Within the assumed context of unity in traditional
China,

"What is the human being?" acquires quite another

meaning and we are propelled into another process of
questioning in respect to people.
question

In this context, the

is given the meaning that a person is a unity

contained within ever larger unities,

ft cursory reading of

the Chinese classics reveals ancther world from that of the
West, a world where harmony and unity are the rule and not
the exception.
This level of abstraction still lacks the focus
necessary to serve as the basis for the operation of the
method.

One way of further refining this is to ask: "What

are the key relationships which transect human experience
and function?"

I believe there are three major dimensions

of interrelation:

h u m a n k i n d ’s relation to Nature, human

beings relation to other human beings, and a person's
relation to himself.

The next three chapters will examine,

in turn, each of these dimensions in an effort to delimit
the conseguences of these alternative frameworks on the
function and experience of human beings.
The structure of these chapters will be the sane.

The

first section will ask the question in each assumed context
to produce alternative meanings.

The remainder of the

chapter will examine the consequences of these alternative
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meanings.

The conseguences will be examined first as they

relate to how a human being experiences along this
dimension* and the final section will examine how this
experience leads tc a difference in what people do in
traditional China as opposed to the Nest.
Before this material is presented,

something must be

said about the emphasis cn China in the following chapters.
No effort will be made to present a completely balanced view
of both systems.

I am assuming a Western reader and will

concentrate my efforts cn making the traditional Chinese
alternative explicit.

Documentation abcut the Western

framework will be presented at points tc make the Chinese
alternative more of an alternative in this contrast.

The

reader will find a full development cf Chinese material,

but

not a full parallel development of Western knowledge in the
following presentation.
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OVEBVIEW
Alternative assumed contexts for questioning were
constructed for traditional China and the West,.

The

assumption of divisibility was found to be functional in the
major traditions of the Nest,

religion and science.

The

assumption was made explicit by producing cases where this
divisibility could not be assumed with a corresponding
failure of Western knowledge to resolve the paradoxes so
generated.
In traditional China,

the assumption of unity as

reflected by the concept of the |ac in Confucianism and
Taoism was made explicit by viewing the paradoxes
surrounding the introduction of Buddhism,
not share this assumption,

into China.

a system which did

Problems centered

around conflicts in the Buddhist view of the human being as
divided

from the world and humankind, and the Chinese view

which regarded the human being as unified along these
dimensions.
These alternative assumed contexts produce different
processes of questioning and different purposes for
knowledge in each system.

These alternatives can be focused

upon the knowledge of human beings by viewing the
alternative meanings given to the key question:
human being?"

"What is a

CHAPTER V

CONSEQUENCES IN HUHANKIND'S GELATION
TC NATUEE

Given the process of questioning in traditional China,
it would be expected that human beings would be unified with
Nature and concern themselves with relationships within this
whole.

This chapter will be concerned first with the

experience of this unity and will consider how function
develops from this experience.

In the case of both

experience and function, a single practical area will be
identified— art for experience and architecture for
function.

These areas will serve as a point of focus from

which one can begin to appreciate an alternative relation to
Nature from that cf the West.

EXPEBIINCING NATUBE
In searching for a pcint cf entry into the experience
of Nature in traditional China, I was immediately drawn to
the "eye" of the artist.

Artistic vision is an extremely

sensitive barometer of a culture*s perception of its world.

The Chinese Artist's Experience of Nature
The immediate point of entry into Chinese art is
unusual from a Western standpoint:
through the written language.

the approach will be

This pcint of entry appears

to be unusual because Western languages are basically
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alphabetic

in f or m w h i l e

idiographic

the C h i n e s e w r i t t e n

in st ruc tu re .

characters

For

ex am pl e ,

are g r a p h i c
as N e e d h a m

earliest characters

for

is

C o n t r a r y to W e s t e r n w o r d s w h ic h

are o n l y a c o m b i n a t i o n of a l i mi te d
Chinese

language

a r r a y of letters,

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of object s.

(1971)

" br idge"

in di cat es ,

was

one of the

simply:

liang

being

a "d ra wi ng of a p l a n k

the l a n g u a g e d e v e l o p e d
e l e m e n t s were,
base,

b ut

of cours e,

the b a s ic

graphic portrayal
ba sic

f o rm a t

for

Calligraphy.
r e l a t i o n of

this p r i m i t i v e

added

of the o b j e c t
the w r i t t e n

(p. 147)

insight,

As

phonetic

to this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l
the c h a r a ct er

it r e p r e s e n t e d

be

a

remained

the

language.

Because calligraphy represents a fundamental
the a rt i st
in C h i n a

forms deriv e.

For

to the w orl d,

e xa mple,

is at o nc e

strokes.

Thus,

l e a rn i ng

to use

calligraphy becomes

fr om w hi c h all of
the

a direct

c a l l i g r a p h y and p a i n t i n g

invo lv e

transition

the othe r

the

art

from c a l l i g r a p h y

and c o n t i n u o u s one.

B ot h

the m o d u l a t i o n of b ru sh

the s t u d e n t b e g i n s w i t h c a l l i g r a p h y by
the b ru sh and

to p ai nt in g.

Painting

to the d e g r e e

that

not that he

a s tr ea m. "

insight of h a vi n g

b a s ic art form

to p a i n t i n g

from

c r o ss i ng

then d e v e l o p s q ui t e

and c a l l i g r a p h y

it is c o m m o n

is p a i n t i n g

form a u ni f i e d wh ole

for a C h i n e s e

a painting

naturally

p a in t er

but rather w ri t i n g

to say
a
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painting.

(Chiang,

1973)

This influence of calligraphy extends far beyond the
scope of the mere similarity cf the brush in hand in
painting to the even more functional art form of
architecture.

Unlikely as it may seem to the Westerner,

writes Lin Yutang

(1935) , the fcrms cf Chinese architecture

are related directly tc the forms of characters in
calligraphy.

He notes that,

like a character, the Chinese

house is built upon a framework with the lines of the
structure visible like the lines of a character.

He

attributes the major characteristic cf the Chinese building,
the curved roof, tc the curved strokes composing a
character.
In Chinese architecture,

there can be found a material

representation of the original insights of the world
codified first within calligraphy.
So fundamental is the place of calligraphy in
Chinese art §§ i
Si iSIJSS as* ikYi&S in t&£
a b s tract that we may say it has provided the
Chinese people with a basic esthetics, and it is
through calligraphy that the Chinese have learned
t heir basic notions of line and form.
It is
therefore impossible to talk about Chinese art
without understanding Chinese calligraphy and its
artistic inspiration.
There is, fcr instance, not
one type of Chinese architecture, whether it be
the p&ilas# the pavilion, or the temple, whose
harmony and form is not directly derived from
certain types of calligraphy.
(Lin Yutang, 1935,
P. 291)
If it is the purpose tc illustrate the fundamental
experience of the unity of the human world with the world of
Nature in Chinese art, attention would be best directed to
the artistic vision cf calligraphy.
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The fundamental inspiration for Chinese calligraphy was
Nature and unity with her.

The origins of calligraphy are,

of course, shrouded in the past.

However, Lai

(1973) notes

that one legend has it that MTs*ana Chieh observed the
patterns and movements of the celestial bodies and earthly
creatures before creating the earliest writing system.*'
(p. xi)

He goes on to note that the now extinct scripts of

old have the names of natural objects which relate to their
origin,
script,"

for example:

the "tadpole script," "the bird

and the "the tiger script."

Through the avenue of calligraphy the entire artistic
tradition of China became infused with a unity with Nature.
The fundamental inspiration of calligraphy as of
all arts of China is Nature.
. . . our love of
Nature is characterized by a desire to identify
our minds with her and so enjoy her as she is.
In
calligraphy we are drawn tc Nature in the same
irresistable way: every stroke, every dot suggests
the form cf a natural object.
And, in turn,
natural objects become in many instances
prototypes of calligraphic style.
Hany expressive
names drawn from Nature have been coined by great
writers in the past to describe different kinds of
strokes: 'falling stone,' 'sheep's leg,' 'the
ruggedness of a plum branch,* 'decayed trunk of an
old tree,' 'the muscles, bcnes and sinews of an
animal's limbs,' are examples.
(Chiang, 1973,
p. 1 1 1 )
In the case of calligraphy,
artistic spirit:

I find the gem of the Chinese

an experienced intimacy and unity of human

art with Nature.
The calligrapher becomes the model for Chinese artists
as they call upon Nature for their inspiration.

Within the

experienced unity of human art form and Nature there is a
full exchange.

Lin Yutang

(1935)

writes that a famous
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calligrapher practiced for years,
perfect

but still could not

his style until one day while wandering through the

mountains he chanced upon two fighting snakes and from this
inspiration developed his classic style called "the
fighting-’-snakes." Such an incorporation of nature into the
calligraphy of the scholar is quite common as he notes:
If a scholar sees a certain beauty in a dry vine
with its careless grace and elastic strength, the
tip of the end curling upward and a few leaves
still hanging on it haphazardly and yet most
appropriately, he tries to incorporate that into
his writing.
If another scholar sees a pine tree
that twists its trunk and bends its branches
downward instead cf upward, which shows a
wonderful tenacity and force, he also tries to
incorporate that into his style of writing.
We
h ave therefore the *dry-vine* style and the
1 pine-branch' style writing.
(Lin Yutang ,1935,
p. 293) .
The transition from calligraphy to painting proper is
hardly a change in the area of discourse at all.

As noted

above, the materials and techniques are essentially the same
and are readily transferable from one to the other.

Indeed,

most paintings have calligraphy appended to them as a matter
of course.

It would be expected that the dominant

inspiration of Nature in calligraphy would apply to Chinese
painting.

iaa<|§£a£e Eaiatiss.

Calligraphy and poetry, antedating

painting as such, reflect at a very early stage cf
development the interest of the Chinese in Nature as a
source of artistic inspiration,

Munsterberg

(1955) presents

several examples of poetry dating frcm prior to 1000
B.C. which exalt the loveliness of Nature and the human

Figure 6
A Typical Chinese Landscape Painting Illustrating
the Integration of Human Beings with Nature
(Courtesy Museum of Fine Arts, Boston)

135

being's intimate relation with her.

Painting, especially

landscape painting, is a graphic representation of trends
which have existed since the dim past of China.
This experienced unity makes itself available to us in
its full fruition in the Chinese landscape painting.
Figure 6 , we have what Munsterberg

(1955)

In

has called an

example of the supreme expression of the spirit of Chinese
landscape painting.

This painting by a Sung artist reflects

his interest in Nature,
major features:

particularly an emphasis on her

mountains,

water, and,

secondarily, sky.

It

must be remembered that the Chinese name for a landscape is
Shan Sjji, translated as "mountains and water."

(Sowerby,

1940)
In the idiom of mountains and water, Chinese artists
relate their experience of Nature:
of Nature.

the yin-yang in the Tao

The water represents change and flow in contrast

to the solidity of the rock of the mountains,
unified within the Tag of the painting itself.

yet both are
£s one

author aptly notes, "peaks and torrents seem to fill these
painters with a kind of intoxication, as if their spirit
were buoyed on the stream of universal life pervading all
things . . .."

(Fry, 1935, p. 13)

In this context,

it would not be suprising to us that

one of the most striking things about Chinese painting is
the early period in which landscapes appeared as independent
themes

(Binyon,

1927).

This is in striking contrast to

Western art where the landscape as an independent theme is a
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quite recent development.
Binyon

(1927)

observes a further contrasts the

mother-child theme is as predominant in Western art as
Nature is in Chinese art.

Even where human themes are

presented in Chinese paintings, he asserts, they are
presented in such a manner as

to suggest the full beauties

of Nature, not of the human subjects.
relation is inverted.

In Western art,

the

The landscape as such was used as a

background for human action and was,

generally, selected to

enhance the human form.
At the heart of all that

has been

said about the

Chinese landscape, there is the intimate, experienced unity
of the artist and Nature as the subject.
Binyon

(1936)

By way of summary,

writes:

The Chinese wcrd for 'landscape' means
'mountain-water picture,' and suggests at once
something more elemental.
It is concerned with
that which is solid and that which is fluid.
The
mountains are thought of as the flesh, and the
streams as the blood, of a living organism.
It is
not the life of nature conceived of as something
separate from the life of man, but the whole
created universe through which one spirit streams.
(p. 83)
A further insight can be obtained by examining how the
artist paints human beings in a landscape.

It follows from

what has been said that when humans are pictured in the
landscape, they are pictured as part of the whole of Nature
got unlike other natural objects such as trees or rocks.
Again in reference to the example in Figure 6 , at first it
is difficult to discern humans in the painting where the
characteristics of Nature predominate.

It is only through
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close inspection that we find seme people in a boat on the
great expanse of water, and then,

upcn closer inspection, we

find some human beings waiting on the shcre overshadowed by
the tree that lies behind them.
(1940)

On this point,

Sowerby

writes:

Often will be found a diminutive human figure or
two accompanied by seme beast of burden;
but
always the dominant theme will be the mountains,
the water, and the mists.
Human figures are
always given their rightful place by the Chinese
artist in the grand scheme of nature.
Never do
they assume proportions that would suggest that
man is considered the most important thing in the
universe;
for Chinese philosophy is above all
rational and maintains a fine sense of relative
values.
(p. 153)
This placing of human beings as an integral element in
the whole of Nature by the Chinese artist takes on added
importance when we compare this with the place of human
beings in Western art.

In Western art, human beings tend to

be portrayed

as

dominant, with Nature serving only as a

backdrop for

their action and the object of their ccnguest.

Throughout Chinese poetry and painting we find
this same awareness cf the beauty and mystery of
Nature— always, however, a Nature in which man
h olds an integral but not assertive place.
Never,
on the one hand, are the mountains, rivers, and
forests of the great Chinese landscape painters
mere decorative backdrops for man and his
activities, as so often in prercmantic Western
art;
equally never, on the other hand, do they
consist simply of empty and seemingly uninhabited
wildernesses.
Always they are peopled by human
figures, tiny yet distinct: a fisherman in his
boat, a woodcutter, a cowherder, a recluse sitting
in contemplation on a rock.
(Bodde, 1957, p. 32)
The false impression should not be given from the above
that the Chinese conception of the unity of human beings and
Nature is somehow the reverse of the Western,

where Nature

Figure 7
The Beciprocal Gelation between the Characteristics
of the Human Being and the Natural Setting
(Courtesy Museum of Fine Arts, Boston)
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dominates the human being.

The relation is a reciprocal and

complete one for the Chinese artist where the human being
relates to Nature and Nature relates to the human being.
In Figure 7, we have another characteristic setting
from a Chinese painting,

a recluse scholar in a natural

scene of again '•mountains and water."

It is significant to

note that the artist is attempting tc relate to us something
about the scholar from the natural setting in which he is
placed.

Priest

(1954), in discussing such paintings, makes

explicit this relation:
Often in these landscapes there is a scholar (or
sometimes two scholars), very tiny in comparison
to the scene he sits in.
He are informed that we
can gauge the profundity of the scholar's mind by
the loftiness of the mountains in the distance.
He are further told that when gnarled, ancient
trees appear they are the symbols of the scholar's
years, that when hung with vines, the vines
symbolize the chains of habit impeding the growth
of the tree . . .. (p. 15)
The artist,

then,

is working with the whole of Nature and

attempts to

use this reciprocal relation to relate to us

something about the characteristics of the human subject.
In respect to Figure 7, Boyd

(1962)

provides these very

appropriate comments:
Hence that constantly recurring figure in Chinese
literature and painting, the scholar recluse in
his retreat, living alone or perhaps with a single
attendant, in a thatched hut surrounded by the
immense precipices, the torrents and mists of the
mountain landscape, having risen above the
ambitions and desires of the world and being freed
from the rapacities and intrigues of the official
career.
(pp. 1 1 1 - 1 1 2 )
Not only is the human being unified with Nature, but so must
the good artist be part of this same whole.
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Tfre Tfto of the artist.

The key to becoming a good artist

in traditional China was an ability to involve oneself with
Nature completely.

Northrop

(1946)

has delineated the basic

differences in approach between the Western and Eastern
artist.

The Western artist superimposes a theoretical

dimension on the subject, while the Eastern artist
approaches the subject directly within a purely aesthetic
dimension without the need for abstraction.
that the

Northrop feels

first thing a Chinese painter must acquire is the

capacity to grasp the immediately apprehended aesthetic
factors in the immediately experienced.

There is little

attempt to approach art via abstraction, as Westerners do,
with perspective and the science of optics playing an
unimportant role.
The comparison that Northrop draws between the approach
of the Eastern and Western artist to art is quite striking:
while Western artists content themselves with the careful
study of the geometric form and perspective,

Chinese artists

immerse themselves in their subjects, usually the majesty of
Nature's mountains and rivers, to obtain an immediate grasp:
Before taking up brush and pigments, they [Chinese
artists] went out into nature, and immersed and
lost themselves, becoming one with the
all-embracing continuum which is nature in its
aesthetic immediacy.
Approaching nature in this
way, in their paintings, they pcrtray the
aesthetic manifold primarily, and the external
three-dimensicnal objects, which Westerners tend
to seek for in these paintings only incidentally,
if at all . . . .
(Ncrthrop, 1946, p. 330)
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Along these lines, Lin Yutang

(1935) comments in a

rather critical vain:
The Chinese artist does not learn painting by
going into a room and stripping a woman naked in
order to study her anatomy, nor does he make
copies of plaster figures cf Ancient Greece and
Home, as some backward art schocls in the West
still do.
The Chinese artist travels and visits
the famous mountains like Huangshan in Anhui or
the Omei mountains in Szechuen.
(p. 288)
If we can free ourselves from Lin lutang's obvious
moralizing,

we can distinguish the two approaches of the

artist to the subject.
This merging of the artist with the subject,
can be carried to an extreme.
Prodan

(1958)

however,

To illustrate this point,

relates the story of the master painter, Li

Lung-Mien who possessed the gift of identifying himself so
completely with his subject that "his friends used to
dissuade him from depicting horses,
become a horse h i m s e l f !11 (p.

for fear lest he might
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It would be an errcr tc leave the area of Chinese art
without relating the unities that have been unearthed to a
more general process within the framework.

The unity of

human beings and Nature in Chinese art is derived from the
assumption of the unity cf the Ta o .
By the single daring assumption of the cosmic
principle cf the
the Chinese fccused on the
notion of one power permeating the whole universe,
instead of emphasizing the Western dualism of
spirit and matter, creator and created, animate
and inanimate, and human and nonhuman.
This
concept of the
was the touchstone of Chinese
painting which affected the creative imagination,
the subject matter and the interpretation.
(Rowley, 1959, p. 5).
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Along the same lines, Munsterberg

(1955)

writes of the

artist and the £§o: ". . . the artist was taught that he
must first of all identify himself with the landscape and
become one with the Jjc which pervades all of Nature, for
only then could he begin tc dc justice to his theme."

(p. 8 )

The Human World as Unified with Nature
There is in Chinese landscape art an anthropomorphic
projection of human characteristics cnto the organism of
Nature.

Sullivan

(1962)

writes of such an attitude toward

Nature as it contributed to the development of landscape
painting:
In popular belief
cosmic being, the
blood that gushes
grasses its hair,
its breath . . . .
In this contest,

the mountain is the body of the
recks its bones, the water the
through its veins, the trees and
clcuds and mists the vapor of
(p. 1 )
Chinese artists locked out upon Nature

and found an analogue of themselves since to them they were
unified within the same T3 0 .

They did not experience a

representation of life in a primitive sense or in a Western
animistic sense,

hut rather they experienced the same order

and relations within themselves as they experienced in the
cosmos.

As we move from the experienced unity of human

beings and Nature in Chinese art to a more general system,
we will find this correspondence assuming more specific and
literal dimensions.
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Macrocosm-microcosm

Chinese art is only a

special case of the general tendency in Chinese knowledge to
experience human beings as a microcosm of the macrocosm of
Nature.

At the root of the microcosm-macrocosm dimension,

were two analogies: " . . . one postulated point-for-point
correspondences between the bod? of man and the universe or
cosmos as a whole, the other imagined similar
correspondences between the human body and the society of
the State.” (Needham,

1956, p.

294)

Needham refers to the

former as the universe analogy and the latter as the state
analogy.
Before examining these analogies in a detailed manner
within a specific area,

something must be said of the

general nature of the unity expressed by the doctrine of
macrocosm and microcosm.

I feel that the key concepts in

Needham's description are whole and correspondence.

This

doctrine is always relating elements from one whole to
corresponding elements in another whole.
It is helpful to imagine three planes, each placed a
distance above the other such that an object on the first
plane becomes projected onto the second plane, and, further,
projected upon the third plane.

Now if a circle is drawn on

the bottom-most plane with points within it, this circle and
its related points will be projected to the next higher
plane,

and from this plane to the third plane.

The

important point is that the circle on each plane will be in
correspondence to the circles of the other planes.

In a
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like manner, the.relation of points on the first plane will
correspond to the relations of the points on the other
planes.
This ordering of a hierarchy of wholes is a dominant
feature of traditional Chinese knowledge.
of correspondence between wholes,

With this notion

I can turn to a practical

illustration in traditional Chinese medicine.

The two

analogies which compose the doctrine of macrocosm and
microcosm can be examined at the extremes of the spectrum
where there is a correspondence between the microcosm of the
human body on one hand and the macrocosm of Nature on the
other.
In Chinese medicine, the whole cf the human body was
related in detail to the corresponding aspects of the larger
whole of Nature.
what Palos
parts of

(1974)

This gives rise in Chinese medicine to
labels a philosophical anatomy in which

the body become experienced as being related to the

phenomena of Nature.
By virtue of the universe analogy, the parts of the
human body are related to corresponding parts in Nature.
The universe with its dual forces (the Yin and
Yang) is a macrocosm.
Nan is a microcosm, a
little universe.
Thus, we read that as heaven is
round and the earth sguare, so a m a n ’s head is
round and the feet sguare.
As heaven has its sun
and moon, its order of stars, rain and wind,
thunder and lightning, so man has two eyes, a set
of teeth, joy and anger, voice and sound.
The
earth with its mountains and valleys, rocks and
stones, trees and shrubs, weeds and grasses, has
its
parallel on the human body in the shoulders
and
armpits; nodes and tuberosities;
tendons and
muscles;
hairs and down.
The four limbs
correspond to the four seasons, the twelve joints
to the twelve months . . . .
The pulse is of
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twelve kinds to agree with the twelve rivers.
The
heart contains seven holes because the ursa major
is composed of seven stars, and the human skeleton
has 360 bones for the simple reason that there are
the same number of degrees in a circle.
(Hong and
Lien-te, 1936, p. 21)
This correspondence was not just a loosely held belief.
but was actually a part cf practical medical knowledge.
Hume

(1975)

remarks that an often heard phrase among Chinese

}:■

doctors is that the human being is a miniature heaven and
earth.

For this close relation of the human body and

nature,

there is nc lesser classical authority than Lao Tse

who said:
doors."

*'0 ne may know the world without going out of

(Chan,

1963, p.

162)

The implication of this is

that all the knowledge of the universe is contained within
the sage himself.
If we turn to the state analogy, there was within
traditional Chinese medicine an equally detailed relation of
the microcosm cf the human body to the macrocosm of the
state.

Again, as in the universe analogy, we find a

detailed correspondence cf the parts of the human body with
the parts of the state.
Thus the body cf a man is the image of a State.
The thorax and abdomen correspond to the palaces
and offices.
The four limbs correspond to the
frontiers and boundaries.
The divisions of the
bones and sinews correspond to the functional
distinctions of the hundred officials.
The pores
of the flesh correspond to the four throughfares.
The spirit corresponds to the prince.
The blood
corresponds tc the ministers, and the Cfrftj to the
people.
Thus we see that he who can govern his
body can control a kingdom.
Loving his people, he
will bring peace to the country;
nourishing his
ghh^. he will preserve his body.
If the people
are alienated the country is lost;
if the Chh 4 is
exhausted the body dies.
(Needham, 1956,
“
pp. 300-301)
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At this point, it may be possible to give more
substance to the image of the hierarchy of wholes.

I can

imagine that on the first plane there is the whole of the
human body.

This

microcosm is related directly to the

macrocosm of the second plane of human social structure or
the state.

Finally,

this micrccosm becomes related, on the

third plane, to the whole of Nature herself.

One could

almost draw a line connecting the wholes within the planes
such that corresponding elements are connected in each
whole.

For example, on the first plane, we have the four

limbs of the body.

This corresponds, on the second plane,

to the four frontiers and boundaries of the state.

Finally,

on the third plane, of the macicccsm of' the universe, the
four limbs of the human body are projected to become the
four seasons.
This hierarchy of wholes that I have just considered
are experienced as being unified such that changes in one
whole are reflected in changes in another whole.
example,

For

changes in the whole cf the human world are

reciprocally reflected in corresponding changes in the whole
of Nature.

It is an attractive idea to consider these

changes as occurring within a causal framework.

I think

this is a reading of the Western framework into these
relationships.
connections,

I do not feel that these are causal

but rather,

more cf a sympathetic resonance

where changes in the miciocosmic human world are reflected
in resonant changes in the macrocosmic whole of Nature.
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This connection,

in ay opinion, cannot be reduced by

analytic methods tc a sisple mechanistic interaction of, for
example,

one billiard ball hitting another.

It will be

recalled from the above discussion that Needham

(1956)

expressed the opinion that objects to the Chinese behaved
not because of mechanistic impulsions but from the general
pattern of things,

such that "if they did not behave in

those particular ways they would lose their relational
positions in the whole."

(p. 281)

This is one way of

conceiving of a framework where correspondences between
wholes are not mechanistically determined, but are
relational,

determined by the pattern of the whole.

This

discussion, if developed, would take us far beyond the
modest purposes of this wcrk tc dealing with the major
interface between metaphysical frameworks in traditional
China and the West.*

Reciproca l relations.

In the following discussion of

corresponding relationships, I will talk of the
corresponding changes of the human bcdy and Nature as if

♦It should be noted that there have been several attempts on
the part of Western thinkers to construct a relational
framework similiar to the one I am talking about in
traditional China.
Jung (1973) with his principle of
synchronicity and the principle of seriality suggested
somewhat earlier by the Austrian zoologist, Paul Krammerer,
reported by Koestler (1971), suggest an acausal ordering
principle.
Progoff (1S73) presents an interesting
interpretation of the relation of synchronicity and J u n g ’s
depth psychology as they are supported by Liebnizian notions
of macrocosm/microcosm.
These positions are an attempt to
approximate the acausal crder cf the Chinese world by
extending the Western framework.
At least in the case of
Jung, there is a decided Chinese influence, in particular
from the J qhiflg.

149

they were causal relationships.
they did not have this coloring.

To the traditional Chinese,
This should not be

misconstrued as indicating that the Chinese did not
experience these relationships;

they simply did not make

the inferences that a Western mind does when confronted with
the correspondence.

I am definitely net asserting that

changes in one whole are producing changes in another whole
in a causal sense.
From the direction cf Mature to the human body, I find
a smooth, continuous flow.
unity is such, as Meedham

For example, the experienced
(1971) notes,

that one flows

smoothly from the hydraulic tc the sociological within the
context of the same discussion.

In the following discourse,

the Duke of Huan is being given counsel by Kung Chung
(presumably,

an engineer)

on the best site for his capitol:

It is the nature of water to flew, but when it
reaches a bend (in its channel) it is retarded,
and when the bend is full (the water) behind
pushes forward that which is ahead.
Where the
land slopes downward it flews along smoothly, but
where it rises (the water) is impeded.
(In some
places) where the bank curves (the water) becomes
agitated and leaps up,.
When it leaps up it runs
to one side,
on running to one side it forms
whirlpools.
After forming whirlpools it returns
to its central course.
On returning to its
central course (and slowing) it leads to a change
of course.
Changes of course bring fresh stopage.
Thus, impeded, (the water) runs wild.
Sunning
wild, it injures men.
When it injures men, there
araises great distress among them.
In great
distress they treat the laws lightly.
Laws being
treated lightly, it is difficult to maintain good
order.
Good order lapsing, filial piety
disappears.
And when people have lost filial
piety, they are no longer
submissive . . . .
(Meedham, 1971, p. 223)
It is interesting to find in the above discourse the ease
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with which Kung Chung passes £rcm the physical consequences
to the social consequences of hydraulics.

One could

speculate that to him the smooth flow of water in its river
bed is the same process as the smooth flow of human behavior
within the channels of filial piety.
In a similar fashion,
direction:
Nature.

we can examine the alternative

the relation from the human world to that of

Bodde

(1S57)

writes:

The close interrelationship of the human and
natural worlds means that disturbances in the one
result in corresponding disturbances in the other.
Floods, droughts, plagues, and innumerable other
abnormal phenomena are, thus, positive evidence of
irregularities in human society.
(p. 38)
He continues with some concrete examples:
The school of changes and reversions says that the
eating of grain by insects is caused by officials
of the various departments.
Out of covetousness
they make encroachments, and this results in the
insects eating the grain.
When these latter have
black bodies and red heads, it is said to be the
military officials (who are the blame), whereas
when they have black heads and red bodies, then it
is said to be the civil officials.
When
punishment is brought to those officials whom the
insects resemble, these insects thereupon
disappear and are no longer seen.
(p. 38)
It follows from this reciprocal relation with Nature that
human beings must be extremely careful in their behavior
lest they destroy N a t u r e ’s order.
The full ramifications of all that has been discussed
is that human beings are inextricably linked with Nature
within the Chinese experience,

in what Needham

aptly labeled an ethical solidarity.

(1956) has

In the West, a human

being’s ethical behavior is experienced as having
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implications for the function of society.
traditional Chinese framework,

Within the

the human b e i n g fs ethical

behavior was experienced as having cosmic implications far
beyond the limits of the immediate society.
In the this framework,

a breach of moral conduct on the

part of a single person was not experienced as an individual
problem or even a social problem, but as an indication of a
potential or actual disorder in Nature.

Needham

(1956)

writes that because of this experienced ethical solidarity,
there was a "basic disguiet arcused in the Chinese mind by
crimes,

or even disputes, because they were felt to be

disturbances in the Order of Nature."

(p.

526).

FUNCTIONING TOWAND NATUBE
It would be expected that the experience of the unity
of the human world and the world of Nature would affect the
actions of people in traditional China.
to begin

Again, it is best

with a practical area cf study and expand this

point of entry to a more general statement.

I will begin

with the functional component cf art in the practical area
of architecture.

Nature in Chinese Architecture
As in the case of calligraphy, approaching Chinese
architecture from the perspective of the garden may appear
to be unusual by Western standards.

Yet it is a clear

example of the differences in Chinese and Western values in
the placing of human structures in a natural setting.

Just
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as with the discussion of calligraphy and its relation to
traditional Chinese art, the garden can provide a valuable
insight into the infusion of Nature into Chinese thought.

The C h i nes e Garden.

The study of the Chinese garden and

its relation tc the European garden is a vast area of
scholarship in its
passing account

own right.

Here, I can only give a

of the Chinese garden as it reflects the

unity of human beings and Nature and, consequently, affects
the function of the architect in building design.

&s in the

case of landscape painting where the majesty of Nature
predominates

(the ruggedness cf mountains, the movement of a

rushing stream)

Nature and her ruggedness predominate,

similar manner,

in the Chinese garden.

in a

This point is best illustrated by a comparison with the
pre-romantic European garden.
dominates;

In the latter, geometric form

Nature is bent to the will of the garden

designer through the use of the ruler and compass.

Nothing

could be more antithetical to the Chinese garden than the
gardens of Versailles where everywhere there is the evidence
of the human hand forming Nature to the abstract patterns of
the human mind.
In contrast, the traditional Chinese garden designer
seems to be inspired by the spontaneity of the free forms of
Nature.

Needham

(1956)

writes from his own experience:

In my youth I greatly admired the gardens and park
of Versailles, but when many years later I visited
it again after having become acquainted in the
interval with the Summer Palace (I Ho Tuan) at
Peking, it was with a feeling of desolation that
one surveyed its geometrical arrangement.
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imprisoning and constraining Nature rather than
flowing along with it.
(p. 361)
He goes on to note that the movement away from the geometric
pattern in the European garden which occurred in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ca n be attributed, in
some degree,

to a Chinese .influence.

These differences relate to differing assumptions for
knowledge in each framework.

In the Chinese framework, the

human being is to be inspired by Nature with the result that
the Chinese garden was designed to continually engage the
visitor

with differing vistas.

The visitor in the Western

garden, on the other hand, is confronted with geometric
formalism which restricts the perceiver to fixed channels of
observation.

Tuan

(1968)

summarizes these differences

precisely:
To the question, what is a fundamental difference
between the European and the Chinese attitude
towards nature, mcst people with any opinion at
all will probably make some such reply: that the
European sees nature as subordinate to him whereas
the Chinese sees himself as a part of nature.
Taken as a broad generalization with a grain of
salt there is much truth in this distinction;
a
truth illustrated with diagrammatic force when one
compares the formal European garden of the
seventeenth century with the Chinese naturalistic
garden.
The geometric contrast reflects
fundamental differences in environmental
evaluation.
The formal European garden in the
style of the Le Notre was designed tc produce a
limited number of imposing prospects.
It can be
appreciated tc the full only at a limited number
of favoured spots where tie onlooker is invited by
the garden’s design to gaze at distant vistas.
Or, seen in another way, the European garden is a
grandiose setting for man; in deference to him,
nature is straitjacketed in court dress.
The
Chinese garden, on the other hand, is designed to
produce almost constantly shifting scenes: there
are no set prospects.
The nature of the garden
requires the perceiver to move along a winding
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path and to be more than visually involved with
the landscape.
It is not nature that is required
to put on court dress in deference to man; rather
it is man who must lay aside his formalistic
pretensions in order to enter nature.
(pp. 176-177)
This experienced unity of the human world and Nature in
the garden has implications for the function of the Chinese
architects, as they approach their work less from abstract
design,

and more frcm the ruggedness of Nature herself.

The

purpose is to integrate the human structure, in the spirit
of the landscape painter, integrating human artifacts into
Nature as an unobtrusive

part of her total pattern, less as

something of human origin and mere as a feature of Nature
herself.

Boyd

(19 62)

speaks of the Chinese garden in this

way;
And yet man was to be present in this natural
landscape, just as in the wildest of landscape
paintings there was almost always some human
figure, some hut, path or bridge.
There was to be
no dichotomy or separation between architecture
and Nature.
There were in fact more buildings and
other architectural elements in the Chinese garden
than in that of Europe;
and this integration of
the two things was cne of the achievements of the
Chinese tradition.
(p. 112)
It seems that the position of the architect in
traditional China was guite different frcm that of the
Western counterpart.

The life and work cf these great

architect-gardeners have been carefully preserved by the
Chinese

(Needham,

1971)..

The relation of the human

structure and Nature was always an important aspect of
design.

Boyd

(1962)

writes:

The Chinese architects never extended the
formality of the building pattern into the
surrounding landscape, forcing nature to be
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architectural, as we in Europe have done from time
to time.
True to their philosophy of the place of
man in the World, the relation cf two things,
architecture and nature, was rather the ether way
around.
As Siren has pointed out, the garden was
not conceived as a setting for the house;
rather
the house was a setting fcr the garden.
(p. 1 1 2 )
Turning to the actual structure of the buildings
themselves,

the architect did not just design a house, but

worked with the relation of the house with its surroundings.
Thus, the "house-garden complex" and the "house-courtyard
complex" became dominant features of Chinese structures.
this manner, aspects of nature,

gardens and open spaces,

were functionally planned as part of the house itself.
Needham

(1971)

indicates;

courtyard system . . .

In

As

"In domestic buildings, the

has the great merit that yards and

gardens are made a part cf the building, and not something
additional and separate."

(p. 62)

Structures £o bje n d a£th
like the Chinese artist,
T^o.

Thus, the architect,
is working within the unity of the

The Chinese artist constructs a painting from the

context of a whole such that where a brush stroke is not
placed is as important as where one is placed.
fashion,

In a similar

the relational nature cf architectural structures

in traditional China produces a meaning for "empty" space,
which surrounds the physical structures.

Wu

(1963)

admonishes his readers that the significance of the
courtyard lies in its "emptiness";
Both clearly demonstrate the significance of the
courtyard, which as negative space plays a
prominent role in forming the 1house-yard*
complex.
The student of Chinese architecture will
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miss the point if he does not fccus his attention
on the space and the impalpable relationships
between members of the complex* but* rather* fixes
his eyes on the solids of the buildings alone.
(p. 32)
The total effect of the relational system of
architecture is to integrate the human world* the world of
the house*

with the larger world of Nature beyond.

The

courtyard system does this guite effectively* for the
courtyard has the effect of bringing Nature into the human
structure and still providing a measure of privacy.
(1963)

writes:

" . . .

Hu

horizontally the yard is separated

from the street by the vail ox by the surrounding buildings*
but it shares both the sky and the elements of the weather
with other houses and yards."

(p. 32)

This courtyard system makes the inhabitant of the house
always aware of the space that surrounds and the
corresponding conditions of Nature
Needham

(1971)

which surround the house.

comments by way cf summary:

"the spaces

between the low houses supply abundant air* and all the
windows look out internally onto plants and trees in the
garden courtyards.

T h q§ man i§ not jspla-fced fypm

qture ."

(p. 62-63, My italics)
As we move inward from the courtyard and the garden to
the house itself, the architect* through the design of the
structural features of the house*

insured an intimate

contact between the place of habitation and Nature.

In the

earlier discussion concerning the relation of calligraphy
and architecture,

it was suggested that the curved roof of
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the house Has thought to be related to the curved strokes of
the Chinese character.

In a similar vein, the complete

structure of the Chinese house is designed much like a
character.

A character is written on a framework with the

strokes placed on this structure.

In a similar manner, the

architect begins with a timber framework for the house and
hangs the walls from it.
The walls serve no support function in the typical
Chinese house.

The walls of Chinese buildings are always

curtain walls and are not bearing walls which support the
structure

(Needham,

1971).

This provides a certain

flexibility in design that is ECt possible in load bearing
walls of Western structures:
Every architect is familiar with the logic— and
the aesthetic— of separating the elements of
support from those of enclosure, the column from
the screen, and the advantages of a frame system
of structure, providing wide spans, supports of
small plan area, a freedom in planning, and a
flexibility in use, since walls and partitions are
'moveable* and need not even be there at all, and
the plan can thus be completely opened up in any
or all directions.
The Chinese were quite
conscious of these advantages and they fully were
used in the Chinese tradition.
(Boyd, 1962,
p. 24)
Within this construction tradition,

the screen walls or

curtain walls could be easily moved and removed without
disturbing the framework of the house itself.

Many times

the walls were not even carried up to the full height of the
framework

(Boyd,

1962).
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In general, this form cf construction promoted still
further the purpose of integrating Nature into the home
first made possible by the courtyard and garden,.

The total

effect of the house-courtyard complex and the method of
non-supporting walls was to allow the full unity of the
human world and Nature such that the human being could
always be aware of Nature within the house.
(1971)

Again, Needham

draws upon his own personal experience:

One of my most dominant impressions for sometime
after first returning to Europe from China was the
sense of loss of intimate contact with the
weather.
The wooden lattice windows cowered with
paper (often t e r n ) , the thin plaster walls, the
open verandahs outside every room, the sound of
rain-water dripping in the courtyards and small
patios, warmth made individual by fur-lined gowns
and charcoal fires— everything gave a
consciousness cf Nature*s moods, of rain, snow,
wind and sunshine, from which one is utterly
isolated in European housing,.
(p. 63)
This is quite an acknowledgement of the ability of the
Chinese architect to put into action the experienced unity
that is so central to the Chinese mind.
In the above discussion, I have concentrated on
individual,

domestic housing as it was constructed to allow

the full relation with Nature.

This same blending is

equally true for architectural structures on a grander
scale.

In general, the Chinese did not attempt tc impose

their architectural forms on Nature,

but rather attempted an

organic union cf the buildings with the natural setting.
Even in the case of large and numerous structures, the
Chinese chose a predominantly horizontal mode of
construction which allowed the buildings to conform to the
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Figure 8
The Integration of Architectual Structures with
the Horizontal Lines of Nature
(Courtesy Museum of Fine Arts, Boston)
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natural contours of the terrain, rather than obtrude from
the natural setting-

In Figure 8, we have an example of a

complex of larger structures as they are made to blend
horizontally with the lines of Nature.
It is interesting to compare this to the Western
tendency toward vertical lines in structural design.
Needham

(1971) remembers musing on this very point with a

Chinese

f r i e n d w h i l e viewing a great cathedral of Europe.

Needham likened the vertical lines of the medieval cathedral
or the modern skyscraper to the general tendency of the
westerner to attempt to transcend the material world in
theology.

While the Chinese with their horizontal lines,

tend to be very this-worldly in their theology.

We can

recall in this context the extreme problems that the Chinese
were confronted with in attempting to understand the Nirvana
of the Buddhists.
In this charateristic horizontal architecture, I find a
material manifestation of a basic tendency at the heart of
the Chinese mind: the tendency to prefer the concrete to the
abstract, the immediate tc the derived,
to the other-worldly.

and the this-worldly

Ihis earth-bound trait not only

reveals itself in architecture, but in many other aspects of
functioning.
The Tai C£i master hi Huang

(1973)

interesting comparison between T^jL

makes the
(a more complete

discussion of this traditional Chinese dance form will be
presented in Chapter VII)

and the Western dance form of
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ballet-

In

la i

chi. he says,

there is a constant awareness

of a connection between the dancer and the earth,

while in

ballet the dancer attempts to touch the earth as little as
possible to produce an ethereal effect.

Again, the nature

of the dance is as earthbound as architecture.

Hany other

examples can be produced from other areas which demonstrate
this proclivity amcng the Chinese.

Chjfleige Ggomjns^.

In the exploration of unity in

traditional Chinese architecture. I have progressed from the
unity of the microcosm of the Chinese garden to an
examination of this same expression in domestic housing, and
finally to the unity of relatively large structures.

I

would now like to examine the macroccsmic implications of
this unity by examining how all human structures were
harmonized into one whole and how this whole was harmonized
with the whole of the cosmos.

The system by which this was

accomplished was a method of gecmancy called Feng Shui, the
science of 'winds and waters.'

(Needham,

1962)

The basis of this system was the correspondence between
the microcosm of the human body and the macrocosm of the
earth as suggested above,

such that the earth was compared

to the human body having veins and vessels corresponding to
those of the human body.

It fellows that the placing of

human structures must be carefully planned lest they cut
these veins and vessels and,
Nature.

thus, disturb the harmony of

The sethed of Fgjjc] Sfryj was a method of divination

whereby these natural lines of the earth could be determined
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and prescriptions made for the placement of human
structures.

Needham

(1962), following Chatley, defines Feng

Shui as " ’the art cf adapting the residences of the living
and tombs of the dead so as to cooperate and harmonise with
the local currents of cosmic b r e a t h . *" (p. 239)
Even though this chapter has concentrated on displaying
the unity of the human world and Nature in China, it is
still extremely difficult to appreciate fgqg Shui which is
based on this unity because our own Western experience is so
different.

Freedman

(1966)

speaks of his own efforts to

understand:
It is difficult for somebody brought up in a
tradition which distinguishes sharply between man
and nature to grasp at once the basic premise of
f ena-shgi and yet (if I may generalize from my own
experience in trying to understand what Chinese
geomancy means to people who believe in it) the
significance of the premise becomes apparent as
soon as the outsider begins to examine a landscape
through Chinese categories.
One may stand by the
side of a Chinese friend and admire the
view . . . the combination of hills and sea
produces splended vistas.
O n e ’s own pleasure is
aesthetic and in a sense ’objective': the
landscape is cut there and one enjoys it.
O n e ’s
friend is reacting differently.
His appreciation
is cosmological.
For him the viewer and the
viewed are interacting, both being part of some
greater system.
The Cosmos, is Heaven, Earth, and
Man.
Man is in it and of it.
So that while my
characteristic reaction to a landscape may be to
say that I find it beautiful, my friend's may well
be to remark that he feels content or
comfortable . . . .
Man is in Nature.
The
landscape affects him directly, in the ideal case
making him feel relaxed and confident.
(pp. 121-122)
It is this experienced unity of the human observer and
Nature that is at the heart of Feng Shui.

Without this

insight the system becomes unintelligible,

a mere primitive
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superstition,

instead of an attempt by the Chinese thinker

to deal with Nature from his context quite as much as
science is the Western thinker's attempt.
Whenever any human structure was contemplated, a
geomancer was called to position this structure according to
the lines of divination on the earth.

Not only the

structures of the

living, but mcst importantly,

the dead were not

constructed without the principles ofFeqg

Slijji being applied by a geomancer.

the tombs of

In this manner, human

structures became related to the whole of the natural world.
In a real sense, the unity of the human world and Nature
were connected in the sagely experience of the geomancer.
This is reflected in the education of the novitiate to Feng

Education of
the eye and the sentiments,
familiarization with the
local terrain, and at the
same time an
initiation, this discipline is an
indication of the primary place of immediate
experience in geomancy.
In the last instance, all
that counts is how a site feels, the quality of
blend of psyche and landscape;
if one can feel
life breath directly, all else is superflous.
(Narch, 1968, p. 259)
Feflg Shqj was not only a descriptive system, but a
remedial system as well, not only indicating where
structures were to be placed, but also how the unfavorable
sites could be more beneficially prepared.
Every place had its special topographical features
which modified the local influence of various qhfr4
of Nature.
The forms of hills and the directions
of watercourses, being the outcome cf the moulding
influences of winds and waters, were the most
important, but, in addition, the heights and forms
of buildings, and the directions of roads and
bridges, were potent factors.
The force and
nature of the invisible currents would be from
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hour to hour modified by the position of the
heavenly bodies so that their aspects as seen from
the locality in question had to be considered.
While the choosing cf sites was of prime
importance, bad siting was not irremediable, as
ditches and tunnels could be dug, or other
measures taken, to alter the f^ng shqi situation.
(Needham, 1956, p,. 359)
]?§£S Shiji not only demanded that human structures be
harmonized with each other, but that all structures
harmonize with the whole and,

ultimately, with the entire

universe including astronomical phenomena.

There is a

certain uniformity of application of the principles of Feqg
Shui such that the largest whole becomes involved directly
with the smallest whole.
For example,

in determining the site, for the grave of a

parent,

a geomancer would be called in and, using the method

of

S h u i . he would position the tomb with the

characteristics of other human structures on the site, with
the structures of Nature herself, such as mountains and
rivers, and, finally,
itself.

with the characteristics of the cosmos

In this manner, £§23 Shuj. provided a unified

function for the traditional Chinese in all of their
architectural projects.
This order was not the result of the dictates of some
master plan.

It was rather that Feng Shuj.. uniformly

applied at each site,

produced an ordered whole with a

spontaneity beyond that possible by the calculation of a
master planner.

Instead of looking to a master plan, in

each specific case, one looked to the immediate
relationships around tfce site itself.

For example, "within
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a village the height and position of a new house are watched
with close attention lest it damage the fortune of other
houses;
house

and caution must be exercised in modifying an old

(by piercing a wall to make a window, for example)

lest a deleterious effect be produced on the Feqg~Shui of
nearby houses."

(Freedman, 1966, p.

139)

Through the consistent application of the principles of
Feng Shui in each specific case, the cumulative effect was
that all of the human structures were unified into an
harmonious whole and this whole itself unified with the
whole of nature.

Using this grassroots ordering principle,

the traditional Chinese became the first successful urban
planners

(Breuer 1970).

One of the most dcxinant features of the Chinese city
is its integrated, harmonious crder.
most cities of the ancient world,
one

The Chinese city,

were not constructed as

whole, but were expanded in stages ever time.

ofthe uniform application of a

like

Because

few principles on a

consistent basis, the result was a unified ordered pattern
while the same additive procedures in the Western city
produced a chaotic pattern of structures.
The whole city was a work cf art.
And this was
not because it was planned by one mind or even at
one time,
on the contrary, Peking was the result
of growth additions over five centuries . . . .
it
was, as it were, a collective rather than an
individual work of art, and the strict limitation
of the Chinese system, the constant application of
a few principles, its constant following of
precedents, far from being disadvantages, were
part of the means by which the Chinese city
achieved its high degree of harnony and artistic
unity.
(Boyd, 1962, p. 72)
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Boyd goes on to make a very fruitful comparison of the
plan of Versailles and the Palace City

of Peking.

of the latter, arising as it does from

the simple

The order

application of a few principles, displays more spontaneity
and artistic integration than that of the former which tends
toward geometric form and abstraction where buildings are
placed simply to satisfy the requirements of the general
plan and the symmetry of the whole.

Even when holistic

planning is attempted in the West, the

whole that results

seems to fall short of the harmony and

integration of the

planless whole and order of the Chinese.
As natural objects are seldom perfect straight lines or
angles, there was a tendency to favor irregular contours of
the terrain.
There was in general a strong preference for
tortuous and winding roads, walls and structures
which seemed to fit into the landscape, rather
than to dominate it;
and a strong objection to
straight lines and geometrical layouts.
(Needham,
1956, p. 361)
There is a certain parallelism here with the Chinese
artist's love for a asymmetry and ruggedness in landscape
paintings.
Under the aegis of the harmonizing principles of Feng
Shgj. the Chinese were counseled to use the wisdom of Nature
to shelter human habitations.
In many ways fgaa Shui was an advantage to the
Chinese people, as when, for example, it advised
planting trees and bamboos as windbreaks, and
emphasized the value of flowing water adjacent to
a house site.
In other ways it developed into a
grossly superstitious system.
But all through it
embodied, I believe, a marked aesthetic component,
which accounts for the great beauty of the siting
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of so many farms, houses, and villages throughout
China.
(Needham, 1956, p. 361)
Before leaving the topic cf the harmonizing of human
structures and Nature in traditional China, I should warn
against reading into this unity Western values of
conservation and ecology. . This unity did not serve to
preserve Nature in her virgin state.

Tuan

(1968)

makes the

point that i f one were to compare the “total tonnage of
earth removed there may not be so very ouch difference
between European formal and the Chinese naturalistic garden.
Both are human artifacts.” (p. 177)

From a purely

ecological standpoint, both the Chinese and the Westerner
were engaged in transforming the pristine condition of
Nature.

It was rather that different ideals and purposes

directed these human endeavors in this transformation.

The Unified Functioning of Humans toward Nature
The example of architecture easily broadens into a
general spirit of human functioning toward Nature,
(1971)

Needham

relates a story scrrounding one cf the oldest

references to the practice of feus Shui.
Heng Thien,

it is alleged that

after building a particularly large section of

the Great Wall, committed suicide because he had through his
excavations disturbed the pattern of Nature.

Meng Thien was

reported to have given the following reason for his suicide:
‘Indeed I have a crime for which I merit death.
Beginning at Lin-thao, and extending to Laio-tung,
I made ramparts and ditches over more than 10,000
li, and in that distance it is impossible that I
did not cut through the veins of the earth.
This
is my crime.' (p. 53)
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It can be seen from this that there was the expectation
that human beings should respect the veins of the earth as
they respect the veins of their own bodies.

Human function

and the function of Nature were to be closely linked, such
that the functioning of the former was a necessary element
to the functioning of the latter.

ff^ h o l o g y §&<| meteorology.

Again the practical area of

medicine is helpful as a point cf focus.

Changes in Nature

were indicative of changes in human health.

In traditional

Chinese medicine there was a linkage between pathology of
the human body and climatological changes in Nature.

The

underlying unity cf pathology and meteorology became the
unguestioned medium for much of medical practice, both
diagnosis and therapeutic treatment.
It is axiomatic in Chinese thought that all realms
of Nature— the macrocosm and all microcosms— are
interconnected inductively.
The energetic
processes of the Cosmos unceasingly modulate the
changes that take place in every individual
organism.
For this reason systematic and
qualitatively unequivocal descriptions of
temporally variable meteorological,
climatological, and imnunclogical influences are
needed for diagnosis and therapy of both the
exogenous . . . diseases and the epidemic and
pandemic diseases.
(Porkert, 1974, p,. 55)
In this context,

an elaborate system of medicine was

developed which allowed the doctor to function within this
relationship.

Pales

(1974)

gives an insight into what his

medical practice entailed:
Ever since ancient times an interrelationship has
been observed between climate, seasons, and
variations in temperature on the one hand, and a
balanced state cf bodily health on the
other . . . .
According to the 'Su Hen', Spring is
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the season of increasing vitality* fecundity in
Nature* the time of restitution*
During this
period the liver can suffer harm if Man does not
adjust himself to the natural order of things.
Summer is the time when celestial and terrestrial
forces combine.
Particularly characteristic of
this season are cardiac diseases and 'the
intermittent fever' (malaria).
In Autumn the
forces between heaven and earth balance out* and
this season can be harmful for the lungs.
Finally* Winter is the period when Nature rests
and it is now that kidney diseases frequently
occur.
It was noted that windy weather in Spring
caused diarrhea and that summer heat brought on
feverish illnesses.
The autumnal dampness
coincided with 'coughing* and the Winter cold with
feverish ailments which broke out in Spring.
(pp. 3h-35)
From the special case of the relation of meteorology to
the health of the person,

it is an easy step to the more

general case of the relation of the natural world to the
health of society.

In this way* astronomical phenomena*

being among the most pronounced of natural phenomena* were
related to the condition of the social order.

Agtgofiomy 3 fid society.

Very early in their development*

the Chinese became interested in recording changes in the
celestial world.

As Needham

(1S70) notes* the Chinese were

the most persistent and accurate observers of celestial
phenomena in any culture before the Benaissance.

It is no

accident that seme modern day radic-astronomers use ancient
Chinese records to validate their theories.

The ancient

Chinese were extremely astute and accurate observers of the
heavens for this interest was motivated not by the love of
abstract knowledge* but by the desire to gauge the events
that were occurring in their own society.

Their records of
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supernova and nova have teen found tc be extremely valuable.
The orbit of Hailey's ccmet was originally estimated from
Chinese

records

(Needham,

1970).

Behind this astute astronomical observation was the
state astrology which locked tc the heavens for portents of
events to come in the political realm.

Thus, astronomy

became an integral part of the government.

This is in clear

contrast to the West of the same period where the astronomer
was an independent seeker after truth.

The contrast is most

striking when a comparison is made between the social
position of the astronomer in ancient Greece and China:
As has been said, 'while, among the Greeks, the
astronomer was a private person, a philosopher* a
lover of the truth (as Ptolemy said of
Hipparchus), as often as net on uncertain terms
with priests cf his city;
in China, on the
contrary, he was intimately connected with the
sovereign pontificate of the Son of Heaven, part
of an official government service, and ritually
accommodated within the very walls of the imperial
palace.' (Needham, 1959, p. 171)
To the Chinese,

astronomy was the "cardinal science."

In addition to observing the portents of heaven, astronomers
also had the vital duty cf fixing the calender which in turn
would order all of the actions of human beings, especially
the actions of the emperor himself.

The Chinese firmly held

to the notion that "'comets dc foretell the death of
princes.*" (Needham,

1970, p. 2)

Given this ethical

solidarity between changes in astronomical phenomena and the
political climate in the society,

meteorological and

astronomical events became an important political force and
were used as an important check on the power of the ruler
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(Eberhard,

1957).

Responsibility to flal^gpe.

Central to this entire

discussion is the notion that the emperor was responsible
for the harmony of Nature.

Thus, any abnormality of this

natural order was immediately related to some disturbance in
human society.

All human beings had a responsibility to

maintain a harmonious social order in order to promote a
harmonious natural order,

Mei

(1968)

reminds us' that there

is a persistent importance applied tc the responsibility of
human beings,

where human beings. Heaven and Earth are

spoken of in the same breath.
This responsibility was true for all human beings but
for the "One Man," the emperor, this responsiblity was
extremely great,

for as the "Son of Heaven" he sat at the

apex of all of humankind and at the vortex of the triangle
where the human world meets the natural world.

It follows

that his personal behavior was extremely ordered lest the
natural order be disturbed.

The emperor was required to

travel about his empire with the regularity of the calendar.
He had to "regulate his progress so as to find himself in
the East during the vernal equinox, in the South during
summer solstice, in the Rest when autumn came and in the
North during winter."

(Beincourt,

1965,

p. 79)

The extent of this integration of the life of the
emperor and the changes cf Nature was extremely detailed in
its correspondence;

Hallnofer and von Bottauscher

(1965)

give the following directives for the e m p e r o r ’s activities
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from the

S p y i n g ajjd

Daring the three spring months, the emperor
remains in the Eastern wing of the Hall of Light
(the principal building for cult rituals). He
rides in a carriage drawn by green-shimmering
dragon-horses.
all the tanners are green.
His
officials and entourage are dressed in green gowns
and wear jade jewelry.
The emperor conducts the
sacrificial rites on.the palace's East lawn.
He
orders his ministers to be magnanimous and to
exercise gentleness, and tc prevent the felling of
trees and the taking of arms (wood is destroyed by
metal!).
(p. 5)
It is interesting to note the detail: the emphasis on green
and the prescription of the place

(by compass position)

in

which the emperor must perform the rites.
He can compare the above with the directives for the
autumn months:
During the three autumn months, the emperor stays
in the Western wing of the Hall of Light.
His
war-carriage is drawn by white horses.
The
banners are white.
His officials wear white gowns
and white jade jewels.
He conducts sacrificial
rites on the palace's West lawn.
The emperor
orders his ministers to revise the laws and to
conduct the court trials.
Dressed in his war
habit, the emperor personally takes part in the
hunting expeditions.
(Hallnofer and von
Eottauscher, 1965, p. 6)
If the emperor faithfully performed the rites that were
prescribed,

it was believed that the order of human society

would be integrated with the order of Nature.
It is important to stress that every action or ritual
had its proper place and time in the order of Nature.

It

was not a question of having enough time to do the
prescribed activities,

as much as needing to perform the

correct ritual at the precise time.
written

For example, there is

in ancient texts that "there is upheld the idea that

174

punishments can only be carried out in autumn, when all
things are dying;

to execute criminals in the spring would

have a deleterious effect on the growing crops."

(Needham,

1956, p. 527)
To fail to execute these rituals at the proper time was
to court disorder and disaster from the natural world.
Again, the emperor was a mcdel for all humankind.
The smallest acticns of the emperor were believed
to affect the cosmic mechanism.
Thus, the Becords
2a Ceremonial . . . informs us that if the emperor
were, in the last month of summer, to wear white
clothing instead red, 'even high ground would be
flooded, the grain in the fields wculd not ripen,
there would be miscarriages among women.' (Creel,
1949, p. 77)
Such a ritualistic function of humankind toward Nature
would not be thought to be fertile ground for the
development of scientific ways cf thinking.

This is not to

say that the Chinese were net very astute observers of
empirical phenomena.

As noted above, the Chinese

astronomers maintained extremely accurate records of the
heavens and changes in celestial phenomena.
example, the first to observe sun-spots.

They were, for

Yet,

something

more is meant by science than simply empirical observation.
It is the welding of these empirical observations into a
theoretical framework that is the essential mechanism of
science.

In this respect,

the Chinese were extremely

limited by their experience of unity with the natural
phenomena being observed.
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The essential scientific process of hypothesis and
refutation could net easily function within their system of
ethical solidarity.

Eberhard

(1957)

speaks to this point:

But instead o f attributing apparent discrepancies,
i.e., unusual celestial or natural phenomena, to
inadequacies of the theories, such phenomena were
thought tc be the result of human activity, human
interference in the balance of Nature.
Therefore,
instead of correcting or adjusting the theory, men
sought the sources of human interference.
(p. 39)
The traditional Chinese thinker was deprived of the basic
mechanism by which scientific

kEOwledge is fostered the

refutation of hypotheses and the corresponding modification
of the theory to account for ancmalous findings.
In summary, the Western thinker could play upon the
assumption of divisibility and deal with Nature as something
separate and objective.

The purpose for the knowledge of

Nature in China was different tc use the assumed unity of
the human world with Nature tc promote a harmonious
relationship,

all within the ever present Tao.

The Chinese

purpose toward Nature could net foster scientific endeavors,
but favored an ethical treatment of Nature:
In order to grasp the universal order, man should
not dream of knowing and dominating Nature with
the help cf scientific kncwledge, but should seek
to integrate himself harmcniously into Nature.
Instead of s c i e n c e , he adopted siisj)§ii£ and
ceremony as the suitable agents for the desired
integration.
Whatever he did or thought, every
item of his life had to be *in tune* with Nature,
related by a set of complicated rules to the
revered Tao.
(Reincourt, 1965, p. 78)
These different assumptiens and purposes for knowledge have
lead to different actions toward Nature in each system.
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GVEBVIEW
This chapter has examined the consequences of the unity
of the human world and Nature on the levels of experience
and function.
painting,

Beginning with calligraphy and landscape

a feeling cf unity with Nature was the

inspiration for
This
the human

central

the artistic vision in China.

unity was expanded to the general case

in which

world was experienced as a microcosm in detailed

relation to the macrocosm of Nature.

In Chinese medicine,

the characteristics of the human body were experienced as
being in relation to tbe characteristics of the natural
world.

Within the state analogy, the characteristics of the

social order were conceived as a microcosm of the naturalThis experience of unity was reflected in practical
areas of function such as architecture where gardens and
courtyards were designed as integral part of human
structures.

This permitted the blending of Nature with the

protection and privacy of a building.

A form of geomancy,

§hui, allowed a harmonious ordering of all human
structures with their natural setting.
In response to this unity, human actions were perceived
as having consequences
order.

in the functioning of the natural

In medicine, human pathology was related to

meteorological changes, as were changes in the cosmos
related to changes in the social world.

In this context,

astromony was a most highly valued endeavor.

All human

beings and the emperor in particular were responsible for
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the smooth functioning of the natural order through the
maintenance of harmony in the social order.

This resulted

in ritualistic behavior inhibiting the growth of a system of
knowledge based on scientific principles.

C H A P T E R VI

C O N S E Q U E N C E S IN H U H A N RELA TI ONS

In this chapter# the discussion will turn from the
macrocosm of human relations to Nature to an examination of
the relative microcosm cf the relation of human beings to
other human beings.

I have taken pains to make this

statement in microcosm-macrocosm terms for the purpose of
stressing that#

at least for the Chinese,

the same unity# only another plane.

we are exploring

This is not a separate

section independent of the last, but a further refinement of
the unity of humankind and Nature.
As has been stressed above the major priority for the
human being in China was to maintain social harmony with
Nature.

It follows that all sccial phenomena were

experienced as having a large component which was related to
Nature;

Nature is always assumed to be the background for

human interactions.
ignored#

Sometimes this background may be

but at ether times# as we shall see below# it is

the most important determinant of social structure.
Before beginning the discussion of human relations# two
problems which relate to this area should be considered at
the outset.

Firstly,

there is the problem of the extreme

complexity of the social history of China.

This history

extends over at least 4000 years# a period which has seen
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the introduction cf man; different ideas about social
structure, the rise and fall of many different social
systems,
ideas.

and the elaboration through time of many social
This area does not easily reduce itself to simple

relationships which have endured unchanging over time.
Yet within this kaleidoscopic sccial history,

I think

most scholars would agree that the Ccnfucian vision of human
relations has been the major constancy and pillar for
Chinese civilization over the centuries.

In the following,

I will concentrate on presenting human relations as they
were envisioned from the Ccnfucian context.

I will deal

with conflicting schools of thought only to the extent that
they can aid in defining these Confucian ideals.
Alas, even Confucianism is a kaleidoscope of different
ideas and has been modified over time.

If Confucius were to

be resurrected, he would no doubt find it difficult to
understand many of the ideas that were propounded in his
name by the Neo-Confucians centuries later.
complicate matters, Confucianism,
system,

To further

like any all-embracing

deviated in social practice from the ideals of the

vision itself.
With these admonitions,

the reader should be fully

aware the following does not represent the full structure of
traditional Chinese social thought or even of Confucianism
for that matter.

In the following discussion, I will

attempt to rise above these issues and examine an ideal
model of the Confucian vision of human relations.
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Secondly, the Western framework of divisibility
presents a further problem.

In dealing with human

relations, the Western framework forces upon us two foci of
attention and two areas of discourse— the human being and
the society.

Within the Western framework,

merely "assumed" as a matter of course.

this division is

For example, the

psychologist does not feel it necessary to defend the notion
that individual psychological processes can be investigated
independently of social variables, but in many cases assumes
the division and proceeds to work within this assumed
context.

In a similar manner, the sociologist does not find

it necessary tc defend the isolation of social processes
from individual processes, but merely assumes that social
processes can be known independently of the individual human
beings that produce them.
The Chinese framework does not allcw such luxuries.

If

I were to make this assumption of separation, the Western
framework would tend to obscure the

framework of traditional

China which has as its mcst important feature the unity of
human beings and the social process.
discussion intelligible,

However, to make this

I must adhere to Western standards

of discourse.
Hy solution will be a compromise— I shall assume both
foci of discourse, the human being and the social process,
and attempt to illustrate that in traditional China both
foci tend toward the same point, to the unity of human
beings with ether human beings.

In this way, we can begin
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to appreciate a framework of unity from the perspective of
Western categories of division.

What will emerge from the

discussion will be the identification of the family as a
major aspect cf the organization which contains both the
individual human being and the social process
simultaneously.

EXPERIENCING CTHERS
The last chapter presented a point cf entry into human
relations.

It is best to examine the interface between

Nature and the social process and expand this entry point to
a consideration of social process in general and the
individual human being's experience.

The pattern that I

shall follow is based on the assumption that the unity of
humankind and Nature reguires a certain unity within human
society itself.

Human Relations at the Center of Social Process
I wish first to establish social prccess in traditional
China as a viable alternative tc Western social structure;
and to do this, I shall examine the same condition in both
China and the West and observe the different reactions of
each.

As a point of comparison, I have chosen gunpowder.

As is well known,

gunpowder was discovered in China and used

there for some time before being introduced into Europe.
The interesting feature which I want to consider is the
alternative reaction of the different social systems.
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As Breuer

(1970)

indicates, the invention of gunpowder

did not produce any major changes in Chinese social
structure and simply found its way into the arsenal of
armies.

In complete contrast,

its introduction into the

social structure of Europe produced catastrophic changes in
the social structure.
printing

Icgether with the invention of the

press, these two forces were instrumental in

changing the entire social order from the feudalism of the
Middle Ages to the Renaissance, heralding the beginning of
the modern era.
In this context, Bzeuer asks how the same element can
produce such different reactions.

He goes on to account for

this difference by discussing differences in the social
structure of feudal Europe and traditional China.

What he

points to is a difference in the social structure and power
structure itself.

In short, the power and influence of the

emperor in the Chinese social system was much different from
that of the feudal lords in Europe when gunpowder was
introduced.

I would be anticipating the material that will

be presented below if I were tc account for the anomaly of
gunpowder at present other than for the purpose of
demonstrating the alternative character of the two social
structures.

I shall attempt to resolve this issue below.

Qpe sixilizgi ftymank4gd|.

At the outset, it is important to

recognize the restrictions imposed by the unity of humankind
with Nature.

It was suggested that this unity placed a

responsibility upon each human being to maintain the order
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of Nature through personal action.

To the Chinese,

Humankind, Heaven, and Earth formed a ternion.
of the pattern was equally important.

Each element

£t the apex of all

humankind was the empeccr whose responsibility it was to
perform set rituals at set times t o insure the smooth
function of Nature.
For this model to function properly, there must be
assumed a uniformity of rituals cf all civilized human
beings.

Mancall

(1968)

writes:

In this sense the Chinese state was not a state at
all, in the conventional meaning of that word, but
rather the administration of civilized society i&
the emperor, far from being the ruler
of one state among many, was the mediator between
heaven and earth, a cardinal point in the
universal continuum, the apex of civilization,
unigue in the universe.
In other words, the
emperor was net cnly a temporal political ruler
but a figure of cosmic dimensions.
The rituals he
performed, or those performed about him, were not
particularistic but universal.
In the annual
fertility rite he plowed the sacred furrow not so
the Chinese crops could grow but so that crops per
se could grow.
(pp. 63-64)
From this linkage of the social and natural orders, two
of the major characteristics of traditional Chinese society
derive— the necessary unity of all civilized humankind
behind the emperor, and the necessity for the basis of the
social order to rest on the rituals and personal relations
of human beings extending upward from the mass of peasants
to the emperor himself.
Like many major civilizations,

the Chinese saw

themselves as being at the center of the world.

However,

for the Chinese this view of centrality was taken to an
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extreme-

The traditional Chinese experience of the world

could almost be diagramed in the fcrm of Dante's Hell with
concentric circles converging on the emperor at the center
and unfolding outward with circles of ever increasing
diameter

representing lesser and lesser degrees of

civilization,

until one is delivered in the outermost circle

to pure barbarians who did not perform the rituals necessary
for civilized human beings.
Nonetheless,

all human beings had their respective

places in this system as they were contained in the major
interface between the human world and the natural.

The

quite common expression which relates this is 22i§n h§i<|,
which is translated, quite literally, "all-under-Heaven."
One finds this expression used quite commonly to refer to
human society,
Heaven.

implying the unity of all humankind beneath

As Fairbank

(1968)

indicates, this expression was

used to embrace the whole, including everything outside
China.

He concludes that the dominant Chinese experience of

the world was that of sinocentrism.
This sinocentrism,
understood.

however, must be correctly

It was not experienced as the dominance of

China as a political entity thrcughout the world-

It must

be remembered that the nction of "China" as a political
entity is a quite recent development of only the present
century.

The noticn of sinocentrism was more basic: the

Chinese experienced themselves as the center of civilized
humankind having the only channel of communication with
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Nature.
Again,

the Chinese reacticn to the infusion of Buddhism

is a very enlightening case in Feint.

The Chinese

conception of civilization led to the rejection of Buddhism
not as a competing civilization or system of thought, but as
barbarism lying beyond the rituals of civilized humankind.
Since, as Mather

(1955)

points out,

. . . China has never exhibited the kind of
xenophobia with which we are familiar in the West,
the almost chauvinistic contempt for ’barbarian*
culture characterizing nearly all critiques of
Buddhism in China seems paradoxical enough.
But
it was precisely because the Chinese intellectuals
did not champion nationalistic culture, but
insisted instead cn maintaining a universal one,
that divergent practices were rejected, not so
much on the grounds that they were Indian or
Parthian or Kuchean, as that they represented £ 0
culture.
If the foreign missionaries had accepted
this universal culture and lived by its
principles, no objections would have been raised.
The cultured man (and he is inseparable from the
moral man) is one who accepts the pattern of the
universe, as it has been perceived and transmitted
by sage kings and emperors, and cultivates it
within himself.
(p. 34)
This salient feature of Chinese social thought
perpetuated itself intc modern times.

Peyrefitte

(1977)

relates a statement made by the emperor on receiving a
British delegation to China in the last century.

The

emperor stated: "Governing the whole world as I do, I have
only one aim in view— to uphold perfect government and to
fulfill the duties of the State."

(p. 2U5)

It was this

quite unrealistic attitude that prevented the Chinese from
taking action against the increasing Western incursion into
China until the situation was irreversible.

Notwithstanding

186

the reality of Western material and technological
superiority, to the Chinese,

given their social and cosmic

unity, the Westerner was still only a barbarian, not a
member of civilized humankind.
Within this experience of the unity of humankind, there
was no place for isolated and autonomous groups of human
beings.

As Fairbank

(1968)

indicates, even our Western

language and ideas seem to fail us for there are no concepts
such as nation, sovereignty,

and equality of states within

the Chinese experience of the world order.

All of these

concepts suggest a division of human beings into different
societies and nation-states which runs in direct opposition
to the experience of the unity of all humankind at the basis
of the Chinese world order.
In a very revealing contrast,

Fairbank

(1968)

writes of

the differences between the European order based on division
and the Chinese order based on unity:
The European order, with its interest in precise
division of territories and its own concepts of
legitimacy, came to depend upon a balance of power
among the nation states.
The Chinese world order,
in contrast, was unified and centralized in theory
by the universal preeminence of the Son of Heaven.
It was not organized by a division of territories
among sovereigns of equal status but rather by
subordination of all local authorities to the
central and awe-inspiring power of the emperor.
(P- 9)
Even during the Chinese Feudal period and during the chaotic
period of the Warring States, the relation of subordination
to the emperor as the Son of Heaven was carefully
maintained.
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Yet, this experienced unity of all humankind within
civilized society extends far beyond the political order
itself to every aspect of Chinese civilization.

Buck (1970)

writes:
The essential unity of China is not in its
political life, which has not until the present
generation been of great importance.
China's
unity, so much more profound than our own,
consists in its people's coherence as Chinese, the
unity of a people who has lived in one part of the
world for thousands of years, a unity of history
and of habit.
To such a people, accustomed to so
profound a unity, the mere unity of a transient
government means little.
(p. 3)
From this context,

we can begin to appreciate the phrase:

"the experienced unity of civilized human beings."
This experience of unity,

cf course, became a central

concept of the dominant system, Confucianism.

Indeed, the

unity of all human beings within society is the very essence
of this system and the source from

which the Confucian

vision arises:
The essence of the Confucian vision was that of a
'cooperative world. ' It was the conviction that
antagonism and suspicion, strife and suffering,
were largely unnecessary.
It was a profound faith
that men's true interests did net conflict but
complemented each other, that war and injustice
and exploitation injured those who profited by
them as well as those they caused to suffer.
This
was, indeed, a thread which 'ran through' all of
Confucius' thinking and frcm which much of his
philosophy can be derived by logical deduction.
(Creel, 1949, p. 123)

M i i s £21 social ord^r.

The second requirement imposed by

the unity of the human world with Nature relates to the
basis of the social process itself.
function

If a human being's

affects the function cf Nature as I have tried to
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establish above, it follows that the smooth function of the
social order and, consequently,

of the natural order, must

be based on the uniformity of rituals of all human beings.
Social order, within this system, must evolve from the
"grassroots" so to speak,

it this pcint, our Western

concepts again seem to fail us, for the basis of the social
order in the West is of a reverse nature:

Western order is

imposed from above to regulate an assumed chaotic system.
This is the reason why divine revelation, natural law or
social contract become the central issues around which the
social process and order revolve.
In China, we find the reverse process where each
element displays its own crder and, through a summation of
these individual orders, the ordering of the whole is
achieved.

We have already met this inverted ordering

principle, above in the discussicn concerning geomancy.
attempted to establish that the geomancer,

I

working at each

individual site, by producing order in the specific was
producing order in the general case.
What I am suggesting is a two-factor theory of how
order can arise within any given system.

One factor orders

the system from the specific tc the general,

while the

second factor orders the system frcm the general to the
specific.

To take a simple example,

if the purpose is to

produce order on the highways, we can proceed in cne of two
ways.

We can attempt to order traffic from the general to

the specific, in which case we would pass new laws for
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speeding and enforce the laws with heavy penalties, increase
the quality and guantity of lav enforcement, and, as a final
effort,

place speed controls cn every engine manufactured.

However, ve could attempt to accomplish the same
purpose by moving frcm the specific to the general.

In this

case, ve would attempt to make individuals through their own
actions produce the order in the larger whole.

We could,

for example, attempt tc produce in each driver a sense of
religious shame if he should exceed a prudent speed,.

From

the Western perspective, it is extremely difficult even to
conceive of how this latter option would be effected, for
the Western framework is heavily weighted toward the first
factor.
The predominant way to produce crder in the Chinese
framework is from the specific to the general:
As I see it from my many years in the Orient and
my few years in my own country, it seems to me
that the two peoples begin thinking from opposite
ends.
That is, the Chinese reason from the
individual tc the general, we reason from the
general to the individual.
That is, the Chinese
principles of living, the Chinese essentials of
what constitute justice and righteousness are
drawn not frcm any religion, not from any
idealism, but from thousands upon thousands of
individual cases.
(Buck, 1970, p. 64)
To apply this principal difference to the problem of
social order,
be found

in the West the basis for social order is to

in the general:

in religion frcm God and his divine

revelation, and in the world of science from some discovered
laws about the world.

In China, the basis of the social

order is from the specific to the general with the basis
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resting on bow human beings conduct themselves.
Within the Western tradition there are few examples to
draw upon.

& notable and important exception is the

philosophy of Leibniz.

Within his theory of monads, we find

a system of order which, in many characteristics, has an
uncanny resemblence to that of the Chinese.

The monad is

thought tc produce, frcm its pre-established harmony, order
in the whole world.

While ve cannot overlook the fact that

this order derives from God, a Western concept to be sure,
the philosophy of Leibniz stands out as being signally
unique in this regard and has suggested to me evidence of a
possible infusion of Chinese thought into European
philosophy.

For those readers who would like to pursue this

speculation further, seme preliminary materials are
presented in the Appendix.
Returning to the problem at hand,

the experience of the

social order develops frcm the relations of individual human
beings.

This process cannot be isolated within the Chinese

perspective frcm the behavior cf individual human beings.
Human relations become the source of all social order.

The

Chinese categorized these relations into five relationships
central to the society:
Consider now the Confucian conception of the
ordering principle in society.
According to the
sage's grandson, Tzu Ssu, it involved the
establishment of five relationships:
(1) Between
ruler and subject;
(2) between father and son;
(3) between husband and wife;
(4) between the
elder and the younger brother;
and (5) between
friend and friend egually . . . .
There can be no
trust in government, no proper relation between
sovereign and subject, without a trust of friend
and friend.
Thus, the first of the five relations
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depends on the fifth.
Bat there can be no trust
of friend in friend unless men are dutiful to
their parents.
There is no point more important
than this for understanding of Chinese culture,
both traditional and contemporary.
A proper
filial relation in the family is prior to, and the
necessary prerequisite for a wider social
organization in the business world or in
government.
(Northrop, 19*46, pp. 326-327)
It can be seen that the Chinese conception of social order
and social process is based directly on
human beings

to other human beings.

human relations

Further,

relationships themselves are interdependent,
relations,

and ultimately social crder,

the relation
I would

of

the
with all

resting firmly on

of filial piety.
be remiss at this point if

I did not examine

one of the virtues of the Chinese social process and one of
the corresponding dangers of the Western social process.
is quite

obvious from the discussion above that,

It

since the

social process is based on the function cf human beings, the
human being is experienced as being at the center of social
process and order.
order,

In the Western framework of social

there is a corresponding tendency for the process to

be increasingly abstracted from human actions.

In the West,

the principles of crder tend to take on an importance beyond
the individuals that have constructed them.

There then

develops the danger that human beings become estranged from
the social process and manipulated by it.
As Harx recognized,

there is a tendency in Western

economic systems for human beings to be alienated from the
means of production.

In traditional China, however, a
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corresponding danger could not exist, for the economic
process has at its heart the function of individuals that
produce it.

Wilhelm

(1947)

writing to this point draws the

following contrast between the two economic systems:
The leaders of Chinese economic policy, above all
Confucius, have always endeavored tc place man in
a central position in regard to fchjggs . . . .
No
one was allowed to sink to the level of a mere
tool.
Hence the tendency to have tools as simple
as possible and artisans as skilled as possible.
The emphasis was entirely cn the perfection of
men, not on the perfection of means of production.
In economic activity it was sought to organize as
a natural expression of man.
Han was to guard his
humanity even in the midst of the economic
process.
(p. 6)
What is true here for economics is also true for the
entire social process.

Since human beings were experienced

as being at the basis of the process, they were experienced
as being unified with that process.

Contrastingly,

in the

West, the social process while still being constructed by
human beings for human beings has the tendency to abstract
itself from its human origins tc become at times an
adversary.

The Human Being in Relation to Others
I will new assume the alternative focus to the social
process and examine the experience of the individual, if you
wish the psychological process.

It is difficult from the

Western perspective tc appreciate the Chinese experience of
the human being.

The individuality of the human being,

especially in the modern West, is so much a part of the
Western intellectual and emoticnal apparatus that it is
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difficult to assume an alternative point of view.
of Hsu

The words

(1970) are helpful in this regard:

. . . in the American way of life the emphasis is
placed upon the predilections of the individual# a
characteristic we shall call individual-centered.
This is in contrast to the emphasis the Chinese
put upon an i n d i v i d u a l ’s appropriate place and
behavior among his f.ellowmen# a characteristic we
shall term situaticn-cen-t;erefl.
(p.
10)
Hsu’s work is an elaboration of this contrast as it is
manifest in many diverse areas cf human function in each
system.
In the West# the predominant experience of others tends
to be individually centered with the person being conceived
as an isolated ego# almost an atom# functioning among other
equally autonomous, isolated centers of consciousness.
this context,

In

the Western ethic reinforces the

individual-centered mode cf life by fostering values of
independence.
In the situation-centered context of China# the
tendency is precisely the reverse.

The human being is

experienced as being in relation to ether human beings as an
initial condition.

Consequently#

the Chinese tend to foster

inverse values to that of the West:

"the Chinese is inclined

to be socially or psychologically dependent on others# for
this situation-centered individual is tied closer to his
world and his fellow men."

(Hsu# 1970#

p. 10) In China#

the

individual ego becomes diluted# or# perhaps more precisely#
never becomes differentiated#

from the matrix of other egos.
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This is not to say that the

Chinese have no individual egos, but that this individuality
is submerged in the egc's pattern cf relationships with
other human beings.
The 'ego' of the Chinese peasant is not in the
first place his own insignificant person but
embraces the larger ego of the family.
The
fortunes of the fanily are the fortunes which he
directly experiences.
A typical example of this
is the answer of a peasant who was asked how long
he lived in the locality: *three hundred y e a r s , *
he said;
'at that time we came to this
neighborhood from the South.' Of course, personal
consciousness also exists.
The individual is
conscious of himself as a separate member of his
family.
But he does not think of himself
abstractly as an individual but as a collective
type.
He is someone's sen, or someone's father,
or holds some other position in the family . . . .
(Wilhelm, 1947, p. 19)
The approach tc the individual ego is always through
the direction of others and the relations that the ego has
with others.
context,

To know an individual within the Chinese

we do not begin with the attributes of the

individual as one is inclined to do in the West, but the
entire direction is reversed.

One must first inguire of the

person's status within the social structure, then the
family, then the relationship

within the family, and,

finally, at the ultimate extreme one begins to examine the
individual consciousness.
To illustrate this situation-centered experience, I
turn to art.

I have concentrated above on landscape art

which is given form by the Taoist ideal of unity with
Nature.

However, there are some examples cf portraiture

which display more of the Confucian ideals and concentrate

An Example of Chinese Portraiture Illustrating
the Interest of the Artist in the Subject’s
Belations to Other Human Beings
(Courtesy Huseum of Fine Arts, Boston)
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on human beings as theix subject.

Because of the rather

formalized character of Confucian art, the entire area has
been treated with benevolent neglect by most scholars of
Chinese art who seem to prefer the vitalism of the Taoist
landscapes.
Displayed in figure 9 is an example of Chinese
portraiture.

The overriding first impression is that of

formalism— the subject

seems tc have very little

"personality” as the artist has painted him.

This contrasts

sharply with the vitalism that characterizes Chinese
landscapes where Nature seems most alive.
such a painting, Hsu

Commenting on

(1970) writes:

The facial expression of such figures is nil.
The
viewer obtains a much better idea of the status,
rank, prestige, and other social characteristics
of the subjects portrayed than he does of their
personalities . . . .
In fact when we do see human
faces in Chinese paintings, their blankness bears
a remarkable resemblance tc the expressionless
figures portrayed in 1Daughters of the American
Revolution.*
However, the absence of expression
in the Chinese faces results because the Chinese
artist is net concerned with personality whereas
the very blankness of the features in Grant Wood*s
work is intended by the artist as a satiric
representation of character.
(p. 18)
This is quite significant for it is po^ that the subject of
the painting in Figure 9 dees not have a personality,

as

much as it is that the perception of the artist upon which
the painting is based is not frcm the focus of the
individual with his independent attributes,

but from a

preoccupation with others and their relations to the
subject.
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In seeking to define the
not looking at a single

human being in China, ve are

human being cr an isolated sliver

of

living protoplasm as much as a nexus of relationships within
an ever wider whole.
that Cheng

(1976)

It is this context of relationships

has recognized as being at the center of

the Confucian world.

He identifies a paradigm which sees

all life as interrelated within wholes upon wholes:
Life is not a single part cf a whole, but a whole
of parts;
nor is it an isolated phenomenon which
is externally related to external things.
For
life phenomenon or life experience, an item or
part is always internally related to other parts
in the whole as well as the whole as a whole.
To
say that parts are internally related to one
another and to the whole is to say that without
relation the parts will net be parts and the whole
will not be a whole.
In this sense, parts and
wholes are defined in the relationships in which
they find themselves,
A part is, therefore,
unlike an atom which has its essence independently
of relations with other things, nor is it like a
member of a class, which is a result of
abstraction in conceptualization and which is also
independent of the existence cf the class to which
it belongs as the latter could be granted
existence as in Platonism.
The life paradigm is not cnly restricted to
things individually, but extends to the whole
world, as the whole world cf things is conceived
of as resulting frcm the same source of life,
which is the Heaven.
The whole world under this
conception is a great organic whole and unity with
internal relational or interrelational structures
in both time and space dimensions.
(p. 9)
Again,

we begin to see the importance of patterns

within wholes.

It is not that a part has an essential

nature which makes it what it is,

but rather that the nature

of the thing arises frcm its position within the pattern of
relationships within the whole.

Focusing this on the human

being, it is the Chinese conviction that to know a human
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being one must know the place occupied by this human being
in the pattern of relationships within humankind.
This to some degree accounts for the importance of the
family*

for it is in the context of the family that a human

being's relations are defined.

The Confucian paradigm of

life demands that each individual person be experienced in
the proper relation within the total stream of life.

The

individual is viewed as being embedded in this stream of ,
life not only spatially in present but*

more importantly*

through time itself.
according to the stream-of-life theory as seen in
the family system* immortality is almost visible
and touchable.
Every grandfather seeing his
grandchild going tc school with a satchel feels
that truly he is living over again in the life of
the child* and when he touches the child's hand or
pinches his cheeks* he kncws it is flesh of his
own flesh and blood of his own blood.
His own
life is nothing but a section of the family tree*
or of the great family stream of life flowing on
forever, and therefore he is happy to die.
(Lin
Yutang* 1940* p. 190)
The emotions that Lin Yutang attributes to the Chinese
grandfather are certainly universal human emotions of any
grandfather toward his grandchild.

However* the difference

lies in degree* and it is an important difference.

The

Chinese have made this universal human experience the most
central of their culture.

This accounts for the care with

which ancestor worship is maintained through many
generations and the egual care that the younger generation
takes for the cider.

Lin Yutang

(1940)

writes:

"The

Chinese ideal of life is to live so as not to be a shame to
one's ancestors and to have sens of whom one need not be
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ashamed.” (p. 191)

This simple principle accounts for many

characteristics of Chinese society.

The individual is

conceived of as a vital connection with the unity of all
humankind.

The family.

In the institution of the family, one

experiences the full stream of life in the concrete rather
than the abstract.

Scharfstein

(1974)

gives a concise

definition of the family within a context of unity:
Ideally, the family consisted of a number of
generations living together in the same household.
Because the Chinese believed that spirits of their
ancestors remained scmehow active and
understanding, the spirits were invited to all
family occasions.
Tablets commemorating ancestors
were kept and honored in a special hall.
It was
supposed that the ancestral spirits, if pleased,
would help the family, and, if seriously
displeased would cause it harm.
The children yet
unborn were considered members cf the family,
which was morally obliged to hand its tradition
and property on to them.
(pp. 4-5)
From the Western context,

it is possible to

misunderstand this emphasis on human relationships within
the context of unity as an affirmation of Christian values
of love for all humankind.

Quite to the contrary, the

relationships were graduated such that differing degrees of
responsibility were associated with various relationships.
The love for all humankind would be a most uncomfortable
abstraction for the Chinese.

They would rather deal with

concrete love beginning with the intimate relationships
within the family and radiating outward from this source.
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Confucianism did net only remain neutral to the
unregulated love of all humankind as a basis for society,
but was actively involved in a condemnation of such a view
on the grounds that to adhere tc such a position would
destroy the obligations within the family and, ultimately,
the society itself.

Thus, the Classic o f Filial Piety

states that "He who does net love his parents, but loves
other men, is called a rebel against virtue;

and he who

does not revere his parents, but reveres other men is called
a rebel against propriety."

(legge,

1879, p. 479)

The Confucian position can be contrasted with the
system of no Tzu

(Hohism)

which advocated a principle of

all-embracing love guite similar to that of Jesus in the
Nest.

The reaction of the Confucians was guick and

complete.

Hohism threatened to dissolve the unity of the

family and the graduated love within these familial
relationships.

For the Confucians,

love must be modulated

by the five relationships noted above.

Hohism was

completely suppressed to the extent that only modern
scholars have recognized its importance in Chinese thought.
Host central of all relationships was that of filial
piety, the relation of the child tc the parent.

This is the

fundamental relationship in Chinese culture because it is
the essential linkage between generations, from o n e ’s
ancestors to o n e ’s offspring.

It was this filial relation

that was the source of all love and benevolence toward
others.

Yu-Wei

(1962)

writes:

"Hence,

the Confucian tenet
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'The benevolent man loves ethers'

must be interpreted in the

light of filial piety to the effect that 'The benevolent man
loves others,

with his own parents as the starting point.'"

(p. 415)
From this fountainhead of filial piety, it was thought,
the other relationships

would be ordered in a loving manner.

With genuine and comprehensive love toward one's
own parents in its developing process, one may
naturally learn to be benevolent to all living
creatures, affectionate toward mankind as a whole,
loyal to his country and to the duties of a free
citizen, faithful in keeping obligations,
righteous in action, peaceful in behavior, and
just in all dealings.
All these eight virtues,
moral items, together with many others, may
emanate from filial piety through its expansion.
The C ^ s s i c 2f
yiftty says, 'It is filial
piety which forms the root of all virtues, and
with it all enlightening studies come into
existence,.' (Yu-Wei, 1962, p. 417)
The Chinese favor the immediate, concrete and universal love
of the child for the parent as the basis for the love of
humankind rather than the abstractions of the West which are
given force by the commandments cf Gcd or the categorical
imperatives of an ethical philosophy.

The Centrality of Human Relationships
This discussion has had two foci:
the social process.

the human being and

In both, I have been impressed at the

degree to which these two points of focus are inextricably
drawn together.

In the social process,

the dominant

conception of the society was that of a network of human
relationships.

Likewise, the experience of the human being

is deeply rooted in human relationships and not in the
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attributes of the individual.

In this context, the

artificial Western distinction between society and the human
being becomes blurred and merges intc the family structure.
The relations within the family beccme the major idiom
for experiencing the world.

It is interesting, for example,

to see how the Chinese used the family concept to deal with
a foreign doctrine.

Nakamura

(1964)

points to the Chinese

interpretation of Indian concepts of atomic structure.
Indian knowledge conceived cf the world as arising from the
union of two primordial atoms.

The Chinese interpretation

of this relation was in terms of kinship referring to the
child atom and the parent atom.

As he points out, such

concepts were not present in either the Greek or Indian
notions of atoms.
The family as a concept becomes the key model for all
human experience in China.

The family has far reaching

implications for all social functions producing many
differences in social institutions with respect to the
West— for example, differences in the perception of
government.

Since government is considered in China to be

paternalistic,

there is no need for laws which protect the

rights of the individual:
The most striking characteristic in our political
life as a nation is the absence of a constitution
and of the idea of civil rights . . . .
A
•constitution' presupposes that our rulers might
be crooks who might abuse their power and violate
our ’rights* which we use the constitution as a
weapon to defend.
The Chinese conception of
government is the direct opposite of this
supposition.
It is kncwn as a ’parental
g o v e r n m e n t ’ or ’government by gentlemen,* who are
supposed to look after the p e o p l e ’s interests as
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parents look after their children*s interests, and
to whom we give a free hard and in whom we place
an unbounded confidence.
(Lin Yutang, 1935,
p. 206)
From the perspective of the individual, the isolated
person without family ties found it difficult to function in
traditional China.

The family system was not a structure,

but the social structure

to the Chinese;

the individual and

social process were cnly different aspects of this one
structure.

FUNCTIONING TOWASD OTHEBS
Assuming human function fellows from experience, the
present discussion is a continuation of what has preceeded,
only here the emphasis is on function.

Belationships at the Center of Social Function
Chinese civilization has maintained an extraordinary
integrity over some 4000

years.

This must be placed in the

perspective of other civilizations.

While their

contemporaries in Greece soon lest their integral
civilization to blend into the greater container of Western
Civilization,

the civilization of China retained its unity

and identity even into the present century.
remarkable record,

This is a

for in no ether place on earth has as

large a portion of humankind lived for such a long period of
time, over such a large land area, as have the Chinese.
This is perhaps the best testament tc the functional effects
of an assumed context of unity.
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It is not difficult to understand why many observers
have labeled traditional Chinese society as the most
successful social system ever constructed,.
latourette

(1964)

The scholar

comments: "Nowhere else has any group of

mankind succeeded so long a time as have the Chinese in
holding together under a single rule so large a section of
the earth."

(p. 18)

f§£i2I§ £I2ffl2iiS3 lopgevity.

Several factors are paramount

in accounting for this stunning record of success.

The

first is the experience of the unity of human beings at the
heart of the definition cf civilization for the Chinese.
Contrary to the definitions of the West, civilization was
defined as the unity of all humankind.

While the Westerner

associates civilization with liberty and individual human
rights,

the traditional Chinese have endorsed the reverse

conception where civilization was associated not with
individual autonomy but with the human being's
responsibilities to others.
Abegg

(1952)

writes of these differing perceptions of

"civilization":
The East Asian has an instinctive aversion as much
to the idea of political liberty, as to
individualism.
He does not regard it as an ideal.
By liberty he understands mostly something
licentious, uncontrolled and uncivilized.
He
associates this idea first and foremost with the
wild animals of the jungle, or with primitive and
barbaric tribes of nomads or hunters.
Liberty is
for him a kind of barbaric and primordial
condition associated with the earliest ages of
man.
He considers civilization and culture to
begin at the moment when men band together in a
community and establish a communal, legal, and
moral code.
Thus, the instincts of the East Asian
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and the way he interprets things are directly
opposed to ours;
for it is generally speaking our
wont to characterize lack cf liberty and
collectivism as barbaric and primative, as a
reversion to a condition ve have long outgrown.
The East Asians relegate freedom to the jungles,
and we, collectivism.
(p. 213)
The functional result of this experience of civilization was
that the traditional Chinese endeavored to produce a
civilization based on the unity of human beings within one
social system.
This tendency toward integration can be found in the
earliest records cf Chinese social history.

Latourette

(1964) recalls that frcm 1766-1122 B.C., "the Chinese
fostered the idea that all men must be unified under a
whole, one unitary government."

(p. 32)

In the West,

government was taken almost by assumption to be the result
of the balance of competing interest groups and their
interaction.

By Shang times, the central features of

Chinese civilization,

together with the central notion that

all China should be under one government, emerged.

This

vision of civilization was to continue over the centuries,
quite unchallenged,
times.

until the impact of the West in modern

Through these centuries, the basis for the function

of Chinese society was the conviction that "All truly
civilized mankind— as the Chinese understood
civilization— must be under one ruler."
p. 33)

(latourette, 1964,
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Another factor was the very structure of the society
itself.

The basis for the society rested not so much on the

external government as cn the grassroots support of the
people themselves.

This produced a great strength, for the

unity of the society was not identified with any one
governmental structure,
itself.

but rested on Chinese civilization

Thus, as governments and dynasties rose and fell,

the integrity cf Chinese civilization maintained itself.
Even the conguest of barbarians did not challenge this
unity, for as time passed the barbarians themselves became
Chinese,

assimilating Chinese ccstoms.

Traditional Chinese government, at least to Western
eyes, presents an enigma.

On the one hand,

the Chinese have

steadfastly maintained a central government with a defined
hierarchy of positions,

while cn the other hand,

paradoxically, this condition cf centrality did not lead to
rigidity cf norms or totalitarian control of every aspect of
society.

To unravel this paradox,

I will examine how this

alternative mode of social order was integrated into the
governmental structure.

S2ZSEBl$Bi-

Traditional Chinese government was a

centralized government,

converging from every point in the

empire to the point of the emperor.

However,

while the

power of the emperor was widely recognized and upheld
throughout the empire,

the structure of the social system

and its order from the grassroots demanded almost complete
autonomy at the village level.

Thus, as Fairbank

(1968)
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remarks, the role of the empercr or Son of Heaven
. . . could be maintained over so broad and
diverse a terrain and so vast a population
precisely because it was sc superficial.
The
emperor remained supreme as a symbol of unity
because his officials did not attempt to rule
directly in the villages,
(p. 8)
It was the nature of the social ordering principle that
the central government and the empercr relied on the
automatic functioning cf society.

In this context, the

emperor*s immediate concern was merely tc serve as a model
for this order by ordering his

own behavior in the manner of

self-cultivaticn.

did net have to be "ruled” in

The society

the active sense cf this word;

to promote order, the

Chinese emperor had only to adhere

tc certain set rituals

and perform certain ceremonies at certain times during the
year.
From this personal focus cf order in his microcosm as
it surrounded him, the macrocosm of his empire would be
given, almost automa£ica^Jy, a corresponding crder.
(1964)

Needham

reminds us that "the ancient definition of the Ideal

Buler was that he should sit simply facing the South and
exerting his virtue

(Te) in all directions so that the ten

thousand things would automatically be well governed."
(p. 144)

we find in the role cf the emperor quite a

contradiction in terms by Western standards— a figure who
was openly and unquestionably revered as a symbol of unity
and who,

at the same time, cared to exert little actual

power which, one wculd think,
exalted position.

should develop from such an
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There was generated then the Chinese proclivity toward
non-intervention of the central government in village
affairs and the equally dominant tendency to use force only
as

a last resort.

The classical distinction between wei and

M

w<r4- is quite illustrative of this:
The central authority relied a great deal upon the
•automatic* functioning of the village
communities, and in general tended to reduce to a
minimum its intervention in their
life . . . .
This difference is expressed
epigrammatically in the Chinese terms wej. and wu
M i meant the application of force, of
will-power, the determination that things,
animals, or even other men should do what they
were ordered to do;
but vjj wqi was the opposite
of this, leaving things alone, letting Nature take
her course, profiting by going vith the grain of
things instead cf going against it, and knowing
how not to interfere.
(Needham, 1964, p. 142)

Thus, the wq wei action cf human beings toward Nature
favored by the Taoists becomes reflected in the wu w^j
function of human beings in the ideal Confucian society.
As will be recalled, I left hanging the issue of the
different effects of gunpowder in East and West.

The reason

gunpowder failed to radically alter Chinese society as it
had that cf Feudal Europe lies in the alternative nature of
government and the power relations in the two social
systems.
Given the wu wei pattern fcr the power structure of
Chinese society, the emphasis was on one central government
with little desire in this central government to exert force
to govern its people.

Consequently, fortresses and

independent principalities were net common.

In this

political context, the introduction of a powerful weapon
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like the cannon would not have great moment.
(1970)

As Qreuer

asks, in such a power relationship, against whom

should the weapcns of destruction be employed within the
country?

There was only one nominal, unguestioned center of

power— the Son of Heaven— and his power existed with or
without cannons.
Feudal Europe,

by contrast, did not have a central

authority with many petty princes,

each coveting small

pockets of humanity from the security of fortified castles.
In this situation power and force ruled.

With the

introduction of gunpowder and cannon, fortified places could
now be breached and power centralized.

This produced major

social changes for the West.

Scholar-officials.

In practice,

China was governed by a

bureaucratic structure managed by a class of
scholar-cfficials.

The word "scholar" is here used because

the major source of appointment and promotion within the
system was scholarship in the Confucian classics.

We should

pause at this point to note the immense importance of
education in Chinese society.

In a very democratic fashion,

education was a important source of social mobility for
families.

The fortunes of families rose and fell in

relation to the success of their members in the state
examinations.
The Chinese very early in their social development
(traces can be found from 165 B.C)
service examination system.

instituted a civil

This examination system was
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theoretically open to all.

There are stories of many a

peasant's son who, through diligent study and excellent
grades, obtained an important cffical position.
system,

As in any

the son of a rich man or a man of the official class

had a better opportunity to pass the examinations,

for his

family could well afford th9 services of a tutor.
The examinations were based primarily on the almost
complete memorization of the Confucian classics.

In his

study, the perspective scholar-official became totally
immersed, mind and body,

in the Confucian vision of human

relations and the unity cf all humankind within a Great
Harmony.

Yang

(1959)

writes of the content of these

Classics:
The Confucian classics are oriented toward the
achievement of T^ai- p ^ing (Great Peace) through
knowledge of the general social order based on a
harmonious system cf human relations and moral
norms.. . ..
The Great Peace will obtain when
things and people are structured into the smoothly
operating order of these principles and norms,
ideally with all frictions and obstructions
eliminated.
(p. 138)
Thus, as the scholar-official was graduated to his post and
assumed his position in the hierarchy,

he tended to function

in accordance with this Confucian ideal of the unity of
humankind.
This system of examination and education had two
profound effects on the governmental bureaucracy,.

First, it

fostered a certain unity and uniformity throughout the
governmental system to the far flung ends of the empire.
All the scholar-officials would have essentially the same
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knowledge and be functioning from the sane framework.
Throughout the empire there was a unity of purpose and
action.

Every educated human being read the same language

and interpreted the world from the same set of Confucian
co-ordinates.
Secondly, a knowledge of human relationships and the
Confucian view of the unity of human beings within a
cooperative world became the basis for the entire
governmental system.

Every scholar-official was pulling in

the same direction toward the same vision of society.
Contrary to most bureaucratic systems where the
specialist becomes highly valued,

appointments and

advancement in the Chinese bureaucratic order went most
often to the generalist with a knowledge of Confucian ideals
about human relationships.

The person who had knowledge of

the Confucian classics and could apply these principles to
the relations between people became most highly valued.
Qalazs

(1964)

writes of the requirements for success in

the Chinese buraucratic order:
They [the sch c l a r - c f f i c i a l s ] did not require any
detailed, specialized knowledge,
what they did
require was worldly wisdom and savoir-faiye. and a
certain amount of rudimentary knowledge about
technical matters together with the fine art of
being able tc manage people;
or, it might be
better to say, these duties called on aptitude
acquired through experience for planning and
directing public works and being in command of the
technicians, experts and specialists.
The social
system did not permit its elite to narrow their
personalities by specialization.
To know the
classics by heart and have a smattering of music,
to master the rules cf polite behavior and acquire
a polished literary style, to be something of a
calligrapher and an occasional writer of
verse— these were the kinds of accomplishments
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considered likely tc contribute more to the
exercise of social and political functions than
would training in seme profession or study of the
exact sciences . . . .
(p. 9)
As a conseguence,

there arose the belief that a

knowledge of the Confucian classics and an ability to apply
this knowledge to concrete relations between human beings
qualified a person for ajiy position within the society.
Yang (1959)

guotes Lu K'un who is reported to have said:

’With a deep acquaintance with the principles of
human relations and worldly affairs, one can take
up any official position, however high;
with
adaptation to the principles of nature and the
inclinations cf men, one can accomplish any
t a s k . ’ (p. 139)
To be accomplished in the art of helping people live in
harmony immediately qualified one for any duty.

In his

books, Lin Yutang never tires of quoting Confucius:
may not depart from human nature;

"'Truth

if what is regarded as

truth departs from human nature, it may not be regarded as
truth.'"

(Lin Yutang,

1935, p. vi) It fellows that the

person who is the most skilled in the art of living
possesses the highest truth and must be highly valued by
society.

Law.

Turning to the practical problems of producing order

in the social system,

while the West has relied increasingly

on the law for the basis for this order, to the Chinese, law
was considered to be rather unimportant.

The major

importance of the law was its punitive action, in an attempt
to restore the harmony cf the social order with that of the
natural order lest this disruption of the social microcosm
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have cosmic conseguences.
Law had a very degraded pcsiticn as contrasted with the
position it has had in almost any other civilization.

To

set the tone for this discussion, I mention two comments
which illustrate this point.

Lin Yutang

(1940), for

example, writes in his usual flippant style that in China
all guarrels and disputes are settled at dinner tables
instead of at the court of justice.
Chinese proverb reads:

In the same vein, a

win your lawsuit and lose your

money.
The Chinese perception of the law was extremely
negative in comparison to the honored position it is given
in most societies.

Bodde and Morris

(1967)

write:

"What is really arresting, however, especially
when we remember the honored status of law in
other civilizations, is the overt hostility with
which its appearance is initially greeted in
China— ^seemingly net cnly as a violation of human
morality, but perhaps even of the total cosmic
order." (p. 13)
This degraded position of the law, it wculd seem, has its
roots in the unigue structure of Chinese society:

in the

nature of the social ordering principle placing an emphasis
on individual morality and on the interface of the social
and natural orders within the microccsmic and macrocosmic
dimension.
Within this conception,

people’s virtuous behavior was

the source of the order, not the abstraction of the law.

As

a consequence, an appeal to law to settle a dispute was used
only in the last resort, when all else had failed.

As
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Meskill

(1973)

writes:

"an appeal to law often had the

connotation cf a failure in virtue.

The resort to law meant

not so much a confirmation of rights as a way of reaching a
decision when more civilized means had failed."

(p. 86)

Law was conceived as having a dubious and dispensible
role in providing for order in the society.

On this point

the two great sages of China are in complete agreement.
Confucius says:
Guide the people with government measures and
control or regulate them by the threat of
punishment, and the people will try to keep out of
jail but will have no sense of honor or shame.
Guide the people by virtue and control and
regulate them by respect, and the people will have
a sense of honor and respect.
(Minick, 197 4,
P. 94)
In a more laconic manner characteristic cf Taoism, Lao Tze
says essentially the same thing: "the greater the number of
laws and enactments,

the more thieves and robbers there will

be." (p. 94)
Both of these statements assert the superiority in the
Chinese mind of virtue ever the law.

The argument is that

if each i n d i v i d u a l ’s behavior in relation to other human
beings is virtuous, there will be no need for laws and a
legal system;

society would become automatically ordered.

Thus, Confucius says:
anyone else,

" ’In hearing litigations I am like

but what is necessary is to cause the people to

have no litigations!*"

(Legge,

1970, p. 364)

In the Chinese

mind, to become involved in litigation was an humiliating
affair to be avoided at all costs.
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Another source of the devalued position

of the law in China relates to the perceived interface
between the social order and the natural order along the
microcosm-macrocosm dimension.

As noted above, disruptions

in the social order were experienced as being disruptions in
the natural order*
and Morris

(1967)

this conception,
social sphere,

This interrelation leads to what Bodde
call a naturalization of the law.

Within

the law was net to function only in the

but was to be instrumental in redressing

relationships in the whole of the social-natural world.
In the Chinese legal framework, the law was less--if at
all— the protector of human rights than the administrator of
punishments.

This is evidenced in the overriding penal

nature of the law, with minimal concern being given to civil
matters.
The law was only secondarily interested in
defending the rights— especially the economic
rights— of one individual or group against another
individual or group and not at all in defending
such rights against the state.
What really
concerned the law— though this is to be surmised
rather than explicitly read in Chinese legal
literature— were all acts cf moral or ritual
impropriety or of criminal violence which seemed
in Chinese eyes to be violations or disruptions of
the total social order.
The existence of the
norms of propriety was intended to deter the
commission of such acts, but once they occurred,
the restoration of social harmony required that
punishment be inflicted to each retribution from
their doer.
In the final analysis, a disturbance
of the social order really meant, in Chinese
thinking, a violation of the total cosmic order
because, according to the Chinese world-view, the
spheres of man and nature were inextricably
interwoven to form an unbroken continuum.
(Bodde
and Morris, 1967, p. 4)
In this context, law always had the connotation of

217

punishment.

There was the tendency to refer in their legal

system to penal laws as punishments
statutes

(f§ or 2u).

fh^j.pg) instead of as

(Bodde and Horris,

1967)

Thus, there was yet another reason for people to avoid
litigation at all costs fcx fear of punishment.

The courts

were almost bound to administer some punishment, even if it
be a token one, for any crime brought before it.

Holcombe

(1895) relates that an ancient rule cf procedure in Chinese
courts was to have b o ph litigants flcgged before the case
was to be heard.

The purpose cf this procedure was "to warn

them not to rush lightly into litigation."

(p. 213)

Acquittals of a defendant were extremely rare.

The

legal framework demanded that if social order had been
disrupted, a punishment must be administered to return the
system to a state of balance.

It was thought that no matter

how occasioned the defendant's crime demanded punishment.
As a case in point, Bodde and flcrris (1967)

relate that once

a
. . . . district magistrate, riding in his sedan
chair at dawn through a driving rain to
participate in the sacrifices at the Confucian
temple, was borne before he knew it beyond the
outer enclosure where, according to ritual, he
should have dismounted.
The Board's conclusion is
that 'his failure to dismount from the chair in
time, though occasioned by the great accumulation
of rain water on tie ground and the error of the
chair bearers, nevertheless constitutes a
violation of the established regulations,. * It
accordingly sentences him to 100 blows of the
heavy bamboo and dismissal from his position.
(P- 181)
Behind this rather harsh decree of the Board is the
naturalization of the law and the need to restore harmony to
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the natural order:
. . . a criminal act is not merely a violation of
the human order, but also j.gso facto of the total
cosmic order of which the human order forms a
part.
In order to restore the original state of
cosmic balance, therefore, a punishment precisely
corresponding to the original violation must be
exacted in return.
(p. 182)
The function of the legal system in China transcended
the mere administration of justice in some abstract manner;
it was most concerned with the delicate task of
administering punishment to the guilty in the degree to
which their crime had upset the balance of the natural
world.

The task was a difficult one because the balance

must be just restored,

and in no circumstances should

punishments be toe harsh, for this tco would endanger the
balance.
Bodde and Morris

(1967)

write:

. . . crimes produce disccrd; once a crime is
committed, harmony is restored by suitable
punishment.
An inept punishment is as bad as, or
worse than none; it will net restore natural
harmony; on the contrary, it will disrupt order
still further.
(p. 497)
It was common practice to pronounce sentences and execute
punishments even aft^y the individual offender had died.
this ultimate administration of the law were not effected,
the continued presence cf the case on the books would
otherwise make impossible the task cf repairing the
imbalance in cosmic harmcny originally caused by the
offense.

(Bodde and Morris,

1967)

If
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If abstract law was not to be the

basis for social order, the concrete actions of individuals
were to be.

Social order was to arise from individual

function and not be imposed from without.

To make this

point clear, it is helpful to distinguish between the
Confucian position and that of a competing school, the
Legalists, and, in this context, to distinguish between the
social order of the Confucians based on li and the social
order of the Legalists based on fg.
As a school the Legalists, or School of Law
was less theoretical than the Confucians.

(Jg ghia ) .

The Legalists in

general were practical men who had as their purpose the
construction of a strong empire with a central authority
which actively administezed through a system of laws which
were fixed and known beforehand.

Thus, everyone's behavior

could be evaluated against a fixed standard.
Quite in contradiction to the general trend of Chinese
society,

the Legalists had great faith in the laws to

provide for a stable social order.

Bodde and Morris

(1967)

give this example of the Legalist position:
'For governing the people there is no permanent
principle save that it is the law (fg) and nothing
else that determines government . . ..
He who
rules makes use of the many while disregarding the
few, and hence he ccncerns himself not with virtue
but with law (fg) . . . .
In governing a state,
t e regulating of clear laws (fg) and
establishment of severe punishments (hgggg) are
done in order to save the masses of the living
from disorder . . ..' (pp. 25-26)
It is clear that the Legalist advocacy of the law

(Jg) runs

directly counter to the Confucian and dominant Chinese view
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that the function of society and its social order cannot
rest on the law,

tut on personal action and virtue.

In contrast to the Legalist glorification of the law,
the Confucians put their faith in ^i.

The term ij., like

many central concepts in Chinese knowledge, has some
ambiguity associated with it, given Western criteria for
definition.

The term originally referred to the cutting of

jade along its natural cleavage.

The term is most often

translated into the English by the word ’propriety.* In the
Confucian world, it referred to the virtuous behavior of the
individual— the fcllcwing with meticulous care the
prescribed rituals and rites,

it the center of the 2i and

its meaning was the Confucian concept of human
relationships.

In the most general sense, 1^ was "a

designation for all the institutions and relationships,
political and social,
Confucian society."
Mu

(1962)

which make fcr harmonious living in a
(Bodde and Morris,

1967, p.

19)

believes that it is significant that the term

li has been translated many different ways in European
literature as "ritual," "decorum," "courtesy" and
"propriety."

both

This indicates a significant difference

between the two systems.

He writes:

When we give different names to ideas like
'propriety,* 'morality* and 'manners,' which are
connected with and partly similar to each other,
we emphasize their differentia at the expense of
their common nature.
To the western mind, these
ideas carry different ethical values so that being
immoral, for instance, is considered worse than
having had manners.
To the Chinese, however, the
undifferentiated term
by constantly making
people think cf what is common among manners,
morality, decorum and so on, gives all socially
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approved actions in China a single motivation and
ethical support and makes all «proper1 behaviour,
from good manners to charity, equally important.
(p. 51)
Li was closely tied to and reinforced by the key
Confucian human relationships:
The five major relationships of Confuc
ianism— those of the father and son, ruler and
subject, husband and wife, elder and younger
brother, friend and friend— are instinctive to man
and essential for a stable social crder.
The i±
reinforce these and similar relationships by
prescribing modes cf behavior differing according
to status, whereas law obliterates the
relationships by imposing a forced uniformity.
(Bodde and Horris, 1967, p. 21)
Since tfce Legalists wanted to administer an abstract
law to order the entire society and the Confucians preferred
the order of the li, a conflict between the two approaches
was inevitable.

The basis cf the Confucian criticism of the

fa of the Legalists,

as Needham

(1956)

nctes, is that

. . . since correct behavior in accordance with
j-i always depended on the circumstances, such as
the status of the acting parties in social
relationships, to publish laws beforehand which
could take insufficient account of the complexity
of concrete circumstances, was an absurdity.
(P- 545)
In short,

it seemed ludicrous tc the Confucians to attempt

to evaluate the virtue cf a particular action before the
action had occurred.
As an historical fact, the Legalist position did gain
power in the third century B.C.

However, the triumph of the

Legalists was short lived, perhaps due to the harshness
dictated by their own system.

Huch cf the structure of the

Chinese legal system owes its existence to this brief period

Median Line

Median Line

(Stage II)

(Stage I)

Legalists’*
(Shift)

Mohists*

Confucius
Mencius
(*Schools that Disappeared)
Taoists
Right

Left

Favors External
Control and External
Reward

Favors Internal Control
and Intrinsic Reward

FIGURE 10
THE TENDENCY AND HISTORICAL SHIFT TOWARD INTERNAL CONTROL
IN THE MAJOR SCHOOLS OF CHINESE THOUGHT
(AFTER CHIANG, 1971)

of Legalist domination.

Following their decline in power,

the Confucian vision was again the guiding force for Chinese
society.

There followed a process which scholars have

labeled the "Confucianization cf the Law."

Within this

process, the Confucian ideal of the 2J. slowly began to
moderate and subsume the positive law

(J§)

of the Legalists.

This historical example tends again to stress the
general tendency in Chinese thought to view the source of
social order as resting with the individual and individual
function rather than with some independent process external
to the individual and imposed from without.

Of the many

positions taken by the numerous schools and social thinkers
of China, this general trend remained dominant.
These historical relations are presented
■diagrammatically by Chiang

<1971)

in Figure 10.

The median

line at stage I (before the second century B . C . ) , lies with
Confucius and favors "internal control." With the
disappearance of the Mohist and Legalist schools in the
second century, the median line shifts even more toward the
left.

It is clear that even given the great diversity of

different schools of social thought in China, the overriding
tendency in Chinese social thought has been toward a
reliance on the self-directed behavior as a source of order.
The ii was a representation of this personal ordering
principle as it permeated all human action and resulted in
an ordered social system.

This system of the 2i was thought

to be able to go beyond the shortcomings of a legal system
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of order.

Mu

(1962)

summarizes:

. . . what the Chinese called 24
manners,
custom, ritual, mcral code all mixed together.
It
has a c q m mqfl4cative function in that it provides a
means by which people can understand but not
embarrass each other;
an arti^-frjc function in
that it satisfies and regulates man's desires by
giving his emotions articulate expression;
and a
so c ial function, in that, based on experience, it
defines the acceptable and safe limits of conduct
and thereby ensures peaceful relations.
It is
only in the abstract, however, that the
distinction can be made between these functions.
For example, losing temper is giving up lucid
expression, calling forth wild and violent feeling
and making oneself disagreeable to others, all at
once.
The law as such may not carry any ethical
sanction and clever offenders will break it in
spirit but not in letter;
moral philosophies may
be interesting as academic theories, but carry no
moral compulsion;
but the Chinese 22, being a
habit to which each individual is trained,
benefits even those ignorant of law and incapable
of philosophies.
To conform to 2 4 in its manifold
aspects is a uniform duty cf every member of the
society because no matter whether a man is acting
with good manners or participating in established
ceremony he is maintaining an order through which
the Chinese society stands.
(pp. 59-60)
In this way the li became the mainstay of the social
structure providing a bread and resilient base upon which
the Chinese culture could be anchored.

So universal and

simple was the 24 that the concept cculd appeal to all
sections of the empire, to people of great learning as well
as to the illiterate peasant.

Human Function in the Context cf Relationships
From the perspective of the individual, it would be
anticipated that the individual's function will be modulated
by the structure cf human relationships in which he is
embedded.

It is helpful to keep in mind that the
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relationships vers themselves graduated, centering around
the relation of the father to the son.

Following this

graduated nature of relationships, it would be expected that
the human being's responsibilities and function would be
correspondingly graduated and correlated with the ordering
relationships.

Belation ^hjp? and behavior.

In the following discussion, I

will concentrate on relatively extreme conditions of human
conduct,

i.e., life and death conditions.

The false

impression should not be given that these extreme examples
of the modulation of human function hy relationships are in
any way abnormal.

I have simply focused upon these cases

because the society has taken particular care to make the
relationships as explicit as possible.

However, in more

mundane aspects of human function, the same principle of
modulation holds.
Beverence within the context of human relationships was
viewed as the basis for human function, the source of all
the harmony in the world.

Thus, we read in the Classic of

IkliZl lASiZ:
The Buies of Propriety are simply (the development
of) the principle cf Beverence.
Therefore, the
reverence paid to a father makes (all) sons
pleased,.
The reverence paid to an elder brother
makes (all) younger brothers pleased;
the
reverence paid to a ruler makes (all) subjects
pleased.
The reverence paid to one man makes
thousands and myriads of men pleased.
The
reverence is paid to few and the pleasure extends
to the many;
that is what is meant by an
'All-embracing Buie of conduct.' (Legge, 1879,
p. U82)

226

The meaning here is guite clear; if human beings use
reverence as a rule of conduct in their relationships with
others, the result will be harmony and pleasure throughout
the entire society-

In the Confucian system the behavior of

the individual was always thought to go beyond the immediate
effects of the personal world tc become the ordering
principle for the entire system.
Beyond mere reverence and respect in relationships, the
manner of human function was carefully and precisely
modulated by the degree of relationship,

as a preliminary

example, I will examine the institution of revenge as it was
practiced in traditional China,

as Chu

(1965) notes, the

obligation to revenge was formulated in terms of the five
relationships.

Further, since the relationships were

themselves ordered, the obligation tc revenge was modulated
in respect.to

the degree of relationship,

chu writes:

"The

five human relationships are not equated in Chinese thought
and thus the obligation to revenge varied according to the
relationship between the victim and the avenger."

(p. 79) To

illustrate this modulation of revenge we find the following
passage in the Li £i translated by Legge

(1926):

Sze-hsia asked Confucius, saying, 'How should
(a son) conduct himself with reference to the man
who has killed his father cr mother?*
The Master said, 'He should sleep on straw,
with his shield for a pillow;
he should not take
office;
he must be determined not to live with
the slayer under the same heaven.
If he meet with
him in the market-place oi the court, he should
not have to go back for his weapon, but
(instantly) fight with him.'
'Allow me to ask,' said (the other), 'how one
should dc with reference tc the man who has slain
his brother?'

Figure 11
The Self as Embedded in a network of Belationships to
Others which Modulates the Self's Mourning
Behavior to the Deceased
(After Legge, 1926)
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•He may take office,' was the reply, 'but not
in the same state with the slayer;
if he be sent
on a mission by his ruler's orders, though he may
then meet with the man, he should not fight with
him.'
'And how should one do,' continued Sze-hsia,
'in the case of a man whc has slain one of his
paternal cousins?*
Confucius said, 'He should not take the lead
(in the avenging). If he whom it chiefly concerns
is able tc do that, he shculd support him from
behind, with his weapon in his hand.' (p. 140)
In this case, a human being's function in revenge is
modulated by the avenger's relationship to the victim.

The

filial relationship of the son to the parent was regarded as
the paramount relationship,
parent through foul
revenge.

and consequently,

the death of a

play required the highest obligation

Confucius makes it quite clear that

the son should

not live

"under the same heaven" with the slayer meaning

that the

son is not to live in the same world

slayer of a parent.

for

with the

As one moves down from this paramount

obligation to the lesser relationships,

the avenger's

required function is equally lessened.
Hhile the example of the modulation of human function
within revenge illustrates the principle clearly, it fails
to do full justice to the complexity and precision with
which the prescriptions for action were given within
Confucianism.

To make this aspect more available, I will

now consider the area cf responsibilities to the dead
through mourning behavior.
Figure 11 represents,

diagrammatically,

the web of

relationships which surround the individual and how these
relationships modulate the mourning behavior of the
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individual in respect tc the deceased.

There were five

degrees of mourning differing in the duration of time in
which mourning rites were to be maintained.

These degrees

of mourning were correlated with the self's relationship to
the deceased.

Because cf this correlation,

the closeness of

relationship becomes defined according to the individual's
place in the mourning system and visa versa
Note for
a son for his

1965).

example that the mourning behavior demanded of
father is cf the first degree reguiring a

duration of three years,
uncle and his

(Chu,

while the degree of mourning for an

wife is crly the second degree reguiring a

duration of mourning for one year.

A careful examination of

this diagram is particularly rewarding for it not only gives
substance to the noticn I expressed above that the human
being or individual self is embedded in a matrix of human
relationships, but it also illustrates the integration of
the self with other human beings in both time and space.
Note that the "great-great-grand father" occupies a place in
the matrix of human relationships and modulates the mourning
behavior of the self guite as much as contemporaneous
relationships do.
I cannot leave Figure 11 without noting the complexity
and precision with which these relationships are presented.
For example, note the remote relationships included— "the
Wife of 1st cousin twice removed" or "the Great
grand-nephew's wife." Such examples tend to underline the
preoccupation with human relationships in the Chinese mind.
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Even in the most elaborate kinship system in the West, one
seldom finds such an intricate and complex structure of
relationships.
Another interesting observation is the change of an
individual’s mourning behavior when the relationship of
others change.

For example,

the duration of mourning for an

unmarried sister is of the second degree reguiring one year
while for the same person when married it is of the third
degree requiring only nine months.

Thus, the same person’s

position in the system changes with respect to that person’s
relationships with others.
As I examine the structure of relationships in Figure
11, I am impressed by the holistic, field-like character of
human experience and function.

The impression that I get is

that of a fish swimming in a sea of human beings with the
fish modulating its direction and speed by the contours of
the currents in the body of water.

The central current, the

central relationship, is that of filial piety.

Fjli^j £1S±2*

Since the filial relation was seen as being

the "root of all virtue," it net only modulated the s o n ’s
behavior directly, but also modulated in great degree all of
the human relationships in the society.

So in the

examination of the responsibilities of the son to the father
in terms of reguired behavior,

we are really examining the

full spectrum of human function.
ElSiy states:

The C l assic of fili^j

"fie who loves his parents will not dare

incur the risk of)

being hated by any man, and he who

(to
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reveres his parents will net dare
being contemned by any man."

(to incur the risk of)

(Legge, 1879, p. 437)

It is difficult for the Westerner tc appreciate the
imperative that the filial relation holds for the Chinese
mind-

To attempt to illustrate this, I will relate a story

from contemporary China found fcy Hsu
newspaper.

(1970)

in a North China

It tells of Chang and his wife who left their

home to work in the coal fields of Manchuria.
Chang*s wife died while there and was entombed.
Finding that he must leave, Chang unearthed his wife*s
corpse and ventured with his small children toward their
home.

Unable to afford transportation,

human cargo several hundred miles.

he walked with his

During their journey, a

thief, thinking the bundle valuable, stole it.
Through various means, Chang was able to recover the
body from the authorities who subsequently reguired that he
bury the corpse locally.
here will never do.

Whereupon Chang replied: "*burial

Even if I agree, my sons will object.

I carried her over a thousand miles.

I used the bundle as a

pillow every night, but I am still net sick!*"

(pp.

1-2)

Chang was allowed to return to his heme and bury his wife.
After reading this story,

the Western reader is no

doubt puzzled as tc why Chang felt such a deep conviction to
act as he did.

We can certainly understand the love of the

husband for the wife, but the Westerner finds it difficult
to understand the extremity of Chang*s behavior simply from
the context of this single motivation.
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At the heart of his behavior was the filial relation#
as Hsu

(1970) comments:

. . . to be buried with body intact in the
village of one's birth is# to the Chinese, part of
the complete life, and it is a son's obligation to
carry this out.
Because the miner's [Chang's]
children were too ycung tc bury their mother# the
father acted for then, regardless of whatever
hardship this entailed.
(p. 2)
In both life and death, the filial relation must be adhered
to.

The relation becomes the ultimate container for all

living human beings.

Again,

frcm the Classic of Filial

Piety: "'The services cf love and reverence to parents when
alive, and those of grief and sorrow to them when
dead— these completely discharge the fundamental duty of
living men."

(legge,

1879, p. 488)

As another example, consider the situation posed by
Buck (1970).

The scene is a simple one: a family of father,

mother and. son are strolling by a lake when far out upon the
water a man is seen going down for the last time.

The son

leaps into the water and attempts to save the drowning man
and the son is himself drowned in the attempt.

Mow,

evaluating this train of events from the Chinese and Western
contexts leads to a different

feeling about the action of

the son:
An American son would leap into the water to save
a stranger, without thcught, probably, of his
parents.
Indeed, his parents would be proud of
him, and would consider him a hero.
If he lost
his life, it would be a melancholy comfort to them
that he lost it in saving someone else.
Thus, his
action might even bring honor tc his parents.
Not
so a Chinese son.
A filial Chinese son would
remember his parents and would reason that his
body belonged to his parents, not to a stranger,
and that he therefore had no right to leap into
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the water at all.
If he did sc forget himself as
to think of the stranger as a human being and put
out his hand to save him and thereby lose his own
life, he would bring actual shame tc his parents.
He should have had more control— he should have
thought of them first, of their dependence upon
him emoticnally, cf his duty to them all his life
long.
He may not risk his life so heedlessly.
(Buck, 1970, pp. 61-62)
Two points present themselves from this example.
First, filial piety,

for the Chinese, is a perennial

modulator for human action thrcugh every second of life.
There are no times when this principle may be forgotten.
Secondly, filial piety is an indispensable standard for the
evaluation of a person's behavior.

The actions of the son

cannot be evaluated apart from the human relationships in
which he is embedded.
Before leaving the consideration of the modulation of
human behavior through the relation of filial piety, I
should attempt to relate the full spectrum of this
modulation from the small and seemingly unimportant to the
area of extreme sacrifices that are obligated.

At one end

of the spectrum, we find the following passage from the

When his father or mother is ill, (a young man)
who has been capped shculd not use his comb, nor
walk with his elbows stuck out, nor speak on idle
topics, ncr take his lute cr cithern in hand,.
He
should not eat of (different) meats till his taste
is changed, ncr drink till his looks are changed.
He should not laugh so as to show his teeth, nor
be angry till he breaks fcrth in reviling.
When
the illness is gene;
he may resume his former
habits.
(Legge, 1926, p. 83)
Here, we find the filial relation modulating the commonplace
aspects of one's life in rather absurd detail.
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However, the sane relation required, at the other
extreme, that very severe measures be taken.

Hsu

(1970)

remarks that it was quite common for the filial relation to
require that a sen slice part cf his flesh for use in a
medicine to be given to an ill parent.

The filial relation

sometimes required even more harsh behavior as this
oft-quoted story relates:
A poor man by the name of Kuo and his wife were
confronted with a sericus problem.
His aged
mother was sick in bed.
She needed both medicine
and nourishment which Kuo could ill afford.
After
consultation
between themselves, Kuo and his wife
decided that
the only way out was to get rid of
their three-year-cld only son.
For Kuo and his
wife said to each other, 'We have only one mother,
but we can always get another child.' (Hsu, 1970,
p. 78)
Reminiscent

of the biblical story of Abraham and his son

Isaac,

as the couple were to dig a hole to

just

thechild, they discovered

Relation s hips and
examination

gold and the child was spared.

the l^w.Given the context of

of the modulation of human function

mourning rites

dispose of

and in tie case cf filial piety,

our
in the
it follows

that the evaluation of any human function cannot be made
without placing this function within the context of human
relationships from which it developed.

The guiding

principle for Confucian law was that any criminal action
could be understood only with reference to the matrix of
human relationships frcm which it arose.
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This emphasis becomes particularly apparent when we
examine the Confucian position in contrast to the competing
school of the Legalists.

The Legalists, as was noted above,

favored a uniform standard for the law tc be administered
equally to all, irrespective cf the status or the
relationships of those

involved.

In clear contrast, the

application of the law fcr the Confucians was a particularly
complex affair, taking into account the nature of the crime,
the human relationships involved and the relative intimacy
or degree of the relationships.
As a concrete example, let me examine the offense of
beating.

To evaluate this crime,

it was important in

Confucian law to establish who was beating whom and within
what relationship in order to evaluate the behavior and
administer a punishment.

As Bcdde and Morris

(1967) relate,

if it is the son who beats his parent, the son is given the
punishment of decapitation regardless of the circumstances.
If, however, it is the parent who beats the son, no
punishment is administered unless the son dies from the
beating,

in which case the parent is given 100 blows if it

was justly provoked by the son's disobedience and a year of
penal servitude if it was net.
This principle not only obtained for the key
relationships such as the filial one, but also filtered down
to the lesser relationships.

Thus, Bodde and florris (1967)

write of the crime of beating within the relation cf brother
to brother:
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Thus if a ycunger brother beats an older brother*
he receives two and one half years penal servitude
plus ninety blows cf the heavy bamboo, even if no
injury results.
If, however, an older brother
beats a younger one, he incurs no penalty at all.
(p. 38)
The same

modulation of punishment by relationship extends

even further tc include cousins and lesser relativesIt is particularly interesting in this context to
examine the conflict between the two powerful institutions
of the law and filial piety.

In most respects, the result

of this interface was the dominance cf the human
relationship of filial piety over the law.

Bodde and Morris

(1967) remark that it was the duty of the son tc conceal a
crime of the father;

implied here is that a son who brings

parental wrongdoing before the authorities is thereby
unfilial and hence subject to heavy punishment.
In this regard, the traditional Chinese legal system
was unusual for it was the only legal system which entailed
a punishment for reporting a genuine crime to authorities!
There is some evidence, as Chu

(1965)

indicates, that the

authorities simply acted as punishing agents.

He remarks

that often the parent wculd simply have to report that the
son was unfilial and, without the demanding of evidence, the
son was punished according to the parent's wishes.
case of filial piety,

In the

the legal system tended to only serve

the human relationship involved.
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The Centrality cf Relationships in Function
In the context of traditional China, the examination at
each focus propelled us inextricably toward a median point:
the importance of human relaticnships as the determinant of
function.

As we examined the function of the social system,

we were constantly drawn to the Confucian vision cf society
based on a hierarchy of relaticnships among human beings.
The examination of the bureaucratic crder likewise
demonstrated that positions were given on the basis of the
person's knowledge and ability to deal with human
relationships.
Assuming the opposite pole of the individual's
function,

we found an egual tendency toward the median of

human relationships.

He found that individual human

function, particularly in the cases of the mourning rites
and filial piety,
others.

was dependent on relationships with

It seems that human function in traditional China

cannot be found exclusively in either the social or
individual mode.
The one institution that ccmes closest to the median
and middle ground between social process and the individual
is the family.

The family was seen as the important

container for human relationships with ethers, and,
conseguently, the family was the basis for social and
individual function.

The function of the father in a family

was seen as the proper function for the ruler of the
society,

in the case of the individual, the person without
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some family affiliation as a basis for function was an
outcast and doomed tc an ineffective life..

Thus, the

relationships of the human being within the context of the
family was the indispensable basis for function towards
others.
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OVERVIES
This chapter has examined the consequences of the
assumed context of unity on the experience and function of
human beings toward others.

The Western framework directs

us to make a distinction between individual process and
social process.

An attempt was made to undercut this

dichotomy by examining both foci and illustrating how they
converge to the same point— relationships within the family
for the Chinese.
Developing from a context of the unity of human society
and Nature, in order for this relationship to be maintained,
there could be only one social system of civilized human
beings.

The social order was experienced as resting on

individual human behavior.

The individual human being was

always experienced as being in relation to others.

The

individual process was submerged in a network of
relationships which were graduated in importance from the
cardinal relationship of filial piety.
Functionally, these factors resulted in an extremely
durable social structure which prescribed in detail the
behavior of the individual toward ethers.

Much of the

longevity of Chinese civilization can be attributed to the
structure of the government which did not rule by force but
by example, and to a bureaucratic system which trained well
its scholar-officials in the Confucian vision of a
harmonious society.

The educational system and a civil

service examination system insured that the scholar-official

241

had a generalized knowledge to deal with human relationships
within the Confucian model.
Abstract law was not valued as a basis for ordering
human relationships.

The dominant Confucian alternative was

to encourage individual human behavior in accordance with ii
or propriety.

When the legal system was used, it tended to

assume a punitive role and had the major purpose of
restoring social order and redressing the imbalance of
Nature produced by the crime.
Relationships with ethers actively modulated the
i n d i v i d u a l s behavior, much of the time in great detail.
For example,

revenge and mourning behavior were rigidly

modulated in accordance with the degree of relation between
the individual and the deceased.

The central relationship

of filial piety was the most important determinant of an
individual's function.

In the Chinese mind,

this

relationship was always to be considered in evaluating any
action.

CHAPTER

CONSEQUENCES

VII

IN R E L A T I O N TO

SELF

He now turn to yet an inner circle of an inner circle
to examine the microcosm of the human being.

I hesitate to

use the term "self" to describe this inner circle.

It is

extremely easy to read into this term all of the Western
assumptions about individuality and personality.

As the

last chapter has attempted to illustrate, the self in
traditional China, even if we may use the word at all, was
extremely diluted by Western standards.

The self or the

individual was always conceived as a node in the matrix of
human relationships, as being in relation to other human
beings within the context of the family.

In this way, one

could guestion if the self as it is known in the West was
ever an appropriate category within their knowledge.
In purely descriptive terms,

it may be impossible to

define the self in traditional China as a point of focus.
However, one could identify a focus for action which is
directed toward the individual.

For example,

medicine has

as its purpose the administering of therapy to an individual
human body at some point in its use.

Equally, exercise

systems may be thought of as making prescriptions for
certain actions for the individual person.

In this way,

even a system which does not place a high value on the
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individual ego and its conscious experience does focus on
the self at least at this functional level.

EXPERIENCING SELF
In this section, I would like tc look at the
experienced unity of the human being.

The human being that

is presented to the cbseiver in the West, is, many times, a
fragmented human being,

a composite cf divisions:

and mind, reason and emotion, and so forth.
context,

cf body

The Western

which endorses such pre-existent divisions,

certain limits on the following discussion.

places

All that can be

suggested is how the Chinese experience of the human being
is somehow the interrelaticn of these divisions forming a
unity.
This manner of approach can only hope to approximate a
system where the divisicns are not part of the assumed
context.

The unification of something divided seldom eguals

the unity before the object is fragmented.

In the following

discussion, my approach will be to examine how the Chinese
have experienced what we in the West have often assumed to
be divided,

knowing full well that such an approach does not

do justice to a system where all was unified in its
beginnings within the unity of the Tao.

The Human Body in Chinese Medicine
Any medical system begins with the human body and its
structure as the basis for medical practice.

In this both

Western medicine and traditional Chinese medicine agree.
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After this point, the divergence begins as each system is
elaborated,

based on different conceptions of the structure

of the human body.

Western medicine, developing as it does

from the context of divisibility,

will tend to experience

the human body as a composite of separate anatomical parts
which are statically defined and,

then, functionally

related.
In contrast,

developing frcm the context of unity,

traditional Chinese medicine,

with equal vigor, attempted to

develop an experience of the human body as a whole with
function being a product of relations within this whole.
Contrary to the Nest, the major purpose for Chinese medicine
was not to increasingly fractionate the human body, but the
purpose was to identify functional relations within the
body.

An alternative an a t o m y.

The approach to Chinese

medicine's anatomy of the human body is somewhat hampered by
Western biases.

There is the tendency in many books written

on this subject to simply translate the relational terms
used by Chinese medicine to describe the structure of the
human body into Western terminology,
Western physiological correlates.

reducing them to

In this manner,

the

experience of the unity of the body and relations within
this whole become obscured.
Recognizing this tendency, Porkert

(1974) indicates

that instead of attempting to deal with the body in Western
terms by relating Chinese concepts to the underlying Western
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substratum of organs* cne should approach the human body as
the Chinese do from the perspective c£ a functional unity.
He suggests the concept cf "orb."

Orbisiconography, as he

uses the term, attempts to undercut the analytic tendencies
of Western anatomy and to do justice to the inductive
synthetic character of Chinese medicine which is concerned
with functional manifestations cf different body regions.
Orbisiccncgraphy is antithetical to the Western
approach to the human body which assumes a static structure
of isolated organs which can be known separately and then
interrelated in a functional way.

The two conceptions may

be contrasted in this way: traditicnal Chinese medicine sees
functional wholes and relations within these wholes, while
the Western experience of the body is that of discrete
pictures of anatomical substrata.

As Porkert

(1974)

indicates, the attempt to reduce one picture to the other in
a one-to-one manner is the source of much confusion in
dealing with Chinese medical kncwledge.
When one examines the Chinese experience, there is a
tendency to view the Chinese conception as an early
developmental stage of Western anatomical thought.

Such a

view fails to account fcr the possibility of different views
of the human body and different purposes for developing such
knowledge.

Manaka and Orguhart

(1972)

warn: "Thus, the

ancient anatcmy charts cf the Chinese dc not show ignorance
of physiology, as some have claimed, but illustrate their
overriding concern with establishing the relationships
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between organs and function."

(p. 38)

For example, defining

the anatomical structure cf the "heart" is, for the Chinese,
subordinate to the majcr purpose of defining functional
relationships.

Thus, the "heart" is not conceived as an

isolated organ but is viewed as a system with blood vessels
and other organs.

Egually, the "heart" becomes functionally

related to other functions like respiration.
Within this framework,

the experience of the body is

that of a netwcrk cf orbs which have an ill defined
anatomical focus and little precise meaning in terms of
Western notions of physiological structure.

Porkert

(1974)

gives the following example:
The Chinese word
'lungs,* for instance, calls
to mind coincidentally and vaguely mcst of the
ideas someone with a Western education associates
with the lungs.
Instead, fei designates primarily
and predominately an orb cf function defined
systematically and logically, the ♦qrbis
pulmon^lis.* The qualifiers used in
orbisiconography (EfiiJBSaallS* c a r d i t i s . and so
on) must be understood as definiticns of effective
relations or functions, not simply as expressions
of crude anatomical insights.
This is why
statements bearing on a certain orb can under no
circumstances be made to agree completely with
statements bearing on the corresponding organ in
Western thought.
The better both statements are
supported in context' by empirical data integrated
into their logical system, the less reconcilable
they turn out to be.
(pp. 106-7)
He goes on to relate that many times an orb will be given
meaning in traditional Chinese medicine and have no
corresponding anatomical substratum in Western medicine,
while the reverse relation also tends to hold where an
anatomical organ has no corresponding orb in Chinese
medicine.
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disease.

Given these different views of the

human body, it follows that diagnosis will take on a
different character in each system.

Chinese diagnosticians

would be more likely tc experience relationships between
external aspects of the body with the function of internal
organs than is the custom in Hestern medicine.

Coupled with

this purpose, as I observed above in the case of
astronomical observation, is the general proclivity of the
Chinese for making detailed empirical observations.

Both of

these factors laid a groundwork for the development of a
diagnostic system which rested upon detailed and subtle
observations about the patient to an infinitely higher
degree than in Hestern medicine.
For example, an entire diagnostic system was developed
around the careful cbservation cf the tongue on the
assumption that its condition was related to the condition
of the visceral organs.

Being faithful to their tradition

of careful and detailed cbservaticn,

the Chinese doctor

distinguished more than cne hundred varieties of tongue
condition.

These conditicns of the tongue were experienced

as being related tc the condition of the internal organs:
The middle of the tongue is correlated with the
stomach.
The two sides of the tongue are correlated with
the liver.
The root of the tongue is correlated with the
kidneys.
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The tip of the tongue is correlated with the
heart.
(Wallnofer and von Bottauscher, 1965, p. 113)
Hore generally, the body was experienced as having a
network of ducts or meridians which connected the internal
organs with the external skin of the body.
with its acupuncture points,

Thus, the skin,

was experienced as being in

relation to the corresponding pcints in the interior of the
body.

as we shall see below, it is this projection that is

the functional basis for the therapy of acupuncture.
Nowhere is the difference between Western and Chinese
diagnosis more pronounced than in the case of the clinical
indications of the pulse.

For Western medicine, the pulse

is experienced as being related to the function of one
organ, the heart.

In traditional Chinese medicine,

pulsology is a central diagnostic tocl and provides
information not only about the function of the heart, but
about the functioning of many iiternal organs.
Chinese pulsology recognizes three spots along the
radial artery cf each wrist that give pulse
readings of the functioning of different internal
organs,
horeover, at these three spots each wrist
has a deep and superficial reading, giving a total
of twelve different pulses in all.
From these,
the trained physician— and it is an art which
requires long experience as well as great
sensitivity— can diagnose malfunction in any of
the internal organs ox in the various
physiological processes of the body.
(Croizier, 1S68, p. 22)
This is only the beginning cf the intricate knowledge
that pulsology can provide to the Chinese physician.

For

example, the pulse is itself differentiated into three types
to be felt with three different fingers:

"The index finger
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feels the ts'sun cx 'inch pulse*

. . .

feels the kuan or *passage« pulse
feels the ch*ih or 'cubit*
Rottauscher,

pulse."

. . .

the middle finger
and the ring finger

(Wallnoffer and von

1965, p. 99)

It follows that, given a different system of
diagnostics, a different experience cf pathology would be
associated.

Disease was experienced as affecting the body

as a whole and having its source in an imbalance in the
relations within this whcle.

While Western medicine was

concerned with localizing the cause of the disease, the
Chinese came to the conclusion that disease is seldcm
localized in one part of the body, but generally affects the
entire human being

(Veith,

1973).

As a result of this, the

concept of a diseased entity was net an important concept in
Chinese pathology.
Health and disease of the body were thought to be
related to the relation of yin and yang within the body.
these two forces were balanced and in harmony,
enjoyed health;

If

then the body

but if one force dominated over the other,

a pathological condition would arise.

Yin and yang became

the key nosological schema for Chinese medicine:
The functioning of the bedy depended upon the two
forces that created the world and men, the Tin and
the Yang.
While Yang, the male or positive
principle, predominated in man, and Yin, the
female or negative principle, predominated in
women, neither of these forces ever existed alone,
but a certain proportion cf both had to be present
in every well-functioning human being.
These two
ever-active forces, alternatively opposing and
supplementing each other, were held to exist
within all parts of the body and tc circulate
through the vessels that carried blood and pneuma.
Pathological conditicns arcse out of abundance of

250

either the Yin or the Yang., obstruction of the
flow of bicod and especially the pneuma.
All
these deficiencies and obstructions disturbed the
balance of the organism as a whole, but usually
affect one particular organ.
(Veith, 1973, p. 20)
In summary,

the Chinese physician was functioning

within a different conception of the human body than his
Hestern colleague.
pronounced:

The contrast was quite

Hestern medicine begins with the experience of a

static anatomical structure,

diagnosis centers around the

knowing of this structure, and disease is conceived of as
the result of a diseased entity which has affected this
structure;

the traditional Chinese view was dominated by

the experience of relation and function, with diagnosis and
ideas about the nature of disease becoming adjusted
accordingly.

Unity of the Material and Non-material
The human body may be conceived of as a microcosm,

the

innermost circle of a hierarchy of concentric circles of
ever-increasing radius.

A dimension can be identified which

begins with the whole of the body, integrates the mental
function with the body tc form another whole, and unifies
both of these within the whole of the material world.

As

one progresses along this dimension, the assumed divisions
of Hestern knowledge become subsumed.
First, the separations of the mental processes
themselves such as reason and emotion,

then to the

separation of the mental and the physical, to the separation
of the soul from the body and,

finally,

the possibility of
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flight from the material world are progressively merged one
with the other.

Again,

the problem is to approximate the

unity of the Chinese experience of the individual human
being from the context of Hestern divisions.
In attempting to relate this unity, a persistent
problem is generated.

It is a difficult task to illustrate

the unity of the self within a framework such as that of the
Best, which relies so fundamentally on a dualistic premise.
A separation between the material and non-material aspects
of human beings and a differentiation of psychological
functions, while a point of argument in the Hestern
framework, in final analysis,
the Hest.

is the basic orientation in

This is not tc say that there have not been

attempts to unify these separate functions within a single
process such as beccming.

However,

the legacy of the

Hestern thinker is that cf a differentiated human being
which must then be integrated, after the fact.
did not share this legacy,

The Chinese

so the integration process was

not necessary.
The problem is reflected in Hestern language itself.
The language we use to talk about human beings has the
assumption of divisibility embedded within it.
regard, Abegg

(1952)

In this

goes directly tc the heart of the

matter: "the chief difficulty— a fundamental one— lies in
the fact that our terms are these of the

'split* type of

man, while the East Asian's terms are those of the
type."

(p. 15)

'total'
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Thialsiia-

Tc illustrate this point, let me take the

example of the concept cf thinking as this concept is given
split and total meanings in the two contexts.
Hestern context,

In the

thinking is conceived of as an autonomous

process in the human being, fcr the most part independent or
split from the other psychic functions like will or emotion
as well as being split frcm the processes of the body.

This

does not mean that one function is not experienced as
affecting another, but they still maintain a high degree of
independence.
In the traditional Chinese context, thinking is
totalized with other psychic functions such that thinking
becomes only one part of a greater unity being harmonized
with other psychic functions.

Thinking takes on a total

type of meaning in which thinking, instead of standing out
from other human functions,

assumes a relative position in

the totality of function:
The chief characteristic of this way of thinking
lies in the fact that it remains constantly aware
of the relative value of the actions of individual
functions.
One function hereby controls the
other;
sensations control feeling, the intellect
and the will, the intellect controls the
sensations, the emotions, the will and so on— and
all are directed collectively by the psychic
center . . . . (Abegg, 1952, p. 32)
This view, based on integration and unity,

produces

different criteria for evaluating the development of the
self.

The iest places great value on the differentiation of

psychic function and has a criterion which reflects this.
Inversely, the Chinese regard this form of development as
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primitive and will look to a criterion which positively
values integration:
In the East Asian's view it is not the 'total*
manner of thinking but, on the contrary, that
which treats the thought func-friqn as something
separate— that does not take 'the entire man* as a
starting point— which is the more primitive.
The
East Asian has known at first hand enough of the
dangers of such cleavages and the problems they
create, and he has, therefore, constantly striven
for the opposite, namely the reconguest of
totality.
(Abegg, 1952, p. 17)

2f mind and body.

Beginning with the unity of the

mind and body, "Traditional Chinese medicine strove to treat
the whole person rather than isolated parts, and to think of
him in relation to his emotional sphere and physical
environment."

(Cooper and Sivin,

1973,

p. 203)

This is a

fair summary of the integration of human function in Chinese
medicine.
Given this orientation,

the psychosomatic cause of

disease was early recognized as being important.

Of the

causes of illness, third in the order of importance after
environmental causes such as ccld,
the seven emotional states:
grief, fear and shock.

wind, and epidemics,

joy, anger, anxiety,

worry,

"The fact is worth noting that,

at that early date, Chinese medicine was aware of
psychophysical interrelationships and recognized the
importance of psychic factors as a cause of physical
disorders."

(Palos,

1974, p. 91)

were

even
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Turning to psychic processes themselves, there was the
feeling cf unity where reason and emctions were not
experienced as separate functions, but as being in relation.
One way of looking at this would be to see the human being
in China as retaining a psychic unity,

while the Westerner

has taken this unity and differentiated it.

This does not

mean that the Chinese psyche has not undergone a
"development," but it is a development that cannot be
characterized as a process of differentiation.
The psychic development of Western man consisted
above all in the progressive differentiation of
his psychic functions.
Feeling, intellect, the
will and sensations went their separate ways and
accomplished those remarkable feats peculiar to
each of them.
Deep religious feeling and abstract
philosophy, miracles of technology and marvelous
harmonies of music, the conguest of the earth and
the conquest of the atom— all these things we have
experienced and acccmplished in the course of our
development.
Things such as these are not found
in East Asia or anywhere else in the world.
(Abegg, 1952, pp. 12-13)
All of these developments have been made possible by
differentiation.

In East Asia, the term is hardly

appropriate where changes in psychic function over time
could best be characterized as an unfolding of a totality.

SsiiZ of th§ jjoui

IdiSlial SSI.13-

Moving from the

unity of psychic functions to the next larger circle, one
begins to experience the unity of the soul and the body
within the material world.

There is absent here the belief

that the individual has an immortal component which could
flee the prison of the flesh and this material world, to
attain freedom and fulfillment in ancther,

heavenly world.
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The earlier discussion concerning the difficulties with
Buddhist doctrine is relevant here.

A concept the Chinese

could not accept was the Buddhist conception of this world
as illusion*

maya. and the practicing of methods which would

allow the individual to flee this life for Nirvana in
another world.

Fart of the difficulty was with the focus of

the Confucians on relaticnships between human beings within
the context of the family.

The notion that monks should

attempt to attain enlightenment and sever all obligations to
others in this world in favcr cf Nirvana in another was
clearly disruptive to society.
It is unfair to characterize the this-worldly
orientation of the Confucians as merely materialistic in the
Western sense* but rather as collapsing the non-material
into the material.

The material world*

as the Chinese

conceived of it, contained both matter and spirit* mind and
body, emotion and reason, all cf which were contained in the
here and now* in the immediately experienced world.

It was

not so much a world of sculs or matter as a world of
soul-matter all contained within the Tao of the World.
In the Chinese view* even if pecple were to die, and
their souls were tc leave their bodies, these souls did not
gain entry to some higher realm, but were experienced as
only changing form and continuing to exist in this world.
"Soul," to the Westerner, implies a separability of the soul
from.the body, suggesting a freeing of the individual from
the prison of this world to attain another-worldly
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existence.

Such an implication of division was not present

in the Chinese mind.

The soul to them was always viewed as

having a corporal component and as such could not free
itself from this relaticn even if it were desirable to do
so.

In this way# the individual was always to be of this

world and in this world.
To the Chinese#

a soul without a body would no doubt

have been a meaningless abstraction.
It was not that the Chinese lacked any conception
of 'souls' or subtle spiritual essences;
on the
contrary, there were more cf them than the
European mind imagined— 'but it was not
thought . . . that an individual personality could
continue to exist without some bodily component.
In other words# their conception of the living
organism was an organic one# neither
spiritualistic nor material.
(Needham# 1956#
p. 156)
This perspective on the nature cf the soul can undercut
one of the major paradoxes China presents.

As Bodde

(1942)

remarks# it is paradoxical that in a country where ancestor
worship is strong and the belief in spirits and ghosts is
rife among the unlearned, the sages of China either are
agnostic about immortality or discount any personal
survival.

Confucius is a case in point.

Confucius did not

discount life after death as much as he tried to redirect
the attention of the questioner to the practical problems of
living in this world.
In an oft-quoted passage from the An^lect^. Confucius
is questioned by a disciple abcut an afterlife;

d$ad.

Chi lu asked about serving the spirits of the
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The Master said, 'While you are not able to
serve men, hew can you serve iljgil spirits?'
Chi lu added,

'I venture tc ask about death?*

He was answered, 'While you do not know life,
how can you know about death?'
(Legge, 1970, pp. 240-41)
Here, Confucius tries to redirect his disciple from the
contemplation of another world to action within this world.
Bather than speculate about the possible glories of the
world beyond this, the duty of a Confucian was to make this
world a paradise through one's harmonious relations with
others and through self-cultivation.
The full impact of the emphasis on living in the here
and now can be found in seme ideas of the Taoists.
Taoists, it will be recalled,
unified with Nature.

The

experienced themselves as

Within this view,

the human body was

not separate from Nature or the material world, but was
contained within the eternal T a c .

Whereas the Westerner

sought the eternal in seme afterlife, there was a tendency
for some Taoists tc seek immortality and the eternal within
this world.*
In contrast to notions of immortality in the West, the
Taoists became captivated with the idea of a material
ilSSCiality, the cult cf the hsiep.

Needham

(1956)

has

stated that in respect to this goal of material immortality,
there does not seem to be any close parallel in any other
part of the world.

The goal of the Taoists was quite simple

*The guest for practices which would promote physical
immortality was an exclusive pursuit of popular Taoist
Religion (Tao-ghj.§g) and was scorned by Esoteric Taoism
(S^2 z£b^a) of the great mystics.
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and direct:

"To become a hjisjJ, or a *True Man*

meant that one would go on living forever

(chhang s eng) with

a youthful body in a kind of earthly paradise."
1956, p.

(sk§fl

(Needham,

141)

One such conception was that of the £i hsien or
"Earthly Immortal"

who would become unified with Nature and

merge into Nature like a mountain "aged but not dying,"
quite immune to human frailties:
. . . able to spend the rest of
eternity
wandering as a kind of wraith through the
mountains and forests, enjoying the company of
similar enlightened spirits and the cycle of the
seasons ever repeated yet with glory ever renewed.
These are the beings that one can discern against
the immensity of a landscape, flitting across
remote ravines in many beautiful Chinese
paintings.
(Needham, 1974, pp. 11-12)
In this conception,

the infinitesimal

becomes the infinite;

in dealing with the

microcosmic whole

of the human being,

one becomes involved with the largest whole of the universe.
Conceptions of a paradise, if there was to be one, had
a materialistic form for these Taoists.

Paradise was

thought to exist in seme remote regions of th 4.s world.
Since the soul was not allowed the luxury of astral travel,
it must seek its paradise here on earth.

Even when the

was to defy gravity and rise Cbristlike into the
clouds, it was thought only to be part of a journey to
another place in this world

(Bauer,

1976).

The conception of paradise was that it was continuous
with present existence and that in this paradise one would
have current human needs:
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Even where the legends evidently report ascensions
to heaven# the extent to which the gravitational
pull of the earth gradually overtook the
'immortals#' the degree to which their flight
through the clouds became a walk across mountains#
is easily recognizable.
Ascensions were less and
less often presented as the transition to a wholly
different mode of being# but rather as a kind of
voyage into another country . - ..
Very typical
in this connection are the stories telling of the
eagerness of many hjsjsh to take along into the new
world the greatest” possible number of objects for
their personal use.
There is even the case of an
'immortal' who was accompanied by his entire
family and household goods as he ascended to
heaven# a naive parallel tc the previously
mentioned custom of placing models of all the
things the dead had come tc cherish during their
lifetime into the grave with them.
To free
oneself from all the ties of this world# to take
one's leave from all the companions left on the
shore before the great ocean was crossed was no
longer the essential element in gaining
blessedness# but mere nearly the opposite: the
attainment of immortality, the promise of
everlasting life# but precisely a life on earth#
or at least, a life as it had been lived on earth.
(Bauer, 1976# p. 103“
For the Chinese# if there was to be a soul# an immortal
element to the human being, it must function within this
world and could not migrate to an other-worldly realm.

FUNCTIONING TOWARD SELF
Before I examine the functional conseguences of a
unified and differentiated view of the individual# I should
stress that each of these views has its own strengths and
limitations,

one is always balancing possible benefits

against possible disadvantages.

Given certain criteria and

certain purposes# one approach will be more functionally
sound than the other;
change,

when the criteria and purposes

so does the ratio of adverse effects to the
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benefical.
As as example, I can follow the reasoning of Abegg
(1952) given above in the context of the discussion of
psychic differentiation.

It will be recalled that the West

has developed along the lines cf differentiation of
psychological processes while the parallel development in
China is best conceived of as an unfolding of a unity.

As

she points out, many of the great achievements of Western
civilization have their source in the differentiation of the
Western mind.

The development cf technology, putting a

human being on the moon,

the writing of great literary

classics and the great advances of modern medicine,

all have

been made possible because of the ability of the Western
thinker to differentiate one aspect cf the psychic function
and give it full power, submerging the ether components of
the mind.
Such was not possible for the Ccnfucian or the Taoist.
The purpose was to balance and harmonize all functions, to
make the whole human being an actuality, at the expense,
perhaps, of the possibility of developing the creative force
of one component.

There was no space here for pure thought

as we find in Western philosophies.
Nothing is gained without an equal sacrifice.

For the

great heights cf intellectual and technical achievement,

the

West has had to pay with the inherent instability of these
separate faculties.

It must be remembered that the mind

that is capable of great achievements of good is also the
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aind that can journey into the deep valleys of despair.
The unity of China, on the other hand, provides for
greater stability and continuity over time.

The full weight

of the society is net on individuals and their achievements,
but on the community of human beings and a continuity of
tradition.

At this point,

the Westerner would ask:

‘•Stability at what cost?— at the cost of stagnation!"

True,

over the history of China, by Western standards of
technological progress, there has been little progress,

but

one must weigh this against the benefits of a human society
which was able tc support humankind,

with continuity, for

4000 years.
My only reason for examining these issues is to
counterbalance the tendency fcr viewing the benefits of the
Chinese framework without also seeing the disadvantages.
The same is true for the

West.

examine the conseguences

in function of the unity of the

self in traditional China.

In the following, I will

It is beyond the scope of this

presentation to evaluate

these conseguences;

it is left to

the reader*s judgment if

it is better to retain the unity of

psychic functions or to develop along the road of
differentiation.

Unity as a Functional Basis for Medicine
In a theory of disease there is a prescription for
therapeutic function.

If one defines and experiences

disease, as in the case cf Western medicine, as being the
result of a diseased entity in some part of the body, it
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follows that one should develop therapeutic methods which
will remove the cause of disease and return the body to a
state of health.
medicine.

This is the primary direction for Western

The Western physician's armamentarium is well

stocked with therapeutic devices for discovering the site of
the diseased entity and with techniques for the removal of
this entityIn contrast,

the armamentarium of the the traditional

Chinese physician is stocked with therapeutic methods which
derive from a different definition of disease and a
different experience of the body.

Traditional Chinese

medicine assumes the unity cf the body and, consequently,
defines the disease of the body as a result of the
disharmony of relations within this whole.
methods, instead of proceeding analytically,

Therapeutic
will attempt to

work with the whole of the body by altering relations within
this whole.

In terms of Chinese diagnostic categories,

disease is an imbalance cr disharmony between yin-yang
relations within the body,

and the purpose of therapeutic

methods is to restore this balance and harmony.
In the following discussion, I do not begin to do
justice to the full spectrum of therapeutic methods used by
the Chinese doctor.

The latter's armamentarium was quite

eclectic by Western standards including not only the use of
drugs or herbs, but, more generally, attempts to administer
to all of the dimensions of physical health with methods
such as gymnastics and diet therapy.

I cannot hope to fully
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document this entire array.

Consequently, I will focus on a

contrasting set of therapeutic methods, surgery and
acupuncture, as they developed or did not develop in each
framework.

&b§§a£§ 2! sur u e r v .

While surgery has been an important

component to Western medicine,

surgery is conspicuously

absent in traditional Chinese medicine.

Since Chinese

medicine did not conceive of disease in entity terms, it is
quite understandable that techniques,

such as surgery, for

the removal of the diseased entity would not have been
developed and, even if introduced,

would not find fertile

ground in China.
There is much evidence that suggests that what surgical
techniques did exist in the history cf Chinese medicine can
be traced to the introduction of Buddhist thought and tend
to originate in Indian medical practices.

Chen

(1964)

feels

that many Chinese surgical techniques can be attributed to
Indian surgeons.

He notes that the father of Chinese

surgery, Hua T«o, is described as performing many operations
that are guite similar tc the accomplishments of the Indian
physician, Jivaka, a contemporary of Buddha.

This has led

some scholars to conclude that the accomplishments of the
former are mere echoes of Jivaka.
Be that as it may,

the important point is that in China

the absence of a divisibility concept prevented the fruition
of surgical methods.

Even with the introduction of an

alternative model of the body, surgical methods never became
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a major therapeutic technique in Chinese medicine.

The

major thrust of Chinese medicine was in the opposite
direction.

Every effort was directed toward the aim of

administering treatment to a whole bcdy and to maintaining
this wholeness as a result cf treatment.
Confucianism supported the unity of the body on an
ethical basis: the body was net the property of the cwner,
but a gift from one*s ancestors which must be returned to
them in good order.
than The Clas§i£

For this, there was no lesser authority
£ilial ffi? t y» which says: "Our

bodies— to every hair and bit cf skin— are received by us
from our parents,

and we must net presume to injure or wound

them— this is the beginning of filial piety."
p. 466)

(Legge, 1879,

In gocd Confucian fashion, it was not an uncommon

practice to retain any severed organs or limbs of the person
to be buried with them at the time of death.
The Confucian imperative to maintain the unity of the
body was sometimes carried to rather paradoxical extremes.
For example, Bodde and Bcrris

(1967), in their consideration

of systems of punishment in Chinese law, state that the
Chinese often chose the slow and painful death by
strangulation over the swift method of decapitation, for the
former left the bcdy intact for burial.

J)£3 E3 &£iS£g qpd moxibustfgn.

In direct contrast to the

absence of surgical therapy in Chinese medicine, there
developed therapeutic techniques which were capable of
treating the body as a whcle and changing the balance of
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relationships within this whole.

As noted above, since the

human body is experienced as a whole such that the internal
organs become projected

via meridians onto the surface of

the skin, therapy to internal organs was possible by the
stimulation of the skin alone.

This is the theoretical

basis for the complementary methods of acupuncture and
moxibustion.
Wallnofer and von Bcttauscher

(1965)

describe the basis

of acupuncture as fcllcws:
As the teachings of acupuncture claim, each
internal organ is in close affinity with its own
definite spots, cr points on the skin . . . .
The
insertion of the needle in these respective points
is said to exert either a stimulating or an
equalizing effect, thereby reinstating order and
harmonious balance within the disturbed
collaboration of the nerves . . . or the Yin and
X§I1S# as the Chinese have it.
(p. 128)
Acupuncture becomes an effective treatment for disease by
restoring the yin-yang balance.
Closely related and complementary in effect to
acupuncture was the method of mcxibustion.
acupuncture is primarily a cold methcd,

While

moxibustion is a hot

method which seeks to heat points cn the skin to produce
changes in the function of internal organs.

Both methods

are based upon the same basic relation and in tandem can
manipulate the yin-yang balance:
To bring Xiji and Yang into proper balance is also
the purpose of moxibustion . . . cauterization
with moxa.
While acupuncture is employed
especially for diseases caused by an excess of
Xafi3» the moxa method seeks to restrain an excess
of jia.
(p. 144)
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The contrast between surgery and acupuncture is a
special case of the more general tendency for Western
medicine to localize the cause cf disease in a substratum of
the body and to focus treatment on this point.
medicine, on the other hand,

Chinese

working on the contrary

assumption that disease is a general condition of the whole
body, seeks to effect treatment by altering the functional
relationships within this whole.

Sfrr^pgths a q d weakpess<=s.

These alternative medical

strategies have different strengths and weaknesses in
respect to function.

Eorkert

relation guite clearly,

(1976) has defined this

noting the particular strengths of

Western and Chinese medicine.

Western medicine has its

strength where the substratum condition can be met, where a
disease can be localized in a particular organ or part of
the body.

For example,

in the case of an accident, where a

part of the body is injured. Western medicine is most
effective with immediate remedial treatment to the injured
part.

However,

when this substratum condition cannot be

met, western medicine reveals a weakness.
In contrast,
another direction.

the strength of Chinese medicine lies in
It will be recalled that the substratum

is unimportant to Chinese medicine;

what is important is

the functional relationships within the body as a whole.
Thus, the Chinese doctor may begin to treat these functional
relationships, his patients symptoms, immediately, with no
need to localize his diagnosis.

The practical consequence
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is that therapy can be administered at an early stage of
development without having to wait, as the Western
therapeutic framework must, for the sore advanced stages
when a particular part of the body reveals the disease.
These factors produce a certain contrast in function:
Chinese medicine tends toward early diagnosis and prevention
while Western medicine tends toward late, localized
diagnosis and reactive therapy.

This difference becomes

very important in seme chronic diseases such as diabetes and
cancer.
There is general agreement that serious organic
diseases . . . are preceded by stages of
functional disorders.
If they are given specific
diagnoses and treatment, they can be prevented
from entering the organic stage, which in the
opinion of Chinese doctors, represents an advanced
if not terminal stage of every disease.
(Porkert,
1976, p. 67)
It is interesting that Western medicine seems to be
most useful and effective for contagious and
accident-related illness,

whereas,

in a complementary

fashion, Chinese medicine has its greatest strength in
degenerative, chronic disease.

From all indications, these

two approaches, and thus t h e i r respective strengths, are
being integrated today in the P e o p l e ’s Republic of China.

Functional Unity of the Material and Non-Material
Again I must deal with three wholes: the unity of body
and mind, the unity of psychic functions themselves, and the
unity of the human being in the world.

Each of these

unities has implications for the human b e i n g ’s function in
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traditional China.

Chi.

In examining the unity of mind and body, it is

best to begin with a concrete example of this integration.
I will begin with ya4 C h i , a traditional exercise system
which attempts to work with the unity of mind and body.
There are currently many books in the pcpular press on the
study of T§i Chi which attempt to introduce the reader to
its forms and postures.

Few of these volumes relate the

fact that this exercise

system is deeply embedded in the

philosophy and culture of China, in particular the central
classic of the J Chj.qg.

According tc Lui

(1972) , the T ^ 4

Chi postures or forms are related in direct correspondence
to the hexagrams cf this book,

such that in doing the

various forms one is almost mirroring in microcosm the cycle
of changes in Nature.
Of the many tales concerning the origins of T a j c h i ,
the one which I prefer relates the source of this practice
to the inspiration of Nature.
century sage, San-feng,

In this legend, a twelfth

observed from his window the gentle

combat of a snake and crane.
movements, in a living fcrm,

He saw in their agile
the principles of the J C h i n a ,

with the latter*s stress on the relation between strength
and yielding.

"The great master studied the crane and the

snake, the wild animals, the clouds, the water and the trees
bending in the wind.

He codified these natural movements

into a system cf exercise."

(lui,

1972,

p.

H)
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This system net only prescribed bodily movements/ but
also demanded a unity of body and mind.

As with many

Eastern arts, a leng period of study is required;

while one

may learn the basic physical movements of each form in but a
few months, it takes many years or even a lifetime to fully
integrate the body and mind.
is necessary,

Here,

the guidance of a master

a mcdel who demonstrates that such a mind-body

integration is possible.
The subtitle of I i u ‘s book on TajL Chi is indicative of
this purpose:

"A Ch o r e o graphy gf ?Qfly and flisd."

Chi

is much more than merely a combination of physical dance
movements, but is much closer to a meditation in motion
where the mental and physical are brought into a dynamic,
harmonious movement.
"First in the
1963, p.

One of the Tai Chi classics relates:

*will,* afterwards in the body.” (Haisel,

211) Given this holistic point of focus, the same

classic goes on: "It must be remembered;
all parts move;
(Maisel,

if one part is still,

1963, p. 211)

The purpose of

as one part moves,

all parts are still."
Chi is to

coordinate the movements cf these parts so that they form a
fluid whole with no seam between mind and body, thought and
action.

In contrast. Western forms cf exercise seem very

shallow.

The mind-body unity of T ^j
Chi translates quite easily into a unity of thinking and
doing, thought and action,
Chinese thought,

which is characteristic of

host scholars of China, I think,

would

agree that the Chinese embrace practicality o*er theory.
This guality is even more pronounced when placed in
comparison to the West where theory predominates guite as
much over practice.
It is interesting to relate the observations of a
relatively unbiased observer.

Needham

(1970)

guotes an

Arabic scholar of Damascus whc lived about 830 A.D.

who had

a privileged position in which to view the two systems
living as he did at the juncture of the two worlds.

The

scholar made this rather astute observation: M,The curious
thing is that the Greeks are interested in theory but do not
bother about practice#

whereas the Chinese are very

interested in practice and do net bother about t h e o r y . ,M
(P. 39)
At the basis of this observation is a very basic
insight into the knowledge of the Greeks as opposed to the
knowledge of the Chinese.

Developing the system completely,

the Greeks made a division between mind and body, thinking
and doing, allowing them to take flights into abstraction.
The Chinese viewed mind and body as unified and in so doing
placed an emphasis on accomplishing things within this
unified structure.
This difference manifests itself very early in the
development of each system.

He can, for example, compare

Platonism with Confucianism on the issue of what constitutes
knowing: MThe Platcnists were ccncerned with knowing in
order to understand, while Confucians were more concerned
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with knowing in order to behave properly toward ether men."
(Munro,

1969, p. 54)

Underpinning these alternative

purposes for knowledge

is an alternative process of guestioning:
In China, truth and falsity in the Greek sense
have rarely been important considerations in a
philosopher's acceptance cf a given belief or
proposition;
these are Western concerns.
The
consideration important to the Chinese is the
behavior implications of the belief or proposition
in guestion.
What effect does adherence to the
belief have on people?
What implications for
social action can be drawn from the statement?
For the Greeks, study was valued both for its own
sake and as a guide to action . . . but bliss lay
primarily in study for its own sake.
In
Confucianism, there was nc thought of knowing that
did not entail some conseguence of action.
(Munro, 1969, p. 55)
Before I examine specific examples cf the unity of
thinking and doing in the majox traditions of China, I
cannot avoid a very thorny thicket— relating this unity of
the Chinese to pragmatic philosophies of the West.

Even

though this issue is difficult one, I think it can provide
some valuable insights into the differences between East and
West.
As soon as one mentions the unity of thinking and doing
and the emphasis cn the practical,

cne is immediately drawn

to the philosophy of American pragmatism, to Dewey, peirce,
and James.

There is a fcrmal identity between the

philosophies of these men and that of China, but some very
important differences.

Both stress the importance of the

unity of theory and practice.
important distinction.

However,

there is a most

Pragmatism is a philosophy,

per 5 5 ,

272

and because of this is firmly committed to the purposes for
knowledge in the West,

fls a philosophy, pragmatism attempts

to deal with the characteristic metaphysical problems of the
Western world.
In China,

given the unity cf mind and body, the unity

of thinking and doing cannot be only part of a philosophical
system but must relate to the whole perscn, to what one
thinks as well to what one feels and, most importantly, to
how one acts.

Here lies the basic difference between the

Confucian proclivity fcr the pragmatic and the pragmatic
philosophies of the West.

Wu

(1971)

writes:

Generally speaking, the unity of theory and
practice in pragmatism is more concerned with, in
addition to human survival, scientific and
epistemolcgical problems . . . .
The term 'theory*
as used in Confucianism is not to be understood in
terms merely cf conceptual framework or
hypothesis.
It should be conceived as deep
SSaxiSiiofi or even uJiisatg concq p n .
'Practice'
in Confucianism is not to be interpreted in terms
merely of something to be exercised or performed
in daily life, like 'diet,' 'dance,* or 'table
t e n n i s * ; it should be interpreted in terms of a
deep moral sense;
it is ccncerned with the toi;^
ESial £§Ei 2 Iiaace of £h§
From the
Chinese viewpoint the total moral performance of
the individual and the totality of his beliefs or
theories should be in harmonious unity, without
any gap or inconsistency,
(p. 10 )
This practicality is less the product of the discovery of
philosophical truth than it is the result of a number of
unities, including the unity of reason and emotion, which
are all contained within one consistent whole that is the
ideal to the Confucian.
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It is possible tc lock at a central philosophical text
of C h i n a , for example the J Chj$g, with the view that it was
a theory of the universe on an abstract level.
to impose Western priorities.

To do so is

The J Ching is first and

foremost a book of divination which helped the user in the
search for decisions for action.

In short,

one must be very

careful not to treat manifest similiarities as indicating
similiar latent processes.
The unity of theory and practice is a central theme in
Confucianism.

Wu

(1971)

notes that "Confucius is probably

the first philosopher to have insisted on the necessary
correspondence between words and actions."

(p. 9)

One of

the basic building blocks of the Confucian social order,
"The Rectification of Names," illustrates the need for a
close correspondence between the title of the person and the
actions of the person,

only when the title corresponded to

the correct behavior would the social order function
harmoniously.
state means:

The Ana^ect? say: "So, to rectify names in a
*Let the ruler be a ruler,

minister, the father l>e a father,
son."'

the minister be a

and the son be a

(Chan, 1967, p. 39)

It is in Taoism, however, that the full fruition of
this unity is realized.

In the above discussion on the

nature of the Tao. I noted that the Tao is not simply a
mental concept to the Chinese tut encompasses both thinking
and doing, while an approach cnly frcm the mind, from
reason,

must fail.

It was in this context that I related

27a
the

story of Ting the batcher who sc worked within the T a o .

the

unity of thought and action, that he could use the sane

chopper for 19 years and have it remain sharp.

Certainly,

any civilization has its craftsmen who transmit their craft
directly from the

master to the apprentice without the need

for

The Tacists, however, carry this notion

abstraction.

much further, beyond a mere skill— tc quote Thing the
butcher, to a full encompassing of the person within the

Needham

(1956)

writes that such "knack-passages," as he

calls them, are quite common in Taoist literature.

In all

of these passages, there is expressed the conviction that
the arts and crafts from one generation to another naturally
involved the total education of both body and spirit of the
learner.

In this context, I would like to quote at length

another famous knack-passage from Tacist writings:
Duke Human (of C h h i ) , seated above in his hall,
was (once) reading a book, and the wheelwright
Pien was making a wheel (in the courtyard) below.
Laying aside his mallet and chisel, Pien went to
the steps, and said, 'I venture to ask. Sir, what
you are reading?* The Duke said, • (The words) of
the sages.* ’Are these sages, then, alive?* Pien
continued.
*They are dead,* was the reply.
'Then,* was the reply, 'What you my ruler are
reading are only the dregs and refuse of bygone
men.' The Duke, angered, said, 'How should you, a
wheelwright, have anything to say about the book
which I am reading?
If you can explain yourself,
very well;
if you cannot, you shall die!' The
wheelwright said, 'Your servant will look at the
thing from the point of view of his own art.
If
my stroke is too slew, then the tool bites deep
but is not steady;
if my stroke is too fast, then
it is steady but does not go deep.
The right
pace, neither (too) slow ncr (too) fast, is the
hand responding tc (some influence which) the
heart (sends forth). But I cannot tell (how to do
this) by word of mouth— there is a knack in it.
I
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cannot teach the knack to my son, nor can my son
learn it from me.
Thus, it is that though in my
seventieth year, I am (still) making wheels in my
old age.
But those ancients, and what it was not
possible for them tc convey, are dead and gone— so
then what you, my ruler, are reading is but their
dregs and refuse.* (Needham, 1956, p. 122)
Here, the unity thinking and doing as revealed by action in
the present is to be valued even

above the sacred

documents

of the sage-kings cf antiquity.
This unity may be expanded to reveal a general tendency
toward unity within Chinese education.

Memory and

repetition have been the core cf

the transmission of

knowledge in China, reguiring cf

the learner the use

mind and body simultaneously.

of both

Consequently, education or

apprenticeship was
. . . not a matter of intellectual understanding,
not at all the appreciation of mathematical
functions describing the behavior of deeply
analysed physico-chemical entities.
¥et to some
extent, the skill of the artisans was handed down
orally in the ubiquitous and invariable practice
of *learning by rote* mnemonic rhymes.
(Needham, 1965, pp. 47-48)
This principle of learning by rote extends not only through
the traditional crafts, but to all areas of education
including medicine and proto-chemistry.
It must be remembered that the medium for recording
knowledge in this system was the Chinese language which
rested on memorizing the characters and learning the
Confucian classics by heart.

Needham

(1956)

recalls, from

personal experience in the 1940s, the silence of the Chinese
countryside being disturbed by the bee-like hum of school
children reciting the classics by heart.
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One would not be stretching a point to agree with Abegg
(1952)

that Asian culture is tc a considerable degree built

upon the basis of memory and the kinds of values associated
with the latter.

One could almost expand this to say that

memory replaces the process of thinking in the Chinese mind.
Many of the characteristics and accomplishments that the
Westerner attributes to thinking are viewed as the products
of memory in China.

Tfris-worjdlY focus.

Moving to the next plane, to the

whole of the psychic functions themselves,

I find that this

unity also produces differences in function.

For example,

it is helpful to make the contrast between the method of
prayer in the west and the method of meditation in Taoism
and Ch*an
Japan).

(the Chinese predecessor to Zen Buddhism of
Prayer rests upon a division between body and

spirit whereby the human being reguests something of God,
and a division of psychic functions themselves whereby
prayer acguires an extreme emotional component which is
separate from the intellect;

consequently,

one often prays

when reason fails and one is left in a Jobian condition
relying on the will cf Gcd.
Meditation,

on the ether hand, is very much a centering

process, built upon unities where the purpose is to
harmonize and unify all functions.
Ch'an

To do meditation in

(Zen), one generally first assumes the lotus position

which is a centered and balanced posture of the body.

One

proceeds to center and balance the mind in a similar manner

277

allowing, in most cases, the natural development of thoughts
and emotion until the mind becomes, as some Zen Buddhists
say, an empty mirror.

In meditation, one is integrating all

functions in one act.
Each of these methods derive from the assumptions of
their respective systems:
Whereas prayer is a primary feature of the
Christian religion (if net in theory, at least in
practice), meditation similarly characterizes
Eastern Asian religions.
Viewed psychologically,
this shows the difference between the religiosity
of the ’divided,* 'unintegrated * type of man and
that of the ’total* type, for prayer has a strong
emotional element, which explains references to
'fervent* prayer, while in the East meditation is
a matter of total contemplation . . . .
Thus it
can generally be said: we think o£ feel,, we
philosophize gr pray, while the East Asian tries
to combine the two.
(Abegg, 1952, pp. 40-41)
This unity of meditation leads directly to the unity of
the soul and body in a this-worldly existence.

This was the

conception of the hsiss ^or tk *3 Tacists, a person who exists
in a material paradise for all time.

This unity had direct

implications for function.
Prior to the introduction of Buddhism, there was not a
real notion of sin and punishment.

(Eberhard, 1967)

Such

concepts rest on the assumption of division between this
world and some other world where the person will be judged
for his deeds.

The Chinese were very reluctant to make such

a differentiation,

preferring this world as the only world.

Prior to the Buddhist introduction of the concept of a world
beyond, there was no real answer to the eternal guestion of
why evil people enjoyed an unpunished earthly existence.
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There was no notion of an after-life in which the person
could be tried for the sins of this life.
absence of what Needham

(1974)

There was an

has called ethical

polarisation in pre-Buddhist Chinese thought, nothing to
provide for the judgment of the living after death, no
provision whereby the sheep and the goats were brought to
justice and separated into cther-wcrldly heavens and hells.
Without the possibility of an other-worldly flight, the
Taoists sought an eternal life in this material world.

To

accomplish this end, the Taoists developed a number of
practices to achieve material immortality.
lists the following practices:
helio-therapeutic technigues,

Needham

(1956)

respiratory technigues,
gymnastic technigues,

sexual

technigues, alchemical and pharmaceutical technigues, and
dietary technigues.

Twc things are apparent from this

list— the Taoists were attempting to implement a wide
variety of methods which focused on the whole person, and
their methods anticipated many modern therapeutic methods.
£ comparison can be made between alchemical and
pharmaceutical technigues in the East and West as they
relate to the search for immortality.

Alchemists in both

civilizations included as their purpose the development of
elixirs for immortality.

In China,

however, the emphasis on

these elixirs was much more extensive than in the West.
There was widespread evidence of a much greater degree
of elixir poisioning in traditional China in comparison to
Europe.

(Needham,

1970)

This higher incidence can be

279

attributed tc two factors.

One was the lack of any

prejudice against the use of mineral drugs which existed in
European alchemy but which did not in Chinese alchemy.
Unlike their European colleagues* the Chinese alchemists
persistently compounded dangerous elixirs of poisonous heavy
metals like mercury* arsenic*

and lead.

In contrast* the

European elixirs would mere likely be compounded with more
innocuous substances of an organic base.
An egually important factor was the dominance of the
idea of a material immortality and an absence of thoughts
about the possibility of an other-worldly existence after
death.

This latter situation,

counterpart in Europe,

which did not have a

primed the traditional Chinese for

any elixir that would offer any hope of producing this
longed-after immortality.
In Europe* there was a clear possibility of human
survival after material death* when the soul would depart
the body and be transported to heaven* hell,
In China,

or purgatory.

given only the context of the material present*

all that could be experienced as real was the possibility of
human survival in a material sense* as a Hsi<=»n.

Needham

writes:
Heaven or paradise in any seriously credible sense
did not exist* but the visible world was eternal
and uncreated* nor wculd it ever cease* and he who
could make himself worthy might continue to enjoy
it with sense-percepticns perpetuated but
purified.
This was the inner meaning of the
proverbial salutation: jjajj jhoji wu chi^qg (»life,
world without end!«)(Needham, 1970* p. 337)
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Given this view of the unity of the body and soul
forever as it is now in the present, the sophisticated
Chinese of the time were left easy prey to the promises of
any elixir which would make the goal of material immortality
a reality.

So widespread was the use of such elixirs among

the rich and educated, that it is difficult many times to
know whether tc evaluate the writings of any one author on
their own merits or as simply a by-product of the early
stages of mercury poisoning.
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OVERVIEW
In traditional China,

when the system did focus on what

would be termed individual process,
self as a unified whole.

the emphasis was on the

The Western separations between

mind and body, soul and body,

and the material and

non-material worlds were not important distinctions to the
Chinese.

These unities were examined in a number of

concrete areas.
Chinese medicine viewed the body from a perspective of
functional relationships

vithir a whole,

flany times these

relationships did not have referents in Western anatomical
structures.

Given this alternative experience of the body,

diagnosis and disease were given alternative meanings.
Diagnostic procedures such as pulsclcgy were much more
highly developed than in Western medicine.

To the Chinese

doctor, the condition of the pulse not only gave indication
of the functioning of the heart, but numerous other
relationships within the body.
being localized,

Disease was not viewed as

but was conceived of as an imbalance of

yin-yang relations within the

whole body.

The functional conseguences of this view of disease and
the body fostered the development of holistic therapies
which operated with the body left intact.

For example,

there was a general absence of surgical methods and an
emphasis on acupuncture and moxibustion which could function
without the need cf removing a disease producing entity.
This provided for a medical system which was very effective
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in treating and preventing chrcnic disease.
In general,

the Western distinctions of mind and body,

reason and emotion, and soul and bcdy were all viewed as
integrated within the Chinese experience.
example,

Thinking, for

could not be separated from feeling.

In both

Confucianism and Taoism, there was a rejection of the idea
that the soul could flee this world for an other-worldly
paradise.

Confucians were reguired to make this world a

paradise through their harmonious relatonships within this
world, while many Taoists sought the elusive goal of a
material immortality in this life.
Functionally,

practices such as Tai C hi attempted to

foster the unity of mind and body.
viewed as unified,

Thinking and doing were

with an emphasis cn correct actions in

Confucianism, and unity with the Tao which transcended mere
skill, as evidenced by numerous knack passages in Taoist
literature.

Education tended to place high value on memory

and associated abilities.
The this-worldly focus was revealed in the practice of
meditation as opposed to the dualistic orientation of prayer
in Western religions.

The search for a material immortality

left many Taoists easy victim tc dangerous elixirs which
promised eternal life in this world.

CHAPTER

VIII

THE UNITY OF THE HUHAN B U N G AND THE PROCESS
OF QUESTIONING

We come new tc the end of a journey into China,

As I

indicated in Chapter IV, the method employed, focusing as it
does on three key relationships, does net do full justice to
the underlying unity of experience and function that is
characteristic of traditional China.

My discussion has

fragmented this unity, imposing Western divisions where
divisions do not exist, always attempting to approximate a
unity by ever more complex relationships between segmented
parts.

For the Chinese,

in my opinion,

all was continuous

and integrated as a given condition and did not have to be
constructed from a series of parts.
If one were to focus on the human body,

for example,

one would be confronted with wholes within a whole.

In the

Chinese framework, one cannot deal with a microcosm like the
human body without at the same time dealing with the
macrocosm that surrounds.

This was the essence of the last

chapter, where in dealing with the individual and the
separation of the soul and body, we were drawn to the
largest whole cf treating the human being as integrated in
the material world of the “ here and now."
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Equally,

it is net enough to define this unity as a

static structure,

independent of any larger process.

My

purpose is to relate this unity to an underlying process of
questioning.

Each of the last three chapters has asked a

question about one relationship of the human being.

It is

extremely easy to become so invclved with examining the
consequences of asking such a question in that context that
one forgets that this guestion is related to a more general
process of questioning which bcth determines and
interrelates the specific question and the consequences to
each other.

My task in this chapter is to deal with these

two issues and to generate a larger picture within which to
work.

THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN BEING
IN CHINA
In the following discussion, I would like to examine
the unity of the unities, the underlying unity of the unity
of the human being and Nature,

the human being and others,

and the unity of the individual.

The assumption of unity

along each dimension produces a unity §mogg dimensions.
By way of introduction, I can note the ease with which
one passes from one area to another of Chinese knowledge.
For example, in the case cf art, one flows guite freely from
a consideration of calligraphy, to painting and even to the
structural lines of the frame of a Chinese house..

Each area

is integrated and mutually reinforcing with the other.

To

be educated in the Confucian sense entailed the ability to
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move freely frcm cue area to the other;
the generalist.

it was the unity of

The ideal man would have some medical

knowledge so that if his parents were ill he could
administer to them, but he was also required to be an artist
of sorts and able to write poetry for his paintings.

In

every endeavor, there was always the unity of the T 30 which
served as a container fcr all creativity and provided
constancy of activity in that one was always working with
relationships between yin and yang.
This underlying unity cf wholes can be appreciated
within the context of a concrete example.

I will take the

two extremities of the unity— the individual body and the
cosmos.

%a4 Chi at the level cf individual exercise can be

related to the cosmos through the trigrams and hexigrams of
the 1 Chjng:
The Cosmos is a great spacio-temporal conception,
graphically represented by the Ta^ Chi.
It
proceeds rhythmically from an immutable and
eternal principle (T3 0 ) which is manifested either
in the form cf repose (yipl. or in the form of
movement fyaflgl. The succession of the two
principles vin and vang represented by continuous
or broken lines makes it possible tc form eight
trigrams (ca-kua ) . These lead to a symbolic
representation of the whole universe, valid on
both a material and moral plane.
It then becomes
possible for an ingenious mind to draw from one
single trigram the exposition of a
physico-chemical phenomenon or historical facts, a
topic of military tactics or sexual union, an
anatcmo-physiclogical diagram cr a therapeutic
formula.
(Huard and Hong, 1968, pp. 231-2)
This unity suggests several things.

First, one is

presented with a unity cf the small and the specific with
the large and the general as

ghj. blends with the cosmos
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into one pattern.

Secondly,

centrality of the I Chijig.

cne is reminded of the
The yin-yang oscillations of Taj,

C£i become diagramnatically represented in the broken and
unbroken lines of the hexigrams of the Bog£ of Change^.
Thus, the I £hiaa becomes the central whole to which all the
other wholes relate.
The effect of this underlying unity of knowledge is to
produce a hierarchy of wholes,

with each whole mirroring the

whole above and the whcle below.

Within this perspective,

the whole of the cosmos is not unlike the whole of the human
body.

This microcosmic-macrocosmic thinking is central to

Chinese thought.
Likewise,

in the social world,

the whole of the family

is the model for all social relations.

The microcosm of the

family was viewed as the model for the macrocosm of the
government.
other areas.

This same relation of wholes applies to many
For example, Wu

(1963)

writes that: "The house

is the basic cell in the organism of Chinese architecture,
just as the family it houses is the microcosm of the
monolithic Chinese society."

(p.

31)

The total image is one of a hierarchy of wholes
interrelated in terms of experience and function.
the oft-guoted passage from

Consider

SlSSl

The ancients who wished tc illustrate illustrious
virtue throughout the kingdom, first ordered well
their states.
Wishing to crder well their states,
they first regulated their families..
Wishing to
regulate their families, they first cultivated
their persons,
wishing to cultivate their
persons, they first rectified their hearts.
Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought
to be sincere in their thoughts . . . their
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thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then
rectified.
Their hearts being rectified, their
persons were cultivated.
Their persons being
cultivated, their families were regulated.
Their
families being regulated, their states were
rightly governed, the whole kingdom was made
tranquil and happy.
(Legge, 1926, pp. 411-412)
The same passage cf T h e <?y^at IsSSSiflS continues: "From
the son of Heaven dcwn to the multitudes of the people, all
considered the cultivation of the person to be the root
everything besides)."

The conclusion seems clear:

(of

the world

is a series of wholes within wholes and the human being is
the center most whcle having responsibility to all others.
Let me attempt to draw all of these wholes together
within the context of one concrete example— traditional
Chinese medicine.

Chinese medicine has appeared a number of

times in the preceding chapters..
briefly.

I will recapitulate

Along the dimension of the unity of humankind and

Nature, I observed that the human being was related to
Nature in a one-tc-one correspondence via a universe
analogy.

As a result, pathology in the human being was

functionally related to meteorclogical changes in Nature.
The body itself was considered to have wholes within wholes,
as the internal organs were projected onto the skin;

this

factor had conseguences in function such as the development
of acupuncture as a therapy.
It is possible to look at the skin itself as containing
wholes within wholes.

Figure 12 is a diagram of such a

microcosm, the pinna of the ear as it appears in
acupuncture.

I ncte that the pinna is a detailed microcosm

289

which can be functionally related to a number of internal
organs.

It is possible that this hierarchy of wholes could

be differentiated further revealing further wholes within
wholes.
It is important to reccgni 2 e the difference between the
Chinese d o c t o r ’s field cf activity and that of his Western
colleague.

Functioning within a framework of divisibility,

western doctors can deal with their patients in a segmented
fashion,

treating cnly the body and one cause of disease

generally localized in one part of the body.

The

traditional Chinese doctor, on the other hand, cannot deal
with his patient or the patient’s body as an isolated unit.
The doctor is treating the whole person and all of the
heirarchy of wholes which surround.

The doctor,

in treating

the yin-yang relationships within the body of the patient,
is at once dealing with the yin-yang relations in the larger
cosmos.

It must be remembered that an ethical orientation

prevailed such that any disruption of Nature, including the
illness of the body,
the

was viewed as a failure of morals and

of good human relationships.
This context placed a high degree cf responsibility on

the doctor:
. . . the ancient Chinese physician functioned
not only as a healer of disease, but even more as
a moral guide who helped his patient to
acknowledge and rectify their infringements of
moral and natural laws.
Eeing a judge of man's
behavior as well as of his health presupposed a
high moral and ethical attitude on the part of the
early physician and a fairly well organized state
of the medical profession.
(Veith, 1973, p. 22)
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A similar expanding of responsibilities and function
can be constructed in ether areas.

For example# the

geomancer is not just siting a building in the immediate
terrain;

but# even though he might not have been aware of

it# he was working with all of the wholes which surround the
proposed building and had responsibility for the unity of
Nature and the human world.
the phrase:

This is the pga} implication of

"the underlying unity of knowledge and the human

being in traditional China."

THE PEOCESS OF QUESTIONING AS
THE SCUBCE OF UNITE
The unity of structure can be related as a product to
the questions that are asked.

I shall attempt to develop

this linkage in the case of Chinese medicine.

At the core

of each relationship examined was a guestion.

For example,

"What is humankind's relation to Nature?" Given an
alternative meaning to that of the West# I proceeded to
examine the consequences on experience and function as they
developed from this questioning.
However# in the consideration cf each relation# there
was absent an intermediate step— the mediating process of
questioning between the key guestion and the conseguences.
For example#

I discussed the general process of questioning

in which the question "What is humankind's relation to
Nature?" was given the meaning cf unity# and then I examined
the affect of this process on the experience and function of
a geomancer.

In this case# the intermediate relation— the

TAB L E

1

AN EXAMPLE OF TEE PEOCESS 01 QUESTIONING
IN TRAEITIONAL CHINESE MEDICINE

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

"At what time of day did the symptoms first
appear?"
"What was the p a t i e n t ’s mental state when the
illness was first noticed?"
"Were visitors present and what influence did
they have on him?"
"Have building operations been recently begun
near by?"
"Have there occurred cases of epidemic
disease in the vicinity?"
"Has there been unusual drought or damp, heat
or cold?"

(After Hume,

1975)
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questions that the geomancer asked— was not made explicit.
The difficulty in making this relation fully explicit
is that the actual guestions that the geomancer asked are
not readily available tc us.
anywhere*

As is the case with craftsmen

a craftsman can rarely make explicit in words the

basis of his activities.

This makes it extremely difficult

to construct the complete process of questioning.
However* there is cne area in which this condition does
not hold— Chinese medicine.

It seems tc be true among

doctors of both the Hast and West that a record be kept of
the questions asked of a patient.

By using these guestions

for the Chinese dcctor, I will attempt to construct the full
process of questioning.
In Table 1* Hume

(1975)

presents us with a look into

the character cf the process of questioning of a Chinese
doctor.

These would be the typical guestions that a doctor

called to an ill patient would ask.

As I inspect this

table* I find that some guestions are fairly universal.
example*

For

the first guestion— "At what time of day did the

symptoms first appear?”— is certainly a general guestion
that any doctor* East or West*

would ask.

The same analysis could be given in a lesser degree to
guestions five and six*

"Have there occurred cases of

epidemic disease in the vicinity?” and "Has there been
unusual drought or damp, heat cr cold?"

It is not difficult

to see that these guestions would be important to any
medical system which attempts to be effective.

Uhat is humankind's
relation to Nature?

The human world is
a microcosm of Nature

Have building oper
ations been
recently begun
near by7
Has there been unusual
drought or damp,
heat or cold?

Uhat is the
human being?

A human being
is a whole
within wholes

Uhat is a human being's
relation to others?

Uhat is a human being's
relation to self?

A human being is in
nexus of relationships

The human being's material
and non-material
aspects aro' unified

Pathology and
meteorology
connected

Uere visitors present
and what influence
did they have on him?

Uhat was the patient's
mental state when
illness was first
“
noticed?

Early development
of
psychosomatic
medicine

FIGURE 13
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THE DERIVATION OF THE QUESTIONING IN CHINESE MEDICINE
FROM THE ASSUMED CONTEXT OF UNITY
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The remaining questions, however, appear to be unusual
from a Western medical perspective, and some downright
bizarre.

Certainly,

guestion number two— "What was the

patient*s mental state when the illness was noticed?"— is
today, given the development cf psychosomatic medicine in
the West, a logical question tc ask.

Question number

three— "Were visitors present and what influence did they
have on him?"— it is certainly a mere unusual question but
not outright bizarre.

The Western mind can still comprehend

this question and the importance of asking it.

However,

with question number four— "Have building operations been
recently begun near by?"— we are propelled, at least by
Western standards,

into the bizarre.

Why should any doctor

ask if building operations had been undertaken in the area?
At this point, the process of questioning departs from
Western patterns.
In Figure 13, I have attempted to link this
intermediate process of questioning cf the doctor to the
general process of questioning.

Beginning with the

question, "Have building operations been recently begun near
by?", the question that provides the context for all
questioning is the guestion "What is the human being?"
Within the context of unity in traditional Chinese
knowledge, this question produces a meaning that the human
being was a whole within wholes.

In this context,

the

question "What is humankind’s relation to Nature?" acquires
the meaning that the human being is unified with Nature.

On
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the next level, guestions concerning this relation become
significant-

Consequently, the guestion "Have building

operations been recently begun near by?" becomes a mg^t
significsQt gugsiicn bgsajjgg

I&lSies lie £jja§£

fco

Macs'
In a similar fashion,
guestions-

I can derive the other two

The question "Were visiters present and what

influence did they have cn him?" is dependent on the unity
of the human being to others and is derived from the unitary
meaning of the question "What is the human b eing’s relation
to others?"

This context of questioning becomes a

significant question because the framework places importance
on the relation of the human being to others.
Finally, I can lock at the question concerning the
mental and physical.

This question becomes significant

because the mind and body were considered as related and
unified as a product of the meaning of the question "What is
the human b eing’s relaticn to the self?"
In this context, it is possible,

from this process of

questioning, to derive experience and function.

For

example, the question about building operations in the area,
relating the human being to Nature, becomes formalized in
medicine to the relating of pathological conditions to
meteorological changes in Nature.

In a similar manner,

guestions concerning the mental state cf the patient become
formalized into an early development of psychosomatic
medicine.
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In the above, I have taken the time to develop a
special case of the full process of questioning in Chinese
medicine.

If the questioning were equally available in

other areas,

at least tisSISiisallJ!# it would be possible to

generate a complete system for that area.

In principle, it

would be possible to generate an alternative system in the
West— given the assumption of divisibility— which would
account for the questioning and actions of the Western
doctor.
In either framework, the important conclusion of this
investigation is that the process of questioning derives its
character from the assumed context, and this process then
places limits on function and experience.
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OVERVIEW

The unity along the three dimensions of the human being
to Nature, to others, and to the self were themselves
unified tc produce one unity cf the Tap ,

it the center of

this hierarchy of wholes is the human being who has the
responsibility to maintain the unity of the other wholes,
beginning with self-cultivation.
This unified framework is the result of the Chinese
process of questioning.

The full linkage between the

assumption of unity and the assumed context, and the
conseguences on experience and function were developed
completely for the case of Chinese medicine.

The doctor’s

questioning was linked to the general process and to the
consequences in experience and function.

C H A P T E R IX

IMPLICATIONS FOB TEI ASSUMPTION OF AN INHEHENT
NATUfiE TO EUHAN BEINGS

My various meandetings into the philosophy of science
and into Chinese knowledge will now be applied to the
problem of challenging the assumption of an inherent nature
to human beings.

A CHALLENGE TO THE ASSUMPTION CF AN INHERENT
NATURE TO HUMAN BEINGS
Before the assumption can be challenged and shown to be
limited,

some statement should be made about what the

implications of this assumption are and how it is used
within the Western framework of knowledge.

Characteristics of the Assumption
The assumption really presents two arguments:

first,

that the human being has a nature which is inherent and has
some independence from the process by which this nature is
known;

secondly, it is assumed that this assumption can, ijj

•EEifiSlEle# be the basis for a universal and complete
framework of the human being.

I will examine these two

assertions in turn.
As noted in Chapter II, the assumption that the human
being has an inherent nature is a special case of the more
general assumption that the universe has an inherent nature
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that can be known.

This entire framework rests on the

assumption of division between the knower and the known.
For this framework to function, there must be an
independence between the knowing process and the object that
is known by this process.
In this context,

it becomes apparent why the findings

of quantum mechanics which,

in the early part of this

century tended to challenge this independence, are so
unnerving.

If the nature of light, for example, changes its

characteristics exclusively on the basis of the experimental
situations in which it is placed, this challenges the notion
that light has an inherent nature,

ifter all, it is this

inherent nature that is to serve as a self-corrective
mechanism whereby one's methods can be tested and knowledge
advanced.
I would maintain that an analogous situation is
presented in the case of an inherent nature of the human
being.

The nature of the process of questioning seems to

change the nature of the human being that comes to be known.
When one obtains contradictory results,

what is normally

brought into guestion is one's methods,

variables, and

theories, but not the question of whether or not the human
being has an inherent nature.

It is assumed that this

inherent nature will act as a corrective and allow the
selection of different methods and variables.
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The second argument is a derivation of the first.

It

is felt that the assumption of an inherent nature of the
human being can, is p^ip^ipje. become the basis for a
complete framework of tie human being.

The present failure

to have such a framework is flgt with the assumption of an
inherent nature, but with our current inability to elaborate
this framework fully.
To draw an analogy, if a ccin is tossed, it will
sometimes come up heads and sometimes tails.

This

observation seems tc challenge the assumption of determinism
whereby all events must have a defined cause.

Now, the

statistician can use the laws of probability to predict on
each toss the probability cf a head or a tail.

In

principle, however, this use cf probability is only an
immediate expedient due to our present ignorance of all
variables that affect the outcome cf the toss.

Thus, the

framework of determinism for the coin toss is at present
incomplete, but, in principle,

can be made complete if all

the knowledge cf the variables were available.
Now, returning to the assumption of an inherent nature
to human beings, the psychologist uses probability and
statistics to describe human behavior;

but, I would

suggest, this is only an immediate expedient, for,
BEiSSiElS*

when the inherent nature is completely known,

when all the variables are available, the prediction will be
complete and there will nc longer be need for statistics.
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Within this analysis*

the present incompleteness of the

framework is a function of the incomplete articulation of
the framework and does not establish the inadequacy of the
framework itself.

In general* then* when the inherent

nature of the human being is kncwn* there will be a complete
framework based on this nature.

The Challenge of the Results
I would suggest that the results of the method
challenge both arguments.

In respect to the first argument*

the results suggest the relation between the process of
questioning and the nature of the human being that is known.
In detail* the results indicate that the 5 §m§ questions
placed in alternative assumed contexts* defining alternative
processes of questioning, have material consequences for the
nature of the human being that comes to be known.

There is

a link between the process of questioning and the nature of
the human being.
In this manner* the results challenge the independence
of human nature frcm the process of knowing through which it
is viewed.

If this is the case* how can that which we

experience as being fixed and structured
••inherent")

(perceived to be

in human beings be understood?

Much of the

force of the assumption results frcm looking at the human
being through a singular process of questioning.

It is only

in the context of alternatives that the full impact of this
encapsulation beccmes apparent.
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Let me take seme examples and develop them using the
results of the method.

It will be recalled in the above, I

placed the guestion "What is the human being?" in the
alternative contexts of the West and traditional China.

The

same guestion generated different meanings: in traditional
China, the human being was experienced as a whole in unity
with Nature and with other human beings.

In the following

sections, I developed the implications of this process of
questioning for experience and function.
As the first example,

the results can now be used to

challenge the notion prevalent among some philosophers of
the West that loneliness is inherent to the human condition.
One must ask, "Is loneliness inherent in human nature or is
it intrinsic to the Western process cf questioning?"
way of looking at

One

things is that the assumption of

divisibility generates a process of questioning

in

the West

which produces an experience and function of human beings
which places them

in isolation from others.

If we

same questions in

the context of the assumption of

ask the
unity, an

alternative process of questioning is generated which leads
to an experience and function of the human being in relation
to others.

Given this parallel development of the two

processes of questioning, the loneliness of the human being
in the West is less a product of the nature of the human
condition and more the product of viewing the human being
from a singular process of questioning.
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Hsu

(1970), for example,

has come tc about the same

conclusion about the universality of loneliness.

He writes

that Westerners seem to assume that loneliness is essential
to the human condition, but, when this assertion is placed
in the context of the alternative system of the traditional
Chinese,

it is found net to be essential to the human being

at all:
The central theme cf Wolfe's voluminous writings
('Which of us is net forever a stranger and
alone?') is to be found with varying degrees of
emphasis throughout Western literature, though it
has become most explicit in contemporary American
writing . . ..
These writers all appear to assume
that this is the human tragedy— that is, the
condition of all mankind.
In Chinese literature
the one kind cf loneliness is that which occurs
when lovers, or families are separated.
There is
absolutely no expression cf the idea that
"alcneness" is the ssssatial condition of man or
of struggling youth.
(p. 87)
Another example can be drawn from alternative
conceptions cf the relation cf human beings to Nature.
the Western framework,

In

it is often assumed that there is

inherent in human nature the need to explore and investigate
one's environment.

The human being is given the license to

explore even the hidden places cf Nature, for it “is often
assumed that in these places great discoveries are to be
made which will advance human knowledge.
context,

In the Western

this function toward Nature is almost the

quintessence of what it means to be "human."
Contrast this ^’inherent" characteristic of human nature
with the function cf the Taoist and Confucian toward Nature.
For the Taoist, the human being was unified with Nature,
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while for the Confucian human society, net Nature,
central concern;

in either case,

the exploration

was the

of

the

universe that surrounds was negatively valued and there was
little inquisitiveness about the sources of knowledge hidden
in remote areas of the world.
It will be recalled that the Confucian was embedded in
a web of human relationships and responsibilities.

For the

Confucian to journey from this womb to a far corner of the
world, let alone the stars,
the civilized world itself.

was considered a banishment from
Bauer

(1976) writes of the

Confucian evaluation of the concept cf a "journey":
While it is true that the "journey" could evoke
the welcome assumption of an official position in
the provinces or, at a later time, the adventure
of the state examinations in the capital, distant
journeys, particulaxly tc uncivilized areas, let
alone to foreign countries, suggested war, exile,
removal from office, or even flight.
Not only
movement itself, but also the encounter with the
other,, the new, which is cf the very essence of a
journey, was profoundly disquieting to
Confucianism.
The exhortation: 'Stay at home and
earn an honest living," could easily have been
formulated by Confucians.
(p. 181)
Given this context, it is difficult for me to imagine a
Confucian looking skyward on a starry night with positive
feelings about a journey to those distant worlds.

Yet in

the West, we find such aspirations the very destiny of
humankind.
Taoists, in many cases without the encumbrance of
Confucian family responsibilities,
distant mountain to become hermits.

would often journey to a
Yet, this journey was

less an exploration of Nature than it was a removal to a
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distant place where one could acre fully appreciate a
communion with the T§g.

As the 332 32

explains, the

sage did not have to discover the secrets of Nature through
any journey at alls
One may know the world without going out of doors.
One may see the Hay of Heaven without locking
through the windows.
The further one goes, the less cne knows.
Therefore the sage knows without going about.
Understands without seeing,
And accomplishes without any action.
(Chan, 1963, p. 162)
While not everyone could hcpe to attain sagehood, the
Taoists also provided an image of the ideal society based on
the above principles,

lao Tze describes this community:

Let there be a small ccuntry with few people.
Let there be ten times and a hundred times as many
utensils
But let them not be used.
Let the people value their lives highly and not
migrate far.
Even if there are ships and carriages, none will
ride in them.
Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will
display them.
Let the people again knct cords and use them (in
place of writing).
Let them relish their food, beautify their
clothing, be content with their homes, and
delight in their customs.
Though neighboring communities overlook one
another and the crowing cf cocks and
barking of dogs can be heard.
Yet the people there may grow old and die without
ever visiting one another.
(Chan, 1963, p. 175)
It is difficult for me tc find in either of these traditions
a reflection of inherent qualities in human nature to
explore and discover the secrets of Nature.
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I could present several ether instances from the
results of the method tc show where an "inherent" aspect of
human nature in the West becomes less "inherent" when
compared to the experience and function of the human being
in traditional China.

In short, it is

®asy to infer

some aspect to be inherent in the human being when one
approaches human nature exclusively from a singular process
of questioning.
In respect to the second argument,

the results suggest

a relational character cf knowledge about human beings.

The

process of questioning and the human nature that results are
inextricably intertwined.

Building a complete framework on

an assumption of an inherent nature would appear to require
that this relational quality be collapsed or at least
accounted for by some variables inherent in human nature.
It is difficult for me to see how any configuration of
variables can ever, in principle, approximate this
relational process.

It has been my feeling from the

beginning of this inquiry in Chapter I that the current
incompleteness of the framework of the human being is not
the result of the current levels of articulation of this
framework, but lies in the assumptions and structure of the
framework itself,

fit last, I can give this statement more

substance.
The results of the method place me in a dilemma.

On

one hand, I need the current framework based on the
assumption of an inherent nature within which to function.
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and* on the other hand*

I also recognize the limitations of

the very same framework.

This dilemma appears to me to be

analogous to the dilemma of the quantum physicists in the
early part of this century-

Hhat was reguired was a

complete reformulation of the theories about the nature of
the universe and a reversal of seme well established
principles.

At least for me* the results suggest the need

for a similar reformulation of theories about human nature.
Before I suggest the bread outlines of what this
reformulation could be* it would be best to deal with some
of the alternative interpretatiens of the results short of a
reformulation.

ALTERNATIVE INTEEFB1IAIICNS OF THE RESULTS
If I may further extend the analogy with guantum
mechanics* even given the experimental evidence* some
physicists have not taken the position that a complete
theoretical reformulation is necessary.
Heisenberg,

Unlike Bohr and

these physicists held out hope that variables

will be discovered which will be able tc explain the current
anomalous findings.

They have become advocates of a "hidden

variable" solution.

A similar position could be taken in

respect to the results of my method.

The Hidden Variable Solution
In the case cf gcantum theory,

Bohm

(1957)

has

suggested that the relation between knowledge and the nature
of guanta can be understood in classical terms by the

308

postulation of hidden variables which would again establish
the laws of causality.

In an analogous manner, the critics

of my interpretation could postulate hidden variables yet to
be discovered which would invalidate the relational
qualities of guestions and the knowledge of human beings,
and reassert the framework based on the assumption of an
inherent nature.

Of course, such a discovery of variables

would also invalidate my arguments against the completeness
of the framework based upon this assumption..
As guantum physicists were guick to point out in the
case of B o h m ’s postulaticn of "hidden variables," the burden
of proof is clearly with advocates of this position.

In an

analogous manner, the burden of proof is on those who would
assert "hidden variables" inherent in the nature of human
beings which would explain the results.
It is difficult to speculate abcut what these hidden
variables could be, but it is net difficult to identify the
dimensions along which they may be contained.

The only

variables that readily present themselves are variables of
the organism, environmental variables,
of the two.

or some combination

I will now examine some examples of ways of

accomplishing this.
One could account for the differences between China and
the West in terms of physiological or anatomical variables.
Ornstein's thesis

(1972)

could be extended for this purpose.

It is asserted that different hemispheres of the brain have
different functions.

The characteristics of Western
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function suggest a dominance of the left hemisphere with its
emphasis on logic and analysis,

while the holistic and

relational characteristics of Chinese knowledge could be the
result of right hemisphere dominance.
Along the dimension of environmental variables, one
could account for the differences in the two frameworks in
terms of geographical or climatic conditions.

Fung

(1966)

suggests that the differences lie in the geographical
structure of the two land areas.

The Greeks were living in

a maritime country which depended on trade over the oceans.
The Chinese,

on the ether hand, were a continental people

engaging primarily in farming.

Each of these conditions can

be related to the characteristics of the social structure
and to the nature of knowledge in each system.
Perhaps the most elaborate and comprehensive
consideration of such matters is the work of Wittfogel
(1957).

He tries to derive the characteristics of the

Chinese framework frcm the environmentally induced need to
manage water for farming purposes.

China becomes,

in his

view, an "hydraulic" society which has elaborated a social
system to deal with this one environmental imperative.
The major problem with any of these variables or
combination of variables is that they seem so shallow and
superficial when one examines the depth of differences
between the two systems.

It is difficult to see how any

combination of variables can account for the full diversity
of the two frameworks.

Again, I always have the feeling of

310

trying to approximate a holistic process from the context of
discrete elements a task that would appear to be extremely
difficult.

The Cultural Solution
By far the simplest and most direct alternative
interpretation of the results would be to the use the
concept of "culture" as an explanatory principle.

The

differences that I have generated in human nature between
the West and traditional China could be explained as simply
a difference in culture.

The results could be quickly

dismissed as trivial, the obvious assertion made that the
two systems are different cultural areas and, therefore,
should produce different human beings.
The first impression that such a solution leaves with
me is similar to the impression that the concept of instinct
leaves with many biologists.

Culture seems to explain

everything and yet explains nothing.

Just on these grounds,

the concept of culture could be questioned-

However, there

is a deeper reservation which rests upon the fact that
culture is a Western construct.
Kroeber and Kluckhchn

(1952),

in their classic

investigation into the concept of culture including well
over one hundred definitions and meanings,
to provide a broad definition themselves,

while reluctant
do conclude with

the assertion that culture is a "logical construct" within
knowledge.

The social scientist uses this construct, as

other scientists use their constructs, to explain phenomena.
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Thus, culture must be grouped with ether constructs used in
the Western framework:
Culture is a general category of nature, and
expressly of human nature.
As such it is
comparable to categories like energy, mass,
evolution.
As a general category it is both
substantive (or classificatory) and explanatory.
(Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952, p. 185)
It can be seen from this guotation how deeply embedded in
the Western framework the concept of "culture" is.

Culture

becomes something objective, a product of the known, as the
concept of mass is to the physicist.
The concept is dependent on the Western framework.
example,

For

the assumption of divisibility is made such that it

is possible for human beings to be separated from ether
human beings.

It assumes that isolated pockets of humanity

can exist which can develop their own culture standing in
opposition to other cultures.

The experience of Chapter VI

has provided the possibility of a different perspective on
this assumption.

Within the context of unity in traditional

China, civilization or culture was always singular in
meaning.

For the Chinese there was only one

which focused on the "One

civilization

Man," the Son of Heaven, who had

the responsibility for interfacing all humankind with
Nature.

There was no place in this framework for the

Western concept of different cultures.
It is difficult to see how the concept of culture,
dependent

as it is on the Western framework, can be a

subsuming

construct which would explain both

frameworks.

There is always the irresistible tendency for most
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Westerners,

in dealing with China,

tc simply extend the

Western framework to beccme the general framework subsuming
the Chinese as a special case.

I hcpe that this inguiry has

indicated the full alternative character of the Chinese
framework and the limitations of an approach which attempts
to expand Western constiucts tc encompass this system.

IH SIftECH OF CBIGIBS
If I am pressed further and reguired to account for the
differences, I would speculate about the possible source of
the differences as they are generated not from a complex
interaction of variables cr from explanatory constructs,

but

as they develop from the process of guestioning itself.

It

must be stressed that the material tc be presented is
speculation,

net historical fact.

This speculation is

presented at the Western reguest tc know the first causes of
things, a thirst which the Chinese mind seldom shared.
The contemporary aspects of Western knowledge have
their roots, not in contemporary conditions, but in the
underlying conceptual framework upon which these conditions
rest.

This underlying framework predates modern times.

In

the discussion in Chapter II, I suggested that the
contemporary process of guestioning within Western knowledge
does not differ in essentials from the process of
guestioning of the Greek philosophers.

I further suggested

that the basis for this process of guestioning could be
found to develop from the assumptions made by the
pre-Socratic philosophers.
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Specifically, these philosophers assumed a certain
divisibility between the knower and the world to be known,
and a divisibility within the world itself between
appearance and substance.

The origins of the process of

guestioning and the assumption for this process can be
traced to the early centuries of the development of Hestern
knowledge.

Tc paraphrase Whitehead, all of Western

knowledge is but a footnote to the framework which was
formulated in its essential structure by the Greeks.
It would seem that a search for origins would best
begin with this process of guestioning as it developed from
this formative period.

The period surrounding the 5th

century B.C. was a remarkable time in the history of
humankind.

It was a time of philosophical ferment not only

in the major areas of Greece and China,

but also in the

other pockets of civilization in Iran, Israel,

and India.

It was from this boiling cauldron of conflicting ideas that
the basic foundations of each framework developed.
If we examine this period in Ancient Greece,
a conflict of ideas.

we discern

On one side I find the beginnings of

what was to be the Western framework of knowledge.

With the

Eleatic school of philosophers, Parmenides and his follower
Zeno, one finds the beginnings of an explicit articulation
of Western thought— -a clear division between change and
permanence, and with this, the development of a logic to
support this position.

At the basis of this was the

assumption that the world has a permanent stuff to be known.
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There was a dissenting voice, a philosopher who
embraced change over permanence.

Heraclitus, called by many

the “obscure," perhaps because his position departed so
drastically from that of his contemporaries,

rejected the

dualistic premise of a division between permanence and
change and asserted that what was fundamental was not a
“stuff,"

but a process

(Warner,

1963).

Change itself was

considered to be the permanence of the world.

In the

philosophy of Heraclitus, I find the beginnings of a system
which begins to look very much like that of the Chinese.
Capra (1975)

carries this comparison further by calling

Heraclitus, the "Greek Taoist"

(p. 116).

He sees in the

philosophy of Heraclitus the same emphasis on change and
cycles of change as is found in the philosophy of Lao Tze.
If we examine the same period in China, one is
presented with a similar and parallel conflict of ideas.
Again,

one can discern one group of thinkers who became

representative of the Chinese framework and a dissenting
group, followers of the philosopher flo Ti
school that he founded,

flohism.

(Ho Tse)

and the

What is remarkable is that

this system appears to most scholars as almost Western in
its characteristics.
For example. Ho Ti was the only Chinese who could be
said to have founded a religion in the Western sense of the
word (Shih,

1963).

This religion had many characteristics

which ran parallel to Christianity.

Abegg

(1952)

writes of

Mo Ti: "By comparison with the doctrines and philosophies of
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life which have prevailed in China fcr centuries. Ho Ti with
his intellectual affinities with the West strikes us as
distinctly un-Chinese."

(p. 227)

I can only briefly touch upon the philosophy of this
school.

For a more complete consideration the reader is

directed to Mei

(1934).

aided by the closely related school

called the logicians. Ho Ti advocated a "proto-Western"
position which included such novelties,

by Chinese

standards, as the experimental investigation of Nature and
the development of logic.

In this latter case, one finds

the spontaneous development of logical paradoxes which are
quite similar to the these suggested by Zeno, indicating the
development of thought along Western lines.*
As with the philosophy of Heraclitus in Greece, the
philosophy of Ho Ti was against the dominant current of the
framework— in this case, the traditions of Taoism and
Confucianism,

one could then build a full parallelism in

both civilizations;

the budding unity of Heraclitus vs.

dominant divisibility of the Eleatics,
unity of the Confucians and Taoists

the

and in China> the

vs. the budding

divisibility of the Hohists and the logicians,.

Given this

setting, it is possible that any particular characteristic

*For further information on this remarkable parallel
development, see Shih (1963, p. 120) and Needham (1956,
pp. 194-5).
Needham (1956) writes on this
correspondences "Zeno's floruit was -450;
the Chinese
paradoxes must have been under discussion about -320.
I
find it very hard to believe in any transmission or
influence at such a time.
It would not be unnatural that
the paradoxical form should arise spontaneously at that
particular stage of thought, but the temporal coincidence
remains remarkable."
(p. 190)
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of either civilization could have developed.

For example,

we tend to view science as a product of Western
civilization.

However, the seed was present at this period

in China as well.

Needham

(1956)

observes:

When one puts together the resemblances of the
early Taoists to the pre-Sccratics, and those of
the Hohists and Logicians to the Eleatics and
Peripatetics, and moreover, when one takes into
account the enormous gaps known to exist in the
ranks of the ancient Chinese writings which have
come down to us, one is left with the impression
that there was little to choose between ancient
European and ancient Chinese philosophy so far as
the foundations of scientific thought were
concerned* and, indeed, that in ceitain respects
the advantage lay with the Chinese,
(p. 203)
At this time, both civilizations were at a point of balance
requiring a small deflection tc alter the course of their
future development.
The factor that has provided for alternative processes
of guestioning and has given each civilization its character
is, in my opinion,

the alternative resolution, in Greece and

ancient China, of these parallel conflicts of ideas.

In the

West, the views of Parmenides have predominated over those
of Heraclitus.
resolution.

In traditional China, I find the alternative

The wcrk cf the Mchists and Logicians became

completely suppressed by the dominant Ccnfucian persuasion.
So complete was this suppression, according to Abegg

(1952),

that "there is no mention cf his name [Mo Ti] in any
chronicle, or in any of the innumerable and voluminous
Chinese histories."

(p. 227)
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Alas, the Western thirst for causes is never fully
quenched!

One would ask what the cause for this alternative

resolution of ideas was?

Unfortunately, such problems must

be left with the historians of this remarkable period to
resolve.
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OVEBVIEN
The results challenge two assertions made by the
assumption that human beings have an inherent nature.

Much

of what has been assumed to be inherent in human nature is a
function of viewing the human being from a singular process
of guestioning.

A framework based on this assumption is

limited in its ability tc deal with the relational aspects
of the process of guestioning and the human function and
experience which result.
The attempt tc explain the differences between China
and the West via traditional arguments cf hidden variables,
and using the concept of "culture," were found to be
inadequate.

It was suggested that the differences could be

traced to an alternative resolution of a parallel conflict
of ideas early in the development cf each civilization.

CBAPTEB X

GENEBATING AND APPLYING AN ALTEBNATIVE
ASSUMED CONTEXT

To this point in this inguiry*

I have concentrated

primarily on the negative aspects of the results as they
apply to the p s y c h o l o g i s t ’s framework of the human being and
specifically to challenging the assumption that human beings
have an inherent nature that can be known.

I would like to

concentrate now on the positive implications of the results*
as these results suggest an alternative assumed context for
guestioning about human beings,.

AN ALTEBNATIVE ASSUMED CONTEXT AS A GENEBAL PBCCESS
The differences between China and the west have been
the major focus of the discussion.

However* the method has

not only highlighted differences but alsc similarities
between the two frameworks.

These similarities can become

the basis for generating a more general process which views
China and the Nest as special cases.

Tha General Process
In the last chapter* the analysis of the results
concentrated on the differences between knowledge and the
nature of the human being in traditional China and the Nest.
If we now ask the guestion* "What similarities have been
generated by the method?"* the results can be made to assume
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a different aspect and serve a different purpose.
In the Rest, the results suggest that the assumed
context of Western knowledge provided the basis for a
process of guestioning about human beings and in turn
affected human function and experience.

In a parallel

manner, the assumed context of traditional China affected
human function and experience with alternative conseguences.
I find in both areas the identity of one process, a basic
similarity.

From this perspective, both traditional China

and the west can be viewed as special cases of the general
process whereby the guestions asked
guestioning)

(i. e., the process of

act in a pronounced fashion on the perception

of human experience and function

(i.e., human nature).

It is not necessary to construct an alternative assumed
context,

for the method has generated such an alternative

through its very function.

At the heart of this alternative

assumed context is the assumption that huja§n figure is a
£ auction of the process o£ gge^tj.onipg through which it is
This assumption can form the basis for an
alternative assumed context of guestioning.
Within the special case of the Western assumed context,
guestions which relate to what the inherent nature of human
beings may be are given central importance.
focus,

From this

the guestions that one asks derive as indicated in

Chapter II.

within the assumed context here being

suggested, the guestions we ask about human beings and the
human nature we desire to have ideally become the focal
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guestions from which all other guestions derive.
If human nature is not inherent in human beings and is
related to the guestions we ask, we take the responsibility
for the process of guestioning and the human nature that
results.

I must again recall the insightful comment made by

the guantum physicist Heisenberg that "tie must remember that
what we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to
our methods of guestioning."

(Heisenberg,

1958, p. ,81)

If I

may extend Heisenberg*s comment, what we observe of human
beings is not human nature but human nature exposed to our
process of guestioning.

This latter phrase is the defining

condition for an alternative assumption and context.
I am not the first, nor, I hope, the last, to suggest
the importance of this relation in the study of human
nature.

For example,

in education,

a very similar proposal

is advanced by Postman and tieingartner

(1969)

in respect to

the current views about students in the teaching situation.
They write: "He have to remember that what we observe
children doing in schccls is not what they a r e , but children
exposed to us by cur methods of teaching."

(p. 80)

Similar

realizations cculd no dcubt be produced from other areas.

Integrating the Specific Process in the General
At this point, one would ask what is to become of the
sizable commitment to the traditional assumed context and
all of the information produced from this process of
guestioning.

If one truncates the general process to one

dimension, all of the aspects of the Western process of
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guestioning can be generated.

Within this special case,

there is no difference between the two.

However, the

alternative does have other dimensions of guestioning which
are not available in the special case.
this point:

We have a choice at

one can truncate the process of guestioning and

limit the guestions that will be asked about human nature,
or one can expand this process cf guesticning to ask
guestions that are not usually asked and indeed make one
uncomfortable.

This choice has implications for everyone

and for the guestions that the psychologist asks in
particular.
The pragmatic results of this alternative mode of
inguiry for the psychologist can be realized most directly
by the guestions that are asked,

fls noted above, the

psychologist is basically asking cnly specific refinements
of one guestion,

"What is the human being?", a guestion that

has its source in the Western assumed context.
of this,

as Dubin

(1969)

The result

has recognized, is that

"psychologists seem to be afraid to ask really important
guestions."

(p. 277)

This is not a criticism of

psychologists as much as it is a criticism of the assumed
context in which psychologists are forced to work, a context
which assigns the guestions that are to be answered.
The result is that, as Dubin concludes,

the

psychologist is channeled into one process of guestioning,
and this process cf guestioning guickly degenerates into a
highly specific mode of guesticning largely dependent on the
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methodology which is currently available:
Thus# it seems to me that we all are far too eager
to ask guestions as *what can be ea^i^y answered?*
'What else can I dc with my test?* 'What aspects
of behavior can I study with my computer or with
my apparatus?* or what problems can I find that I
can fit this method to?
(p. 277)
In short#

within the current assumed context, the

process of inquiry is subservient to the process of
guestioning#

with the latter being a sacred process which

itself is free from criticism;

while within the

alternative, tie process of inguiry is directed toward the
process of guestioning and has as its purpose the criticism
of the guestions we ask and an active manipulation of these
guestions-

The choice is really between having control over

this process or continuing to work within the process
without being able tc explore its full potentials and being
limited to only one dimension.

APPLICATION TO TEE PBOBLEM
The alternative just presented can serve as a solution
to the problem which initiated this inguiry-

It will be

recalled that the problem was defined in Chapter I as the
limitation of psychology*s framework to encompass human
potentials-

I proceeded to illustrate the problem by

examining its two dimensions: the limitations of the
framework's capacity toward the potentials of others and
toward the potentials of human beings as knowers.

In both

instances# it was concluded that the attempt to encompass
human potentials completely within the traditional framework
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resulted in either a paradox of reflexivity or, more
acutely,

in an image of the human being without human

potentials.

Those aspects of the human being that ve

associate with being human become systematically excluded by
the framework.
The alternative framework just suggested has the
capacity to deal with both aspects of the problem.

Within

the alternative, the only limits placed on human potentials
are those imposed by the human being's own process of
guestioning.

likewise, the acute issue of incorporating the

knover and the known within the same framework is obviated,
for the alternative postulates a unified process which is
uniform and continuous for both the knower and the human
being who is known.

I will new examine the implications of

the alternative alcng each of these dimensions.

The Alternative and the Potentials of Others
The traditional psychological framework has a limited
capacity for encompassing human potentials because these
potentials must be contained within the dimensions of
something inherent in human nature.

The alternative

framework of the human being obviates the problem by viewing
human beings as constructing their own potentials within
their process of guestioning, the only limit being that they
remain within seme process of guesticning.
Since human potentials are linked tc something inherent
in human nature within the Western framework, these
potentials are viewed as being intrinsic to this nature.
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The human being,

in final analysis,

an elaborate manikin.

becomes something inert,

As I have tried to suggest in the

preceding chapters, the human being is engaged in a progess
more profound and active than this view would indicate.
Within the traditional framework,

the purpose is to discover

what this inert, intrinsic structure is, resulting in
recourse to ever more complex models of what this manikin
may be in an attempt to close the gap with observed human
potentials.
In Chapter I, I presented seme cf the difficulties
involved in such a program;

but these difficulties have not

impeded the search which has produced a mosaic of possible
models.

Here are but a few:

Han is a telephone exchange, a servomechanism, a
binary digital computer, a reward-seeking vector,
a hyphen between S and B process, a stimulationmaximizer, a food, sex or libido energy converter,
a ’utilities* maximizing game player, a status
seeker, a mutual egc-titillatcr, a mutual
emotional (or actual) masturbator, a hollow cocoon
seeking ecstasy through the liguidation of its
boundaries in the company of other cocoons
similarly seeking ecstasy,.
(Koch, 1974, p. 6)
One could,

of course, add to Koch's list.

However, as

the list is expanded and one includes more and more
increasingly elaborate models cf human nature, the goal of
encompassing human potentials, instead of approaching
realization,

seems, as with attempt to reach absolute zero,

to recede at an even faster pace and seems even more beyond
one's grasp.

I attempted in Chapter I to illustrate that

the problem of human potentials cannot be solved in an
additive manner by simply combining different variables and
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models in an eclectic manner.

The problem lies with the

assumption upon which the framework is based and is
intrinsic to the structure of the current framework.
The alternative obviates the problem of encompassing
the potentials of ethers by viewing human beings as
constructing their own potentials through their process of
guestioning.

It is hoped that this inguiry has established

that at the heart cf human nature is a process, a process in
which human beings construct themselves.

Since human beings

construct their own potentials from this process and the
human being can alter the flow cf this process through the
questions asked and the assumed context in which they are
asked, a framework based on this assumption has the capacity
for almost infinite variation in human potentials.

The only

limitation imposed on human potentials within the
alternative is that the human being must remain within somg
process of questioning.

In short, the major point of

departure for the alternative is the conviction that the
human being's potential is to alter human potential.
The alternative,

cf course, frees the knower from

forever looking for some secret to human nature, from the
search for the model that "fits," and which will account for
all human potentials.

I would submit that the human being

has no secret nature to be discovered, for this nature is
the same as that of the knower.
from a process of guestioning.

One constructs knowledge
This discussion brings us

full circle to a consideration of the other dimension of the
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problem— the potentials of the human being as a knower.

The Alternative and the Potentials of the Knower
I elaborated at length, in Chapter I, the separation
between the human being as a kncwer and the human being that
is known.

I quoted Gouldner

(1970)

as saying that they are

thought to compose two breeds cf men.

On the one hand, we

have the human being as a knower displaying one process of
knowing,

characterized by rationality and autonomous action.

On the other hand, we have the human being as known
displaying yet another process,
and determinism.

characterized by motivation

The current framework,

then, confronts us

with alternative processes for the two categories of human
beings and, consequently, different orders of potentials.
The problems centering around reflexivity, turning one
process back upon the otter,

defined the paradoxes of this

approach most acutely.
This situation is quite analogous to the role of the
observer in the Newtonian universe.

Within this framework,

the observer was tc exist in a God-like framework of
absolutes separated from the universe being observed.

The

revolution of relativity has removed the human being from
such a privileged status, and has brought the observer into
the world being observed.

In an analogous manner,

playing

upon the assumed divisibility that underlies Western
knowledge everywhere,

the psychologist,

the social

scientist, and, ultimately, the Western knower are assumed
to be in a privileged position in respect to other human
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beings.

The main thrust of this inguiry has been an assault

on this aloofness.
The point where the alternative challenges this course
of events is, at its heart, the assumption that there are
two processes, that the knower has different potentials from
the human being who is known.

Within the alternative

framework, I am suggesting, the two processes are collapsed
into one process.
process:

In both cases, there is the unity of one

as knower or known, the psychologist or scientist

constructs knowledge from assumptions and guestions giving
definition tc a process of guestioning.

This process then

affects o n e ‘s experience and function.
It follows that human beings as kncwers or as the known
have the s§me potentials, being limited only by the
guestions they ask and the assumed context in which they are
asked.

Psychologists as knowers have all the limitations

and potentials of other human beings they are attempting to
know.

APPLICATION TO AN ABEA OF PSYCHOLOGY
The core of the alternative framework here suggested,
in direct application tc what a psychologist does, is that
psychologists are constructing human nature by the guestions
they ask about human beings and the situations in which the
psychologist places human beings.

Tc apply the alternative

to an area of psychology would entail presenting evidence
that psychologists are becoming aware of this relation.
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From the very beginning cf this inguiry,

it was

necessary, in order to define the problem, to examine the
total psychological framework beyond the limits of the
customary boundary conditions between areas of psychology
and between psychclcgy and other disciplines.

It was only

within this perspective of the total field and, in many
cases, the extrapolation cf the current levels of
articulation tc ideal levels cf development, that any
experience of the problem could be generated.
Now, as I attempt tc apply the results of this inguiry
to a specific area of psychology, I am confronted with the
inverse of the problem.

The results apply to the total

framework and are not limited to the domain of one specific
area of psychology.

For example,

it is difficult to see the

effects of the construction of human nature in the area of
the physiology of perception in, say, experiments on retinal
gradients.

Yet, the guestions being asked by this

experimenter are in fact derivable from the general process
of guestioning within the larger framework of psychology.
The problem is that as one fragments the framework into
smaller and smaller components and sub-disciplines, one also
tends to obscure the relationships that are so central to
the alternative that I am suggesting.

This situation makes

it extremely difficult tc examine the theories and data of
one area of psychology and immediately apply the alternative
in a meaningful fashion.
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With these difficulties and limitations firmly in mind,
I will attempt to apply the alternative to social
psychology.

This field is a particularly fertile one for

dealing with these relationships because the subject of
study is the relatively complex aspects of human behavior
and involves the effects of one perscn on another.
A major conclusion of this inguiry was the realization
that investigations into human nature are relational and
reflexive activities which involve both the knower and the
known.

Approaching from an experimental and empirical

direction on this issue, some psychologists are beginning to
assert that psychological research is a relational and
reflexive activity.

Gadlin and Ingle

(1975)

have suggested

that psychological research should be considered in this
light even though this view runs counter to the current
S§i£a§i§t:
Conducting research means entering into
relationships with people, and these relationships
significantly affect the outcome of the research.
Our present methodology prescribes these
relationships as impersonal ones, leads us to
minimize the effects of ‘personal* factors, turns
our attention away from a consideration of the
relationships, and facilitates treating our
subjects as objects.
Alternatively, we are
suggesting that there is no way in which human
research cannot be relational and that
psychological methodology must attend to the
relational quality of research;
this is the
beginning of reflexivity.
(Gadlin and Ingle,
1975, p. 1008)
They go on to expand this notion of reflexivity to
viewing both the psychologist and the human subject as
contained within one process and subject to the same
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process:
Additionally, reflexivity can be created by
acknowledging that the study of human behavior
necessarily includes the behavior of
psychologists.
This recognition implies, of
course, that the psychologist is as prone to
psychological processes as anyone else and should
be especially self-ccnsciccs of this fact when
acting as a scientist.
(Gadlin and Ingle, 1975,
p. 1008)
These statements are remarkably close to the spirit of the
alternative framework for psychology that I have suggested.
As a conseguence of the relational and reflexive
structure of psychological research,

the psychologist, and

the social psychologist in particular, may be viewed as
constructing a human nature that one's subjects then
internalize,

and which the social psychologist then

validates empirically as human nature.
limiting

what human nature can be.

In this way, one is

fmpirj.gal validation

dges fio£ m§afi that something i§ inherent ip human na ture,
aalz ifeat a c§£+ain ££§ult is
m§aas of apppopgh.

Argyris

(1975)

a £££££&&££
gives the following

example:
For example, if students read textbooks that
purport tc describe human nature and if these
textbooks include dissonance and attribution
theories, then the psychological processes that
compose these theories may form the basis for the
model of man implicit in these theories.
Ne are
told in these tests that human beings strive to
reduce post decisional dissonance or freguently
make attributions cf others.
The student reading
these generalizations may understandably come to
conceive of human nature as including dissonance
mechanisms and attribution activities.
Such an
inference would be supported empirically.
But it
does not follow that dissonance reduction and
attribution are part of human nature in the same
sense that 1/2 gt2 is part of the physical
universe.
The latter is hypothesized to

characterize an essential quality of the physical
universe.
The former can be shown to be an
artifact# a convention that can be altered Xt
other concepts of human nature are developed.
(pp. 473-74)
One can see an application of the major structural
elements of the alternative framework of human nature in
these comments.
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OVERVIEW
The resalts of the method generate an alternative
assumed context fox guestioning which encompasses the
Western and the Chinese frameworks as special cases.

The

alternative assumes that human nature is a function of the
process of questioning frcm which it is viewed.
This alternative was used as a solution to the problem
of encompassing human potentials.

The only limit placed on

human potentials withir the alternative is that one must
remain within some process of guestioning..

The knower and

the known become viewed as being within the same process and
as having the same potentials.
The alternative was applied to a field within
psychology.

Psychologists, notably social psychologists,

have expressed views about reflexivity and the construction
of human nature which are congruent with those of the
alternative suggested.

FUTUEE PEESPECTIVES

As I look back upon the distance that this inguiry has
covered# the speculations that have been made# the expanding
of some principles beyond the limits to which they are
normally taken and the placing cf factual elements into#
sometimes# quite obscure contexts# I ask myself#

"For what

reason has this inguiry teen undertaken?"
I can only answer for myself.

To me this inguiry makes

a positive statement about the responsibilities of the
knower as a psychologist and as a human being.

As a knower#

I must assume the responsibility for my nature and that of
others beyond just discovering what that nature is.
This inguiry would imply that if we so focus and limit
the questions that we ask about ourselves and others#

we can

come to discover and validate § theory of what human beings
are and what we ourselves are.

It is possible to do this#

and this is a fair description of what is currently
happening in Western knowledge.
This is currently being dene# but should it be done?
This inguiry suggests that we have a choice.

The

psychologist can expand the guestions that are asked and the
resultant human nature that can be ccnstructed and
experienced.

When one asks guestions about what human

nature is, one will discover what is contained within one's
guestioning#

which in turn limits what the human being can
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be.
The

key to approaching

what can be is the recognition

that the

limits of what the

human being can be are not given

by something inherent in human beings, but in their process
of questioning and in our process of questioning when we
view that nature.

This inquiry has attempted to show that

at this point in time the Western process of questioning is
quite invariant.

There is one assumption and one central

question from which the structure of the ques-tioning
derives.

The total effect is a dominance of the notion that

human beings have an inherent nature that is to be known.
The

Only place in the contemporary world where I can

find an example of the wide scale attempt to construct human
nature in an alternative manner is in the People*s Republic
of China.

It is my experience and that of many others who

have visited China in the last few years that there is a
concerted effort in that society to remake human nature.

If

one is to accept at face value what one reads, gone is the
assumption that certain characteristics such as intelligence
and creativity are inherent in some individuals and not
others.

Working on such principles of the mutability of

human nature, this country has,

since the revolution,

transformed an entire society.
As one examines this construction of a new human being
in contemporary China, one begins to ask different
questions, questions about the questions that we ask about
human beings in this society, and guestions about what
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guestions the Chinese themselves are asking.

William Hinton

writes of this challenge:
What can one say about a society that really takes
seriously the idea that everyone has untapped
potential, that everyone can be creative, that
intelligence is not fixed, that human nature can
be transformed?
What can we make of the idea that
creativity is not a private matter— a guestion of
this or that individual genius doing his or her
own thing— but arises from cooperation, from
combining the intelligence and efforts of many?
Or, for that matter, of the idea that education
should teach people to think;
that exams should
test o n e ’s ability to think, or, even the
collective ability of a group to think;
that
discipline is rooted in a voluntary commitment to
decisions and rules that are comprehended and
agreed upon?
And how can we deal with the idea
that education should be ccmbined with productive
labor while productive labor everywhere should
generate education— every school a factory, every
factory a school— with the further implication
that education should never stop and that no one
is too old to learn?
(Gamberg, 1977, p. x i i i ) .
It is always tempting for the Westerner to regard
contemporary China as a resolution to Western problems.
While the Chinese must be applauded for the enormous changes
in human nature that have been produced since 1949, these
changes themselves have keen generated from and limited by a
Marxist view of the human being which views human nature as
a function of social and economic conditions and not as a
function of the boundary conditions cf o n e ’s process of
guestioning.

It was this Marxist ideal cf the human being

which has acted as the guiding force for this tranformation.
As Uao said in pre-revoluticnary days in Yenan:
Is there such a thing as human nature?
Of course
there is.
But there is cnly human nature in the
concrete, no human nature in the abstract.
In
class society there is only human nature of a
class character;
there is no human nature above
classes.
We uphold the human nature of the
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proletariat and of the masses of the people* while
the landlords and bourgeois classes uphold the
human nature of their own classes* only they do
not say so but make it out to be the only human
nature in existence.
(Mac Tse-Tung, 1967, p. 90)
Much of the transformation that has been possible in China
was the result of this relationship where social conditions
were changed and a new humac nature constructed.
One must ask if this is the only ideal which has the
potential to guide the construction of a new human nature.
The Marxist view of the human being places certain boundary
conditions on the guesticns that can be asked and limits the
human nature that can be constructed.
If this inquiry stands for one thing.* it stands for the
principle that there must net be any preset boundary
conditions for the guestions asked about human nature.

It

is only within such an open process cf questioning that the
full potentials of the human being can hope to be realized.

APPENDIX

LEIBNIZ AND CHINESE KNOWLEDGE

The philosophy of Leibniz stands out among other
Western philosophies as being in many ways unique and
reminds one cf how a Chinese thinker would construct his
world more than of the way a Western thinker does.

This has

suggested to me that Leibniz may have been stimulated to
develop such ncn-Western ideas from contacts with Chinese
knowledge.

Since the work of Leibniz is central to much of

the work of the later European philosophers, it could be
speculated that,

via Leibniz, there was a major infusion of

Chinese concepts into Western knowledge, or more precisely,
an infusion of the Chinese framework of unity info the
Western framework of divisibility.

The following all too

brief consideration of this speculation attempts to follow
this intuition.
There can be no question, in my opinion, that
Leibnizian philosophy is fettered to the Western framework
of divisibility and its attendant philosophical problems
which derive from this assumed context of questioning.
Leibniz was very much interested in the traditional problems
of Western philosophy that the assumption of division
presents— the relation of God to the human world and the
relation of mind to body.

As Carr
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(1960)

has recognized.

339

these two divisions were interrelated for Leibniz such that
in the mind-body relation he found in miniature the
God-world relation.

Leibniz hoped that by solving the

mind-body problem a general metaphysic could be produced
that would solve all problems concerning reality.
While the purpose and problem for Leibniz were defined
by the Western framework, his approach to these problems was
quite unorthodox by Western standards.

Leibniz suggested a

radical redefinition of the idea of a substratum to the
world,

abandoning the traditional Western notion of a static

substratum in favor of an active subject

(Carr, 1960),.

This

radical reformulation of the concept of substance is
essential to an understanding cf his concept of the monad.
Using this as a basis, Leibniz obviates many of the
oppositions in thought and suggests an alternative which
subsumes the dualisms.

For example, his doctrine of

"pre-established harmcny" obviates and subsumes the
opposition of the causation theory and the doctrine of
occasionalism in relating God to the world.
All of this tends to suggest that Leibniz,

while

definitely working within a Western framework, has generated
unique solutions which one finds difficult to derive from
completely Western sources.
non-Western,
thought.

This tends to point to a

possibly Chinese, source of influence on his

I am certainly not the first to see in Leibnizian

ideas, not the divisions of the West, but the unity
characteristic of Chinese knowledge.

For example, Eeichwein
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(1967) writes:
The doctrine of a *pre-established harmony* has
its Chinese counterpart in the
s£ IfeS Worlfl.
Leibniz believes, like the Chinese sages, in the
world of reality as a Onity, as a continuously
rising scale of spiritual beings developing
progressively.
(p. 79)
There is some historical evidence to support the
assertion that throughout his life Leibniz was very involved
with "things Chinese," Lach

(1945)

indicates that at an

early age Leibniz was guite familiar with Chinese materials
that were being conveyed to Europe from China by Jesuit
missionaries,

fts time went on, Leibniz became very involved

in the controversy raging in Europe concerning the
interpretation of Confucian rites within Catholic theology.
The stimulus of China was present.

The real guestion is the

degree to which the ideas of his philosophy were a direct
result of this Chinese stimulus and to what degree his ideas
were independently developed.
Hughes

(1943)

writes Th at with the one exception of the

existence of Gcd, the position of Leibniz would be in almost
complete agreement with that cf a Nec-Confucianist.

He

suggests the thesis that Leibniz was to a great degree
absorbing the Chinese materials presented to him by the
Jesuits.

He writes:

The natural inference, and I think, within limits
the right one, is that the Chinese influence went
very deep in him [Leibniz], deeper than he knew,
since the spirit of the man was such that he
gladly and easily accepted what he read in the
Jesuit books.
(p. 20)
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Mungello

(1971), on the other hand, asserts the

somewhat opposing view that the Chinese influence was less
important in the development of his ideas and that Leibniz
only sought confirmation of his ideas in Chinese thought,
Mungello writes that "confirmation,

not derivation, of his

key principles seems to have been what Leibniz sought in
China."

(p. 20)

It is beyond the scope of the present inquiry to
consider this issue further.

He can conclude, however, that

beyond the historical problems involved in evaluating the
particular weight of Chinese knowledge in the development of
the philosophy of Leibniz, there was an infusion of
Chinese-like thought into European philosophy at that time.
The degree to which his unigue contribution was developed
independently or as a result cf the Chinese stimulus may
forever remain a moot point.
Needham

(1956) suggests the interesting thesis that

Leibnizian philosophy was instrumental in disseminating the
Chinese

philosophy of organism into European thought.

It

was this philosophy which was central to the collapse of the
monopoly of the tarren mechanistic
thought.

philosophy in European

Hith this collapse, new theoretical heights of

science and philosophy were possible.

The development of

the organic philosophy necessary for these theoretical
triumphs can he traced, according to Needham, to Leibniz
and, ultimately, to the Sung Neo-Confucianists.
The great triumphs of early 'modern* natural
science were possible on the assumption of a
mechanical universe— perhaps this was

He writes:
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indispensible for them— but the time was to come
when the growth of knowledge necessitated the
adoption of a mere organic philosophy no less
naturalistic than atomic materialism.
That was
the time cf Darwin, Frazer, Pasteur, Freud,
Spemann, Planck and Einstein.
When it came, a
line of philosophical thinkers was found to have
prepared the way— from Whitehead back to Engels
and Hegel, from Hegel to leibniz— and then perhaps
the inspiration was.not European at all.
Perhaps,
the theoretical foundations of the most modern
•European* natural sciences owe more to men such
as Chuang Chou, Chou Tun-I and Chu Hsi than the
world has yet realized.
(Needham, 1956, p. 505)
This is a very interesting line of thought along which
there has been little in the way of systematic scholarship.
I have long felt that many of the theoretical developments
of the West could not have been executed from only the
Western framework of divisibility.

The Chinese framework,

on the other hand, with its assumption of unity, provides a
certain freedom which cannot be found in the Western
framework.
It is indeed an intriguing thought that perhaps Western
theoretical triumphs have their source not with the
pre-Socratics, nor with Plato or Aristotle,
Taoists,
China.

but with the

Confucians, and Sung Neo-Confucians of traditional
It is at once a humbling and gratifying thought

which tends to indicate the unity of world knowldge.
While we are at this point in the currents of world
knowledge, I cannot hesitate tc make yet a further
speculation concerning the contemporary world.

It is an

enticing thought that perhaps, in the guise of Marxism,

the

Western modified traditional Chinese framework has again
returned to China.

Maoism, as it derives from the work of

3U3

Harx and Engles#

would seem to enter at this point on the

chain developed above.
made to Peyrefitte

It is revealing to a note a comment

(1977).

He guotes one Chinese communist

theorist as saying# "Besearch may in time show that in fact
aarx borrowed from China.

He took it straight from Hegel,

and Hegel— along with Fichte and Schelling—
derived it from Asiatic thought."

seems to have

(p. 56)

The feeling that this discussion leaves with me is
similar to that which I have cften had when viewing a huge
machine.

Hany times# I can see the relation between

different moving parts, of piston to rod, but the final
purpose of the machine remains a mystery.
assumption is that world knowledge#
cross-currents, is evolving#

A comforting

through these

generating its dynamism from

the continued cross-fertilization between China and the
West.
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